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Citizenship, understood as the legal relationship between a person and a state, is a key 
concept in contemporary political theory. Over the last two decades, there has been a 
resurgence of scholarship on citizenship. A substantial part of this re-emerged body of 
literature is dedicated to the role of citizenship in a globalised and privatised world 
(Dauvergne, 2007, pp. 490-491). Scholarly debates on transnational and participatory 
citizenship and post-national forms of membership have triggered a theoretical and 
empirical discussion on the extent to which traditional conceptions and practices of 
citizenship remain relevant (Jacobsen, 1996; Sassen, 1996). The process of citizenship 
becoming ‘denationalised’ or ‘deterritorialised’ is often portrayed as part of a growing 
tension between globalisation and the nation-state, where the latter is losing ground to 
the former (Bosniak, 2000; Soysal, 1994; Tan, 2017). Examples include the partial 
denationalisation of territory, the transfer of some components of state-sovereignty to 
supranational institutions and entities, the extension of traditional citizenship rights to 
resident non-citizens, cross-border flows and regulation of capital and goods, modern 
telecommunications, and transnational communities. However, an examination of 
political debates and citizenship law suggests that state-centric citizenship, and the 
rights and duties it entails, continues to be highly relevant. Politicians and legislators 
emphasize the importance of citizenship for identity, loyalty and security, for instance 
by problematizing dual citizenship in the context of war and holding public office. States 
increasingly attempt to retain or re-establish ties with emigrants by granting them 
various socio-economic and socio-cultural benefits, and providing facilitated pathways 
to naturalisation (Joppke, 2003). Citizenship policies continue to transform, as policy 
makers put in place a variety of civic and linguistic integration requirements to 
reinvigorate the meaning of citizenship, and ensure commitment to common values 
and practices (Goodman, 2014). These examples serve to illustrate that while 
relationships and communities may supersede national boundaries, citizenship is still 
the subject of contention. If anything, processes of globalisation have reinvigorated the 
discussion on the scope, meaning, and criteria of membership to the nation (Orgad, 
2017). This raises the question whether access to and holding citizenship still matters. 
Formally speaking, the answer is convincingly illustrated by considering those 
without citizenship. Lack of any citizenship status, or statelessness, is a very practical 
obstacle to international mobility, access to public services and labour market 
opportunities in countries around the world (Blitz & Lynch, 2011; Bosniak, 2017). 
Without trivializing the problem of statelessness, a second dichotomy exists between 
individuals who possess the citizenship of the country in which they reside, and those 
who only hold another nationality. Being a citizen theoretically implies full equality of 
rights and standing in a particular political community. Conversely, individuals who do 
not possess the host country citizenship are not full members of the polity, and thus do 
not enjoy the rights and entitlements that are associated exclusively with citizenship. 
While formal benefits differ between citizenship regimes, non-citizens generally require 
permission to enter and reside on state territory, and have conditioned access to labour 
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markets and social systems.1 In spite of anti-discrimination law harbouring rights for 
citizens and non-citizens alike, employers, mortgage officers, public servants and 
residents may in practice still treat fellow citizens favourably, with more respect, or 
more seriously. Furthermore, the limited electoral power of non-citizens disincentives 
political parties, unions and other advocacy groups to invest in their plight. Moreover, 
limited means for mobilisation and political change may hamper the development of a 
sense of identification and solidarity with the political community. Lack of self-
empowerment and the means to enact change may also factor into non-citizens’ social 
and psychological well-being. For all of the above reasons, naturalisation carries the 
promise of a better life that is more equal, free, just and prosperous. However, from an 
empirical perspective, citizenship does not deliver on its promise. Migrants2 as such 
suffer from taste-based and statistical discrimination by employers and lenders 
(Aalbers, 2007; Blommaert, Coenders, & van Tubergen, 2014; Ross & Tootell, 2004; 
Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016), but naturalised migrants still perform worse than natives in 
the labour and housing market (Enchautegui & Giannarelli, 2015; OECD, 2011), and are 
more likely to be socially excluded (Hutcheson & Jeffers, 2013). Even though naturalised 
migrants are constituents of the political community, individuals with a migrant 
background are underrepresented in legislatures of established electoral democracies 
(Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2009). Furthermore, ethnic minorities continue to have a higher 
probability of incarceration, regardless of citizenship status (Light, Massoglia, & King, 
2014). In that context, citizenship is a hollow promise; a theoretical notion that has no 
substantive weight in practice.  
From such a pessimistic perspective, the valorisation of citizenship based on its 
theoretical ideal may be construed as a veiled attempt by states to ignore socially 
generated inequality, by presenting vulnerable migrant groups with an explanation for 
their disadvantaged position, and the false hope of a better tomorrow. However, the 
important observation that substantively citizenship does not meet its theoretical ideal 
does not necessarily imply that it does nothing. While inequalities based on origin, 
religion, education and class are not washed away by naturalisation, citizenship may 
have the potential to mitigate them, and function as a tool for upward mobility of 
immigrants (Bloemraad, 2017, p. 546). Acquisition of the host country citizenship may 
improve labour market access and stimulate wage growth (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir, 
2002; Helgertz, Bevelander, & Tegunimitaka, 2014; Steinhardt, 2012), increase political 
participation and civic engagement (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Pietrantuono, 2015) 
and foster social integration (Bloemraad & Wright, 2014; Hainmueller, Hangertner, & 
                                                                
1 Note that membership of political communities is in practice more complex, as membership boundaries are 
blurred by quasi-citizens, understood as individuals who possess some rights and duties associated with full 
membership while not being recognised as citizens, and semi-citizens, who possess formal citizenship but lack 
particular rights and duties that are typically associated with the status (Bauböck, 2017; Cohen, 2009; Smith, 
2017). This thesis does not distinguish between these intermediate forms of membership. 
2 In this thesis, ‘migrant’, ‘immigrant’ and ‘individual with a migrant background’ are used interchangeably. 
Emigrants are always referred to as such. 
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Pietrantuono, 2016; Manning & Roy, 2010; Maxwell & Bleich, 2014). Yet research on 
the outcomes of naturalisation – also known as the citizenship premium – is far from 
conclusive on whether citizenship matters for the integration of immigrants.  
Aim of the thesis: the central research question 
In this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on the question of the relevance of 
citizenship by analysing legal status transitions and related socio-economic outcomes 
among first generation immigrants.3 I start with the question of immigrant 
naturalisation, and which personal and contextual characteristics factor into this 
decision. In contrast to most of the literature, I simultaneously analyse the relevance of 
citizenship policies, and how the institutional context conditions the propensity and 
ability to naturalise of different migrant groups. Subsequently, the importance of access 
to and holding citizenship is addressed by analysing socio-economic outcomes of 
naturalisation. First, I explore the relevance of citizenship for labour market access of 
immigrants by analysing whether naturalisation improves the probability of 
employment. Furthermore, I focus not only on whether citizenship matters, but 
particularly to whom and under which conditions this is the case by performing 
separate analyses for different migrant groups, and through a detailed comparison of 
the labour market performance of immigrants before and after naturalisation. Next, the 
socio-economic outcomes of naturalisation are examined in greater detail by analysing 
income from labour, and the extent to which citizenship acquisition provides access to 
better (i.e. higher paying) jobs, increases working hours, and facilitates mobility 
between labour market sectors. Finally, I go beyond the exclusive focus in the literature 
on labour market indicators of socio-economic integration by analysing the relevance of 
citizenship in the housing market. More specifically, I investigate whether naturalisation 
improves the probability of homeownership, and which migrant groups benefit from 
citizenship most. To answer these questions, I focus on the Dutch context, and make 
use of individual-level administrative data from Statistics Netherlands. Immigrant 
integration and naturalisation has been the subject of fierce political debate in the 
Netherlands over the last decades (Entzinger, 2003). This is reflected in substantial 
variation in citizenship policies and naturalisation rates over time (van Oers, 2014). As 
such, the case of the Netherlands allows for a comparative analysis of the relevance of 
transforming institutional conditions for immigrants’ propensity and ability to 
naturalise. Furthermore, the use of register data offers important advantages in terms 
of population coverage and data validity, as well as methodological opportunities to 
address omitted variable bias and causality issues. Details regarding the specific 
                                                                
3 In this thesis, I focus on first generation immigrants, understood as foreign-born individuals of whom both 
parents are born abroad, because second and later generations can attain citizenship by descent or through 
facilitated procedures. Indeed, literature suggests that the decision to naturalise fundamentally differs 
between immigrant generations (Bauböck et al., 2013; Dronkers & Vink, 2012). 
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advantages of the Dutch case and the use of administrative data in the context of this 
dissertation are discussed below. More generally, the aim of the thesis is to answer the 
following central research question: what are the determinants of citizenship 
acquisition, and what is the relevance of naturalisation for the socio-economic 
integration of first generation immigrants in the Netherlands? 
From a societal perspective, this thesis aims to contribute to effective, targeted 
policy making in the field of naturalisation and socio-economic integration of 
immigrants. Although there is a large field of literature that has analysed the effects of 
citizenship in the labour market (e.g. OECD, 2011), these studies focus almost 
exclusively on the question whether citizenship matters or not. Such research is of 
limited use for policy makers, because there is substantial heterogeneity in citizenship 
regimes and pathways to citizenship. For example, migrants may acquire citizenship 
early or late in the settlement process, and at different stages of their life course. 
Citizenship policies differ between countries and over time, and may not matter equally 
to all migrant groups. This thesis specifically analyses to whom and under which 
conditions citizenship matters, providing policy makers with a more detailed 
understanding of the outcomes of citizenship policies for particular migrant groups, and 
offering evidence-based suggestions on how to facilitate settlement success of 
immigrants. 
A life course approach to naturalisation and socio-economic integration of 
immigrants 
Research on the labour market outcomes of naturalisation is an established field of 
literature that dates back to the late seventies, and originated in the United States 
(Chiswick, 1978). In light of the structural disadvantages of immigrants in the labour 
market (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010), scholars have theorized that 
citizenship may facilitate integration by removing legal obstacles to labour market 
access and reducing administrative costs in the hiring process (Bauböck et al., 2013; 
OECD, 2011). Furthermore, employers may assume that possession of the host country 
citizenship reflects positive characteristics such as commitment and motivation. 
Citizenship may thus function as a signalling device that placates feelings of risk 
associated with hiring a foreign-born individual. More recently, North-American studies 
have been replicated in the European context (e.g. Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; 
Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011; Fougère & Safi, 2009; Helgertz et al., 2014; Steinhardt, 
2012). Although the analytical models have developed over time, almost all of these 
studies share the same underlying goal: to identify whether a citizenship premium exists 
or not. Yet after numerous studies across a range of countries, this remains an open 
question. Citizenship acquisition confers individual rights and lifts legal obstacles to 
participation, but it is not so clear whether naturalisation also stimulates socio-
economic integration. Empirical findings paint an ambiguous picture that frequently, yet 
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inconsistently, reveals a citizenship premium (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 343). Most of the 
literature has explored methodological explanations for this empirical ambiguity. 
Citizenship acquisition is an inherently selective process, and recent studies increasingly 
make use of individual-level panel data to disentangle the direction of the association 
between citizenship and integration. Empirical findings clearly show that this is 
important, as the relevance of citizenship acquisition reduces substantially when 
controlling for selection into naturalisation (Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 197; Engdahl, 
2014, p. 23; Steinhardt, 2012, p. 818). However, self-selection does not explain the 
inconsistent findings between studies. Remarkably, this persistent ambiguity is often 
taken as a challenge to the overall relevance of citizenship for the integration of 
immigrants. The result is a polarised field of literature, featuring scholars who 
theoretically and empirically argue either for or against the existence of a citizenship 
premium. 
I approach this puzzle by developing a more complex understanding of the 
theoretical mechanisms underlying naturalisation and its associated outcomes. The 
literature predominantly attempts to identify whether a citizenship premium exists or 
not, but this implies a universal effect. Instead, I argue that the more important question 
is to whom and under which conditions citizenship matters (Bloemraad, 2017, p. 544). 
Migrants have different motivations to naturalise, and the legal and financial obstacles to 
naturalisation differ between host countries, change over time, and may not be equally 
relevant to all migrant groups. This raises the question whether variation in the pathways 
to citizenship – fast or slow, under liberal or restrictive conditions, the list goes on – 
matters for related outcomes. Furthermore, how do naturalisation decisions take shape 
in the broader social context of family, friends and communities (Helgertz & Bevelander, 
2016; Street, 2014)? Since the established mechanisms in the literature provide limited 
guidance to answer these questions, I introduce new theoretical concepts to the state-
of-the-art, drawing on the sociological life course paradigm (Elder, 1974). This approach 
is increasingly used in migration studies (Wingens, Valk, Windzio, & Aybek, 2011) but so 
far not in the field of citizenship. Life course research puts emphasis on the way in which 
human lives are embedded in the social and institutional context in which they take 
place, and conceptualises human development through strings of life events. The 
underlying notion is that there is a temporal dynamic to these events, where the 
interaction between skills and resources on the one hand, and opportunities and 
ambitions on the other hand, promote or stifle subsequent events. Most of the literature 
on the citizenship premium focusses either on the contextual level, by comparatively 
analysing destination countries in terms of citizenship policies and migration history, or 
the individual level, by focusing on personal incentives for naturalisation and associated 
outcomes. However, one of the central ideas of the life course paradigm is that 
contextual structures shape biographical plans and developments. As such, a complex 
understanding of immigrant naturalisation and socio-economic integration should be 
based on the interrelatedness of societal structures and institutions on the one hand, 
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and the micro-foundations of naturalisation decisions on the other hand. In other words, 
immigrants’ plans and ambitions for the future are evaluated in light of transforming 
institutional opportunity structures. Since the value and meaning of citizenship differs 
between migrant groups, and restrictive citizenship policies likely constitute a bigger 
hurdle for some migrants than for others, the interrelated nature of membership 
regulations and individual incentives for naturalisation may explain why some migrants 
acquire the host country citizenship and benefit from naturalisation, while others do not. 
This thesis poses the central idea that the decision to naturalise and related outcomes 
need to be understood from the perspective of interrelated immigrant biographies 
embedded in transforming institutional structures. In Chapter 2, the application of this 
life course approach to immigrant naturalisation and the citizenship premium is outlined 
and discussed in detail. 
Context: the Netherlands 
In this dissertation, I focus on the case of the Netherlands. On January 1, 2011, the 
Netherlands numbered 16.7 million registered residents, of which 3.4 million had a 
migrant background. While mostly a country of net-immigration, the number of 
immigrants arriving in the Netherlands has fluctuated over the last decades. Between 
1999 and 2011, immigration to the Netherlands shows a curvilinear pattern, varying 
between more than 92,000 individuals in 1999, less than 71,000 in 2005, and around 
132,000 in 2011. The gradual drop in the number of immigrants from 2001 onwards is 
likely the result of policy changes regarding the (economic) requirements for family 
reunification (Jennissen, pp. 38-39). The subsequent rise in migration figures is mostly 
due to economic migrants from Romania and Bulgaria (which became part of the EU in 
2007), as well as an increase in economic migration from Southern European countries 
– most notably Spain – which suffered particularly high unemployment rates during the 
financial crisis. On average, around 99,000 first generation immigrants migrated to the 
Netherlands per year between 1999 and 2011. As a result, the percentage of first 
generation immigrants residing in the Netherlands has increased, from 8.8 percent of 
the Dutch population in 1999, to 10.4 percent in 2011. Moreover, while the migrant 
population of the Netherlands has grown in volume, it has particularly increased in 
diversity. Whereas the Netherlands only numbered 110 nationalities in 1998, this has 
increased to more than 200 in 2015. This reflects a broader trend of migration flows 
from an increasingly diverse array of non-European countries concentrating on a 
shrinking pool of destination countries (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). As immigration has 
played a prominent role in the Netherlands over the last decades, so too has the 
political debate regarding the integration and naturalisation of immigrants. 
Since 1985, when the first Dutch Nationality Act was introduced, the role of 
citizenship for the integration of immigrants has been the subject of contention in 
Dutch politics (Entzinger, 2003). This is apparent in the gradual shift from a ‘thin’ 
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minorities policy, aimed at preserving immigrants’ identities, to a full-fledged 
integration policy with formally tested civic and linguistic integration requirements. 
Under the former ideology, access to citizenship was relatively liberal, reflecting the 
notion of naturalisation as a stepping stone for integration (van Oers, 2014, p. 36-38). 
This perspective to immigrant integration was heavily influenced by the advice of the 
Scientific Council for Governmental Policy, urging the Dutch government not to make 
naturalisation more difficult than necessary (Heijs, 1995). The underlying notion was to 
reinforce the legal position of immigrants through naturalisation, thereby facilitating 
their participation and integration. To that end, the Council recommended allowing dual 
citizenship, which would be particularly interesting to the substantial number of Turkish 
migrants in the Netherlands, who could only give up their Turkish citizenship after 
completing their military service (Groenendijk & Heijs, 2001). In 1991, the Dutch 
government, consisting of the Christian Democratic CDA and the Social Democratic 
PVDA, decided on a compromise. The CDA withdrew their objections to dual citizenship, 
and the PVDA gave up their plans to extend voting rights at the national level to non-
Dutch residents of the Netherlands. Consequently, in the memorandum ‘Multiple 
citizenship and voting rights for aliens’, the government proposed to abolish the 
renunciation requirement, a decision which was implemented by statuary discretion 
and with consent of the Second Chamber in November 1991. Although dual citizenship 
was tolerated from that moment onwards, the bill was never formalised due to a shift in 
the integration debate in the early nineties. Around 1994, some political parties 
developed a more restrictive assimilationist view on naturalisation as the legal and 
emotional completion of the integration process (de Hart, 2004). Steps were taken 
towards more demanding criteria with the re-instalment of the renunciation 
requirement in 1997, and the introduction of a formal naturalisation test in 2003. This 
restrictive development of citizenship policies in the Netherlands is mirrored in the 
number of naturalisations during this period of time. Figure 1 reveals substantial 
variation in naturalisation rates, with a large decrease in 1997 and 2003. Researchers 
have theorized that the former drop may be explained by migrants anticipating the re-
introduction of the renunciation requirement, and the latter by the introduction of the 
naturalisation test (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk, 2013). However, these aggregate 
data do not allow for controls on compositional factors. As such, the extent to which 
the policy restrictions caused the number of naturalisations to decline remains unclear. 
More generally, we know very little about the role of citizenship policies for immigrants’ 
propensity to naturalise4, and how policy variation conditions the relevance of 
citizenship. In other words, does citizenship policy matter, and if so, to whom does it 
matter? In light of substantial variation in Dutch citizenship policy over time, the context 
of the Netherlands presents unique opportunities to explore these questions. 
                                                                
4 See Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013) for a cross-national analysis, and Helgertz et al. (2014) for a bi-
national comparison between Sweden and Denmark. 
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Figure 1.  Independent naturalisations in the Netherlands. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Data: the System of Social Statistical Datasets 
To analyse immigrant naturalisation and integration, I make use of register data from 
Statistics Netherlands. The use of administrative data is increasingly popular in social 
sciences. Traditionally, information on individuals and households is principally collected 
through surveys. But non-response rates (de Leeuw & de Heer, 2002)5 and the relatively 
high cost of surveys have animated some statistical offices to develop alternative forms 
of data collection.6 In the Netherlands, this resulted in the System of Social Statistical 
Datasets (SSD). The SSD is a linked system of centrally stored and standardized registers, 
covering a wide range of socio-economic and demographic characteristics (Bakker, van 
Rooijen, & van Toor, 2014). Using unique identification keys, these data can easily be 
linked to different units of observation, including individuals. To ensure the quality of the 
data and facilitate efficient use and secure storage, the SSD is embedded in an elaborate 
support system of organised processes, software tools and coordination principles. 
In the context of this thesis, register data have important advantages. First, while 
the development, collection and analysis of survey data presents multiple challenges 
(see Couper [2017] and Biemer et al. [2017] for a recent discussion), these issues are 
often amplified when researching ethnic minorities (Kappelhof, 2014, 2017). Lack of 
                                                                
5 Note that more recent analyses, which are yet to be published, suggest that the trends reported by de 
Leeuw and de Heer (2002) have continued over the years. 
6 For instance, the 2001 census in the Netherlands was produced on the basis of register data for the first 
time. While the costs of the traditional census were estimated around 300 million euros, the 2001 census cost 
approximately 3 million euros (Schulte Nordholt, Hartgers, & Gircour, 2004). 
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mastery of the native language among foreign-born individuals increases the chance of 
non-response and measurement errors (Font & Mendez, 2014, p. 16). Potential feelings 
of distrust and suspicion towards interviewers are likely stronger for those who have 
experienced racist attitudes, do not speak or understand the native language well, or 
originate from countries where talking to and confiding in researchers carries risk. 
Moreover, cultural differences and a potentially insecure legal status may make it hard 
to assess up front which topics will be sensitive or controversial for immigrants, and 
thus how valid the collected data will be. Furthermore, residential patterns of 
immigrants are less stable than natives, presenting researchers with a more limited 
window of opportunity for interviews at home. All these issues complicate the 
collection and analysis of survey data on immigrants, but are circumvented by the use 
register data. Almost all registered foreign-born individuals are represented in these 
data, which is particularly relevant in light of the increasingly diverse nature of the 
migrant population (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). Furthermore, the administrative character 
of these data solves some of the problems associated with non-response and social 
desirability. Second, to analyse naturalisation decisions and outcomes, panel data is 
crucial. Methodologically, a panel data structure provides opportunities to isolate 
selection bias resulting from endogenous characteristics that are difficult to measure 
and control for. Moreover, in terms of research design, the focus on one host-country 
(in this case, the Netherlands) implies that the relevance of the policy context can only 
be analysed longitudinally, by comparing time periods where different institutional 
conditions applied. Furthermore, to develop a complex understanding of the social 
context in which naturalisation decisions take place, it is important to be able to not 
only track individuals, but also their partners, over time. The Dutch register data in the 
SSD offer these opportunities.  
There are of course limitations to these data as well. For instance, in spite of its 
increasing popularity, little is known about the quality of administrative data. Some 
research has analysed this by linking survey data to register data, and using structural 
equation modelling to determine the indicator validity (Bakker, 2012). Although results 
suggest that the accuracy of administrative data is not substantially lower than survey 
data (and in some cases even better), there is not enough research to provide definitive 
conclusions on this matter (see Oberski, Kirchner, Eckman, and Kreuter [2017] for a 
recent discussion). Critical reflection on the plausibility of empirical findings in light of 
previous research based on non-register data is thus of key importance. Administrative 
data also raise questions regarding representation. Although the inclusive nature of 
register data is generally portrayed as one of its strongpoints, these data per definition 
do not include the non-registered or ‘illegal’ population. For target populations with 
substantial variation in legal status, such as immigrants, this can lead to selection bias. 
However, since legal residence is a formal requirement for naturalisation, 
undocumented migrants would have to be excluded even if the information was 
available. As such, the problem in the context of this thesis is not so much selection 
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bias, but rather that the relevance of the empirical findings does not extend to those 
who are not registered in the host country. Furthermore, administrative delays, both at 
the moment of arrival (migration) and permanent departure (emigration), can result in 
under-coverage and over-coverage respectively. In many cases however, administrative 
delays can be corrected over time (Bakker, 2011). Furthermore, the probability of 
administrative delays is lower if the accuracy of the variable in question matters to the 
reporter. As such, it is important to critically assess the quality of the data in light of its 
source, and repeatedly check the plausibility of the data by comparing the information 
to other registers. If one administrative source for instance suggests that a migrant has 
left the country, while another does not, this should prompt further scrutiny of both 
registers. Finally, the conceptual scope of administrative data is inherently limited, as 
there is typically no information on opinions, motivations or experiences. One solution 
would be to link register data to surveys with more specific information, but doing so 
will always constitute a trade-off between quantitative mass and conceptual reach. 
However, the literature on the citizenship premium predominantly focuses on basic 
administrative information such as legal status, employment, income, gender, age and 
marital status. These data are all available in register format. Notwithstanding its 
limitations, the SSD is therefore ideally suited for an analysis of the citizenship premium, 
and this thesis is the first to exploit it to that end. 
Empirical strategy 
Both naturalisation rates and associated integration outcomes are characterised by 
substantial heterogeneity. Some migrant groups have a higher propensity to naturalise 
than others, and not all migrants benefit equally (or at all) from citizenship acquisition in 
the labour market. However, unravelling the ambiguity regarding the relevance of 
citizenship for the socio-economic integration of immigrants presents methodological 
challenges (OECD, 2011). Studies in this field of literature typically focus on identifying 
the direction of the association between citizenship and labour market outcomes. Legal 
status transitions are not random, and migrants who naturalise may thus be positively 
selected with regard to their labour market performance already prior to naturalisation, 
as a result of endogenous characteristics such as motivation, skill and ability, which are 
associated with both the propensity (and ability) to naturalise and labour market 
outcomes. These characteristics are difficult to measure and control for, but failing to 
do so will result in an overestimation of the unique relevance of citizenship acquisition. 
In that context, the state-of-the-art methodology in this field of literature (developed by 
Bratsberg et al. [2002]) makes use of longitudinal data to disentangle selection effects 
from citizenship effects. Yet in spite of the methodological focus in the literature on the 
causal relationship between citizenship and integration outcomes, empirical 
heterogeneity between studies persists. The core question whether a citizenship 
premium exists or not thus remains unresolved. 
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While the importance of the development of the analytical models cannot be 
overstated, the theoretical foundation underlying these models has not received similar 
attention. More specifically, the literature has analysed the relevance of citizenship for 
integration outcomes largely in isolation of the pathway to citizenship. The effects of 
naturalisation are typically modelled as a binary before-after phenomenon. In other 
words, citizenship is expected to matter in the labour market after it is acquired. The 
assumption is that employers associate less risk with hiring a naturalised migrant 
compared to a non-naturalised counterpart. However, the focus on the acquisition of 
citizenship itself neglects the role of access to the status, and the way in which it is 
acquired. Citizenship acquisition is not merely a legal status transition, but also involves 
a preparatory process leading up to naturalisation. Migrants will have to invest in 
meeting the formal linguistic and civic requirements for naturalisation. Furthermore, 
the decision to naturalise often implies the intention to stay and build a life in the host 
country. As such, investing in host-country specific knowledge and skills is likely to pay 
off for these migrants. I therefore expect to observe positive outcomes of naturalisation 
already prior to citizenship acquisition (Bratsberg et al., 2002, p. 590). These effects are 
not the result of the legal status transition itself, but rather stem from the explicit life 
course decision to naturalise in the future, and the investments that are associated with 
that decision. Since any positive outcomes prior to naturalisation are typically 
considered inconsistent with the notion of a citizenship premium (Helgertz et al., 2014, 
p. 351), the analytical models in the literature are often not designed to analyse the 
years preceding naturalisation in detail. In other words, the citizenship premium is 
generally modelled and analysed as a transition (from non-citizen to citizen), while 
ignoring the process (where migrants prepare and invest in themselves leading up to 
naturalisation). The existence of an anticipation effect may thus explain the limited 
empirical support for a citizenship premium in the literature, as positive outcomes 
associated with the decision to naturalise in the future already manifest prior to 
naturalisation. Furthermore, institutional conditions likely play an important role in this 
anticipatory mechanism. In countries with liberal citizenship policies, where few 
demonstrable skills are a requirement for naturalisation (such as Sweden), we may not 
expect an anticipation effect, since migrants are not obliged to invest in their labour 
market potential in order to naturalise. But in countries with very restrictive 
requirements (for instance Denmark), we may similarly not expect an effect, as 
vulnerable migrant groups – who are highly interested in naturalisation and stand to 
benefit from citizenship most (Fougère & Safi, 2009; Vink et al., 2013) – do not have the 
resources to meet the formal requirements, and are demotivated to invest in its 
acquisition. In other words, the institutional context in which immigrants are 
embedded, and which stipulates the relative accessibility of citizenship, may matter for 
the socio-economic outcomes of naturalisation. In this thesis, I employ a more complex 
distributed fixed-effects model that goes beyond the dichotomous comparison before 
and after naturalisation. More specifically, this empirical strategy provides detailed 
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information about the years surrounding naturalisation, thus capturing potential 
positive integration outcomes leading up to citizenship acquisition, as migrants prepare 
for the formal requirements, and anticipate future benefits and rights associated with 
the status. 
It is well established that a cost-benefit framework is a good predictor of the 
propensity to naturalise (Yang, 1994). The motivation and ability to naturalise differs 
between migrant groups, depending on the origin context and personal characteristics 
(Chiswick & Miller, 2009). However, individual life courses are interconnected through a 
continuously transforming network of social relationships (Elder, 1994). From that 
perspective, I argue that the value and meaning of citizenship is also determined by the 
social context of the family, which has so far have received limited systematic 
attention.7 The decision to naturalise suggests the intention to stay and invest in 
building a life in the host country. This implies that naturalisation decisions are at least 
partly made at the family level. Yet the relevance of the family – for instance the spouse 
– is traditionally considered from a utilitarian rather than a social perspective, and 
analysed as an individual-level characteristic (e.g. married versus not married). Instead, I 
argue for a more dynamic understanding of the relevance of the family, for instance by 
analysing the timing of naturalisation relative to the spouse, and by accounting for the 
legal status of the partner. Since these characteristics change over the course of 
immigrant lives, it is crucial to employ a longitudinal empirical strategy that captures 
these temporal dynamics. For this reason, I analyse immigrant naturalisation using Cox 
Proportional Hazards regression with time dependent covariates. This methodology 
examines the relationship between the survival distribution and explanatory variables. 
In other words, it estimates the relevance of personal and contextual characteristics for 
the probability that a specific event (such as naturalisation) occurs. The benefit of this 
approach is twofold. First, Cox regression accounts for changes in characteristics within 
individuals over time, including partners and their legal status. Second, this strategy 
specifically addresses the causal nature of determinants of immigrant naturalisation, 
thus accounting for potential bias resulting from reverse causation. For the same 
reasons, this methodology is used to analyse the impact of legal status transitions on 
the probability of homeownership of immigrants. 
Outline of the dissertation 
The thesis is structured along five substantive chapters based on a combination of 
published and submitted research articles. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical 
innovation of the thesis. First, I outline the state-of-the-art literature on the citizenship 
premium, and identify the need for a more developed theoretical framework that may 
                                                                
7 See Bevelander and Helgertz (2016) and Street (2014) for a quantitative and qualitative exception 
respectively. 
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account for varying outcomes of naturalisation across countries and time. To that end, 
concepts and guiding principles of the sociological life course paradigm are introduced, 
which may provide a useful starting point. I then offer concrete suggestions on what an 
application of this life course approach to the literature on the citizenship premium would 
look like. In the subsequent chapters, this is put into practice by analysing immigrant 
naturalisation and related outcomes using Dutch register data from Statistics Netherlands. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse determinants of citizenship acquisition, with a specific focus on 
how naturalisation decisions are shaped by the social context of the family, and the 
institutional context of citizenship policies. Results confirm that a cost-benefit framework 
is a good predictor of citizenship acquisition. The propensity to naturalise is high among 
migrants with a native-born or naturalised partner, particularly during the year in which 
the partner acquires Dutch citizenship, suggesting that the decision to naturalise is at least 
partly made at the family level. Furthermore, the analyses show that the institutional 
context matters: restrictive citizenship policies decrease the propensity to naturalise, 
particularly among disadvantaged migrants from economically less developed and 
politically unstable countries of origin, who are interested in and stand to benefit from 
citizenship most. In the subsequent chapters, I focus on the importance of access to and 
holding citizenship. Chapter 4 analyses the relevance of citizenship for acquiring 
employment, and employs a distributed individual fixed-effects regression to not only 
analyse legal status transitions, but also the trajectory to citizenship. Empirical findings 
show that citizenship acquisition increases the probability of employment of immigrants. 
However, the positive labour market outcomes particularly manifest leading up to 
naturalisation, suggesting that migrants invest in their human capital development to 
meet the requirements for naturalisation, and in anticipation of the rewards and 
opportunities that citizenship will offer. The labour market outcomes observed in Chapter 
4 are explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, where the role of citizenship for immigrant 
earnings is addressed. While some migrants benefit from naturalisation in terms of 
income from labour, the positive effects are comparatively small, and generally limited to 
vulnerable migrant groups from less developed countries of origin, who face structural 
obstacles in the labour market. In so far as citizenship matters, it provides access to higher 
paying jobs and more working hours, but does not facilitate mobility between labour 
market sectors. Chapter 6 broadens the substantive scope of the thesis by investigating a 
citizenship premium in the housing market, specifically in terms of homeownership. 
Results show that naturalisation increases the probability of homeownership, but only for 
employed migrants, who likely meet the basic economic requirements for a credit in the 
housing market. Moreover, possession of the host country citizenship does not matter for 
migrants with a native-born partner. More generally, empirical findings suggest that legal 
status discrimination may be one of the underlying mechanisms behind the positive 
effects of naturalisation in the housing market. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a 
discussion of the main findings and their implications, and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Naturalisation and the Socio-Economic 
Integration of Immigrants8 
  
                                                                
8 This chapter has been published as: Peters, F., & Vink, M. (2016). Naturalization and the Socio-Economic 
Integration of Immigrants. In G. P. Freeman & N. Mirilovic (Eds.), Handbook on migration and social policy 
(362-376). Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. In 2017, the chapter received the Best Chapter Award by 
the Migration and Citizenship Section of the American Political Science Association. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is citizenship an important instrument for the socio-economic integration of immigrants 
into the host society, and if so, why do some immigrants naturalise while others do not? 
Although research on these questions dates back decades, the literature provides no 
straightforward answer. While most empirical evidence indeed suggests a positive 
relationship between citizenship and labour market integration, not all studies support 
these findings. For example, Bratsberg et al. (2002), Steinhardt (2012), and Helgertz et 
al. (2014) found evidence of a positive association between citizenship acquisition and 
labour market outcomes in the North American and European context. However, 
Chiswick (1978), Scott (2008) and Bevelander and Veenman (2008) found no such 
effect, or even a negative relationship. While this empirical incongruence hardly comes 
as a surprise, given the wide variation in empirical contexts, types of data and 
methodological designs that characterise studies in this area, much of the literature is 
preoccupied more with the question of whether there is ‘a’ citizenship premium, 
instead of the question to whom, and especially under which conditions citizenship 
matters for immigrants.  
In this chapter, we argue that the literature would benefit from a more 
comprehensive theoretical model that accounts for how immigrant naturalisation and 
socio-economic outcomes can be understood in light of variation in destination 
countries’ demographic composition and institutional setting (e.g. Bauböck et al., 2013; 
OECD, 2011). We draw especially on the sociological life course paradigm (Elder, 1974), 
where life course development is analysed as the product of personal characteristics 
and individual action as well as cultural frames and institutional conditions (Mayer, 
2009). A life course perspectives has been increasingly popular within migration studies 
(Wingens et al., 2011), yet so far under-utilized in naturalisation research. In our view of 
the state-of-the-art of the field, a life course perspective chimes well with research that 
demonstrates that the decision to naturalise is not solely the result of an individual 
deliberation, but rather made in the context of the family situation and broader social 
network in which immigrant lives are embedded (Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Street, 
2014). Comparative research has demonstrated that the decision to naturalise is 
contextualized by the institutional setting, especially the relative restrictiveness of the 
host country citizenship policy and origin/destination country dual citizenship policies 
(Vink et al., 2013). A more developed theoretical framework that accounts for these 
institutional and social aspects of naturalisation may reveal why certain immigrants 
naturalise and benefit from citizenship acquisition while others do not, thus providing 
potential to go beyond merely observing empirical ambiguity in the literature.  
Methodologically, a life course perspective also fits with the increasing use of 
longitudinal rather than cross-sectional data in order to deal with the frequently 
observed problem of self-selection in naturalisation research. More specifically, it could 
be argued that migrants who are better equipped to perform well in the labour market, 
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regardless of their legal status, are also more likely to naturalise. Research by for 
instance Scott (2008) and Engdahl (2011) shows that the positive association between 
naturalisation and labour market outcomes is largely attributable to endogeneity in 
Sweden. However, analyses by Steinhardt (2012) contradict these findings for Germany, 
revealing a substantial wage growth for male immigrants after naturalisation, even 
when controlling for self-selection. By emphasizing the way in which early life events 
promote or stifle subsequent events, and by acknowledging how biographical actions 
and plans are embedded in the social and institutional context in which these take 
place, a life course perspective may aid the development of a theoretical model that 
can account for both the institutional and social context of naturalisation and labour 
market outcomes.  
This chapter is structured in three parts. First, we review the state-of-the-art, both 
on immigrant naturalisation and the relationship between citizenship and labour market 
outcomes. The second part then introduces the sociological life course paradigm, 
outlining its key concepts and methodological principles. Third, we return to the state-
of-the-art to illustrate how a life course approach has the potential to go beyond the 
empirical ambiguity in the literature, differentiating between biographical and 
ecological aspects of immigrant naturalisation and labour market outcomes. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of this approach to future research on citizenship, and reflect 
on its limitations.  
LITERATURE ON NATURALISATION  
Traditionally, research on immigrant naturalisation has been strongly embedded in a 
broader literature on integration and adaptation processes of immigrants in the host 
society, both on a socio-economic and socio-cultural level (e.g. Barkan & Khokhlov, 
1980; Bernard, 1936; Beijbohm, 1971; Chiswick, 1978). In his seminal work, Yang (1994) 
introduces a cost–benefit model of subjective utility maximization, which constitutes 
the basis of the dominant theoretical framework on citizenship acquisition. In this utility 
model, benefits comprise political and socio-economic rights and privileges, while costs 
include the effort spent in an application process, the potential loss of the former 
nationality and the rights it offered, increased citizen obligations in the host country and 
potential financial expenses (Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Yang, 1994). 
The continued development of the literature has centred on identifying which 
elements play a role in this deliberation. One strand of research puts emphasis on the 
origin context and personal characteristics and the way in which these properties 
condition the perceived utility of citizenship acquisition. A lack of economic freedom, 
political security and low standards of living in the country of origin may discourage 
migrants to return. In these cases, citizenship of the host country offers security by 
providing unrestricted access to its territory. Research shows that these migrants 
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naturalise quickly and in large numbers (Bueker, 2005; Chiswick & Miller, 2009; 
Dronkers & Vink, 2012; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1986; Vink et al., 2013). By contrast, for 
immigrants from high developed countries, the perceived benefits are typically lower 
given the value of the original citizenship in the country of origin. For such immigrants, 
if they choose to naturalise at all, years of residence plays a crucial role (Vink et al., 
2013).  
Furthermore, the origin context not only conditions the relative value of the 
citizenship of the destination country, but also plays a role in determining whether 
people are required to renounce their original citizenship upon acquiring another. 
Losing the original citizenship can have important implications, for example with regard 
to ability to work, hold property or invest in the origin country, as well as the loss of 
rights to its public services and social benefits (Bloemraad, 2004; Jones-Correa, 2001; 
Mazzolari, 2009). Furthermore, the loss of mobility rights may imply a more permanent 
disconnection from relatives and friends in the origin country. A cost–benefit 
framework counts the automatic loss of the original citizenship as an important 
deterrent to naturalisation. Empirical findings in the literature, however, produce an 
ambiguous picture and do not universally support the hypothesis that being able to 
retain the citizenship of the origin country increases the propensity to naturalise in the 
destination country (Dronkers & Vink, 2010; Jones-Correa, 2001; Logan, Oh, & Darrah, 
2012; Mazzolari, 2009; Scott, 2008; Yang, 1994). 
Besides the origin context, the value and meaning of citizenship depends on one’s 
current life situation. In this regard, one of the most important personal characteristics 
that is consistently found to be positively related to citizenship acquisition is length of 
residence (e.g. Bueker, 2005; Dronkers & Vink, 2012). Prolonged residence is not only in 
most cases a requirement for naturalisation, but also increases commitment to the host 
society through the gradual accumulation of socio-economic, political and cultural 
resources specific to the host country. The literature is less conclusive about the 
relevance of other personal characteristics, such as age. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986) 
find a negative association between age and citizenship acquisition. They argue that, as 
age increases, the period of time in which one may enjoy the benefits associated with 
the destination countries’ citizenship reaches a point where it no longer justifies the 
effort to acquire it. In contrast, Yang (1994) finds a curvilinear relationship and Chiswick 
and Miller (2009) a positive association. Another example of contradictory findings 
concerns the role of children. While Yang (1994) finds that having young children 
increases the odds of naturalisation, these results are often contradicted in subsequent 
contributions (e.g. Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Vink et al., 2013).  
The relevance of marital status is relatively undisputed. Yang (1994) argues that 
marriage provides stability and societal integration, which may facilitate naturalisation. 
Furthermore, marriage with a native born not only increases commitment to the host 
society, but may also lower potential legal obstacles to naturalisation such as the 
residence requirement. Most empirical findings indeed support the notion that 
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marriage is positively associated with citizenship acquisition (e.g. Bueker, 2003; Liang, 
1994; Vink et al., 2013). Recently, Helgertz and Bevelander (2016) analysed this 
relationship in further detail using longitudinal data, finding that marriage with a 
foreign-born citizen subsequently increases the propensity to naturalise, particularly 
during the year in which the spouse attains citizenship. Notwithstanding the dominant 
view of naturalisation as a product of an individual utility-maximizing calculation, these 
results indicate that the decision to naturalise is a joint resolution between partners 
based on a shared ambition to invest in a long-term settlement in the host country. 
These social aspects of naturalisation are also emphasized by Street (2014), whose work 
reveals the intergenerational motivation for citizenship acquisition by immigrants in 
Germany in order to guarantee citizenship status for their children.  
A recurrent trait of many contributions that analyse individual incentives for 
naturalisation based on the origin context and personal characteristics is their focus on 
a specific point in time and a single destination context (e.g. Chiswick & Miller, 2009; 
Yang, 1994). The lack of both a cross-national and longitudinal design leaves little room 
to address the relevance of the destination context, for instance in terms of citizenship 
policies. However, citizenship law constitutes a legal framework that determines the 
conditions for citizenship eligibility, and is thus of crucial importance. This is particularly 
the case in Europe, where citizenship policies vary significantly (Vink & de Groot, 2010). 
Consequently, a separate strand of literature specifically investigates the relevance of 
the destination context in terms of migration history, citizenship policies and the 
political landscape across countries and time (e.g. Aleksynska & Algan, 2010; Gonzalez-
Ferrer & Cortina-Trilla, 2011; Janoski, 2010; Reichel, 2011). This research clearly 
illustrates the relevance of the destination context by revealing large discrepancies in 
naturalisation rates between countries. However, as most of these macro-level studies 
employ aggregate data, they employ limited controls for the demographic composition 
of migrant populations, for example with regard to levels of education, wealth, or 
migration background. Such studies may thus compare countries that are in 
compositional terms highly dissimilar, and run the risk of drawing inferences about 
individuals based on aggregate data (better known as the ecological fallacy). In other 
words, there is literature focussing on variation at the individual-level of immigrants, 
and the macro-level of institutional contexts. But while these lines of research have the 
potential to complement each other, they mostly exist in isolation.  
NATURALISATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
It is widely accepted that the labour market performance of immigrants regarding 
employment and earnings is worse when compared to natives (e.g. Algan et al., 2010; 
Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Schmidt, 1997; van Tubergen, 2006; van Tubergen, 
Maas, & Flap, 2004). Research has identified five major reasons for this discrepancy. 
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Social capital theory states that social networks, and the resources they entail, can 
promote labour market opportunities (de Graaf & Flap, 1988; Drever & Hoffmeister, 
2008; Franzen & Hangartner, 2006; Lancee, 2012; Lancee & Hartung, 2012). Since 
immigrants are relatively new to the host society, they can be expected to have less 
social capital than natives (e.g. Nee & Sanders, 2001; Schmeets & te Riele, 2010), and as 
such are less able to employ their social network to attain employment. Social capital 
provides access to host-country specific human capital, which brings us to the second 
argument. Migrants are often less empowered by human capital, or possess human 
capital that is less relevant in the host society, than natives, to the detriment of their 
labour market performance in Western societies (Becker, 1962; Heath & Cheung, 2007; 
Schultz, 1961). Education and labour market experience in the country of origin is not 
simply transferable to the country of destination, since employers cannot always readily 
interpret the relevance of said qualifications. Also, due to restrictive regulations, 
immigrants may not have access to specific segments of the labour market, such as 
public sector jobs. Furthermore, most immigrants are at a disadvantage with regard to 
mastery of the native language when compared to natives, which hampers their 
employability (Hayfron, 2001).  
Citizenship has the potential to mitigate some of these disadvantages (Bauböck et 
al., 2013; OECD, 2011). The main mechanism through which citizenship contributes to 
the socio-economic integration of immigrants is threefold. First, citizenship removes 
restrictions on public sector jobs, increasing employment opportunities. Second, the 
administrative costs of hiring and retaining a naturalised migrant are lower compared to 
a migrant who has not attained citizenship. Third, citizenship acquisition placates 
employers’ uncertainties about the educational qualifications, work experience and 
general work ethos of a migrant by signalling ‘good’ integration. Therefore naturalised 
migrants have more job opportunities, are less expensive and pose less of a risk to hire 
compared to those who have not naturalised.  
While these mechanisms may explain how citizenship can be beneficial to the socio-
economic integration of immigrants, findings in the literature on this core question of 
the impact of citizenship are ambiguous (e.g. Engdahl, 2011; Scott, 2008; Steinhardt, 
2012). For instance, longitudinal studies in North America or Germany reveal increased 
wage growth after naturalisation (Bratsberg et al., 2002; Steinhardt, 2012). By contrast, 
a similar study performed by Engdahl (2011) and Scott (2008) in Sweden suggests that 
the relationship between citizenship and socio-economic integration is largely due to 
self-selection. In other words, immigrants who perform well in the labour market in the 
first place may be the ones who are also more likely to naturalise, and might 
consequently be positively selected before the act of naturalisation. Each set of 
contributions tells a different story, but neither reflects on the mechanisms that might 
explain these results. In our view, this is surprising, given the differences in empirical 
contexts, types of data and methodological designs among these various studies. In 
other words, it may be possible that acquiring destination-country citizenship matters 
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for some immigrants, but not for others. As such, what the literature needs is a more 
developed theoretical framework that may account for varying outcomes of 
naturalisation across countries and time. To that end, we introduce the sociological life 
course paradigm, whose concepts and principles may provide a useful starting point for 
such a framework. Subsequently, we apply this perspective to the field of naturalisation 
and integration.  
THE SOCIOLOGICAL LIFE COURSE PARADIGM 
The sociological life course paradigm (Elder, 1974) can be characterised by the search 
for regularities in socially interrelated human lives, where life course development is 
analysed as the product of personal characteristics and individual action, as well as 
cultural frames and institutional conditions (Mayer, 2009). Broadly speaking, life course 
research concerns itself with the concepts of time, context and processes by analysing 
the interrelated development of human biographies in transforming societal conditions 
(Diewald & Mayer, 2009). As such, it represents a distinct way of thinking about and 
studying human lives that combines two conceptual models. On the one hand, it is 
essentially a multilevel approach that analyses pathways of human life as the product of 
the interplay between micro- (individuals), meso- (societal structures and institutions) 
and macro- (historical time) level dynamics. In this manner, life course research 
explicitly positions biographical actions and plans in the formal and social context of 
structures and institutions in which these take place, and which are similarly susceptible 
to changes through time. On the other hand, it is also a strongly longitudinal approach 
that attempts to go beyond the investigation of point-like states of being by analysing 
human development through strings of life events. The key assumption here is that 
there is a temporal dynamic to these events, where past experiences and resources, as 
well as opportunities and ambitions for the future, promote or stifle subsequent choices 
and developments.  
To translate these conceptions into models for empirical research, the life course is 
perceived in terms of trajectories and transitions. Transitions are changes in state that 
are more or less abrupt (Elder, 1985), for example from having employment to being 
unemployed. While the perpetuation of a status is informative in its own right, it is 
arguably the life events that mark transitions between states that most research 
questions are focused on. Trajectories are periods of time in life domains or institutions, 
such as education, work or health, in which transitions are embedded (Elder, 1985). In 
this sense, a trajectory is the conceptual glue that ties various life events together in a 
meaningful way. Through trajectories, changes in state have cumulative effects that 
produce long-term advantageous or disadvantageous developments in the life course. 
Rather than a random sequence of idiosyncratic life events, the life course is at least 
partly a conglomerated structure of social pathways that follow a certain temporal, 
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institutionalized sequencing (Mayer, 2004). Societal institutions, such as educational 
and occupational systems, provide a framework of rules and regulations, as well as age- 
and time-scheduled sequences of classes that shape life course trajectories. These 
models of standardized life courses are culturally endowed, and often dissimilar 
between groups, such as men and women. For instance, the transition to a shared 
household or starting a family may signify a less active role in the labour market in the 
life course of women, in contrast to men (Fortin, 2005; Vella, 1994). Furthermore, the 
life course is not simply the product of societal and institutional conditions at a given 
time, but is actively constructed within these contextual circumstances. Individuals are 
agentic actors who evaluate formal and social opportunities and constraints in light of 
past biographical events and outcomes, as well as ambitions and plans for the future. 
Thus trajectories represent the longitudinal way of thinking about actors in changing 
societies, by capturing the causal connections between transitions (Elder, 1994, p. 4). 
As the name implies, trajectories are characterised by a sense of direction. When a 
certain life event causes a fundamental shift in the direction of a trajectory, it is marked 
as a turning point. Since all transitions are thought to have long-term effects, a turning 
point is essentially a transition that has a discontinuous effect on its trajectory, relative 
to its predecessors. By their very nature, these transitions can only be dubbed as such 
with hindsight, since their defining features only become apparent in retrospect 
(Abbott, 1997). Nevertheless, turning points can be an important concept to make 
sense of biographical development. 
Life course research has introduced a number of guiding principles that help us link 
trajectories and transitions to substantive theory that explains these lines of 
development (Shanahan & Macmillan, 2008; Wingens et al., 2011). Here we discuss 
those that will prove most relevant to theory on citizenship, namely linked lives, life 
stage, accentuation and agency. 
‘Linked lives’ refer to the fact that life courses do not exist independently but are 
interconnected through a network of social dependencies and relationships (Elder, 
1994). These lines of association range from family and friends to colleagues and 
communities, and provide resources and opportunities that mutually affect people’s 
lives. The ‘life-stage’ principle emphasizes the way in which the impact and meaning of 
life events changes throughout the life course (Shanahan & Macmillan, 2008). In other 
words, to understand the impact of life events, one needs to take into account the 
phase of life in which the event occurs (Wingens et al., 2011). ‘Accentuation’ is the 
process when existing values, beliefs and practices become more pronounced when 
environmental structures and conditions rapidly change (Wingens et al., 2011). For 
example, a migrant residing in a foreign country may feel strongly connected to another 
individual solely on the basis of a shared cultural background, even though these 
qualities would not have been as relevant prior to migrating. The principle of ‘agency’ 
refers to the ability of individuals to actively plan and construct their life course within 
the boundaries of societal and institutional opportunity structures. As such, individuals 
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evaluate their options in light of available resources, ambitions and situational 
constraints, and actively react to changes in these conditions (Heinz, 1996). An example 
of this would be individuals anticipating and acting on a pending policy change. 
The central ideas of the life course paradigm relate naturally to processes of 
migration and integration. As Wingens et al. (2011, p. 2) point out: ‘Understanding 
migrants’ behaviour and explaining the cumulative effects resulting from their actions 
which, in turn, are embedded in societal structures and framed by institutions, requires 
just the kind of dynamic research approach the sociological life course perspective 
suggests.’ However, so far the life course approach is rarely used explicitly in migration 
and integration research, let alone in the literature on citizenship acquisition and socio-
economic integration. However, we will show that these life course concepts and 
principles neatly fit and complement the existing theoretical framework, while 
simultaneously highlighting the very elements that may prove crucial in explaining the 
current empirical ambiguity in the literature. 
A LIFE COURSE PERSPECTIVE ON NATURALISATION AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
How are the theoretical concepts and principles of the sociological life course paradigm 
relevant to research on citizenship? Since migration and integration are life course 
processes, the act of citizenship acquisition can be perceived as an important transition 
– from non-citizen to citizen – within this trajectory. To understand the underlying 
motivations that underpin this transition (why do immigrants naturalise?) and its 
implications (what is the impact of citizenship on socio-economic integration?), the 
dynamic research perspective of the life course is needed to grasp both the social and 
institutional context in which immigrant decision-making is embedded. 
The biography of immigrant naturalisation 
The literature on citizenship acquisition has developed considerably since the 
introduction of a cost–benefit model by Yang (1994), both in conceptual and 
methodological terms. However, throughout this period of development, the underlying 
theoretical model has remained largely unchanged, and at its heart still focuses on 
individual utility as the key motivation for citizenship acquisition. As such, it provides 
limited guidelines regarding the role of social relations. Yet recent findings in the 
literature clearly show that the decision to naturalise is not an individual deliberation, 
but rather made in close consultation with the spouse, or for the future benefit of 
children (Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Street, 2014). Therefore citizenship acquisition 
has to be understood in a biographical sense, where the utility of citizenship depends 
largely on the point in one’s life course at a given time. For instance, the value and 
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meaning of citizenship will differ between migrants who may want to start a family, 
compared to those who are either younger and whose plans and ambitions for the 
future are not as intertwined with others, or who are older and for whom naturalisation 
no longer carries the potential of a life-changing turning point. In other words, linked 
lives and life stage are crucial concepts to accurately portray the complex dynamic of 
human lives in which the decision to naturalise is embedded. This not only relates to the 
propensity to naturalise, but also to its subsequent socio-economic impact. For 
instance, Street (2014) demonstrates that a key motivation for naturalisation of 
migrants in Germany was in fact not focused on personal gain, but rather on securing 
citizenship status for their children to promote their opportunities for upward mobility. 
Clearly, if the propensity to naturalise is not necessarily based on personal benefit, an 
individualistic model of subjective utility maximization is too limited. In other words, 
concluding that citizenship does not matter if it has no positive effect for the 
naturalising individual is presumptuous. Hence we need a biographical understanding of 
the decision-making process, not as a substitute, but in addition to existing calculating 
explanations of immigrant decision-making; however, our understanding of an 
immigrant’s motivation to naturalise should refer not only to purely individual 
considerations, but also to those made at the family level.  
A biographical perspective is not only a valuable addition to the model, but also 
provides an important starting point to address empirical findings which seem puzzling 
in the context of the current theoretical framework. For example, Steinhardt (2012) 
finds that naturalisation offers no wage benefit for women; from a life course 
perspective, this may partly be due to dissimilar models of standardized life courses per 
gender (Fortin, 2005; Vella, 1994). As mentioned earlier, certain life events such as 
marriage or having children may have distinct implications for men and women. Since 
Steinhardt focuses on migrants who are full-time employed, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the women included in his analysis are very motivated and skilled, since these 
women have chosen to remain highly active in the labour market in spite of the 
prevailing life course pattern where women predominantly start working part time or 
leave the labour market after having children (Fortin, 2005; Wingens et al., 2011). For 
this reason, we emphasize that it is important to reflect on the implications of the 
selected research population.  
Furthermore, the temporal dynamic inherent to a biographical perspective also 
builds on an ongoing methodological discussion in the literature that emphasizes the 
importance of using longitudinal data. Since citizenship acquisition is a selective 
process, this entails the methodological risk that those migrants who choose to 
naturalise do so partly because of endogenous qualities related to their labour market 
outcomes. Immigrants who perform well in the labour market may also have a high 
propensity to naturalise, and might consequently be positively selected even before the 
act of naturalisation (Helgertz et al., 2014; Steinhardt, 2012). By employing a life course 
approach, the assumption of causality – where citizenship acquisition precedes socio-
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economic integration – is directly addressed through the longitudinal analysis of life 
events in the human biography. In that sense, a biographical approach that emphasizes 
both the temporal and social aspects of immigrant naturalisation and labour market 
outcomes synchronizes well with current methodological developments in the literature 
regarding the increased usage of longitudinal data. In other words, longitudinal data 
offer more than just methodological opportunities, and should invite us to develop and 
test more complex theoretical models. 
The ecology of immigrant naturalisation 
A central idea of the sociological life course paradigm is that individual lives are 
embedded in societal structures and institutions that shape biographical plans (Wingens 
et al., 2011). As such, institutional transformations at the meso/macro-level are 
consequential to life courses at the micro-level, as redefined opportunity structures 
open new pathways or close existing ones. Yet the literature on citizenship and labour 
market integration largely focuses on either the macro- (in terms of for instance 
citizenship law or the migration history of destination countries) or micro-level (in terms 
of individual incentives for naturalisation). However, individuals evaluate societal and 
institutional opportunity structures against their aspirations and plans, and act 
accordingly (Heinz, 1996). As Street points out: ‘Research on citizenship laws should be 
based on an understanding of the micro-foundations of naturalisation behaviour’ 
(Street, 2014, p. 265). Similarly, an analysis of the individual’s decision to naturalise has 
to account for the societal and institutional context in which this deliberation takes 
place. However, the development of such a theoretical model is hampered by the fact 
that most contributions in the literature focus on a single destination country, and, 
when employing longitudinal data, choose not to analyse the impact of changes in the 
destination context through time (e.g. Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; Bevelander & 
Veenman, 2008; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Mazzolari, 2009; Scott, 2008; Steinhardt, 2012). 
Indeed, Steinhardt makes an empirical caveat on this point: ‘Given that (…) the effect 
[of citizenship] depends strongly on the legal requirements and consequences of 
naturalisation within a country, the following discussion refers explicitly to the situation 
in Germany’ (Steinhardt, 2012, p. 815). 
While it is true that destination contexts often cannot be readily compared, given 
the limits of available datasets, we should at least theorize on their impact and strive 
towards a model that accounts for its relevance. For instance, with regard to personal 
characteristics, Yang (1994) finds a curvilinear relationship between age and citizenship 
acquisition, arguing that the utility of citizenship is particularly relevant during the 
period of time in which an immigrant is active in the labour market. By contrast, 
Chiswick and Miller (2009) find a positive relationship and Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986) 
a negative association. Chiswick and Miller argue that the absence of a curvilinear 
relationship may be linked to policy changes that have limited non-citizens’ access to 
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social services, particularly increasing the benefit of citizenship for those of higher age 
(Chiswick & Miller, 2009, p. 32). As such, individual incentives for naturalisation based 
on age are conditioned by the institutional context at a given time and place.  
Similarly, Yang (1994) finds that having young children increases the odds of 
naturalisation, but these results are often contradicted in subsequent contributions 
(e.g. Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Vink et al., 2013). However, citizenship policies may play 
an important role in the relevance of children by conditioning whether naturalisation 
can be employed as a strategy for intergenerational upward mobility (Street, 2014). 
When Germany changed its citizenship policy in 2000 to include ius soli citizenship 
provisions, extending citizenship to immigrants’ children born in Germany, citizenship 
rates actually lowered in contrast to political expectations. Even though the policy 
reform made citizenship acquisition easier for most migrants, a key naturalisation 
motive for foreign parents, namely upward mobility for their children, was removed. In 
other words, opportunity structures defined at the macro-level condition the impact of 
personal characteristics at the micro-level.  
Just as the impact of the institutional context depends on individual incentives to 
naturalise, so too is the relevance of personal characteristics conditioned by the 
destination context. Although restrictive citizenship policies are negatively associated 
with naturalisation rates (Bauböck et al., 2013; Dronkers & Vink, 2012), recent findings 
show that this is particularly true for migrants from less developed countries (Vink et al., 
2013). Although further research on the underlying mechanisms is required, one could 
argue that, as citizenship policies become more demanding in terms of financial costs, 
as well as the required level of knowledge and skills, this will particularly present an 
obstacle to migrants from less developed countries. Thus, to understand the relevance 
of citizenship policies of the destination context, it is important to account for 
demographic properties of its immigrant population. For example, in countries with a 
large number of refugees, who predominantly originate from less developed countries, 
a restrictive citizenship policy might have a relatively strong impact.  
Furthermore, the institutional context may not only reflect on naturalisation rates, 
but also on the subsequent outcomes of naturalisation. Since German citizenship law 
was based almost exclusively on the ius sanguinis principle until 2000, it is possible that 
many migrants in the analysis of Steinhardt (2012) chose to naturalise to guarantee 
citizenship status for their children, rather than the core aim of improving one’s 
employability. If the motivation for naturalisation of immigrants is not so much 
motivated by these personal utility payoffs, but rather by those of others, then this may 
also be reflected in the relation between naturalisation and labour market outcomes. 
Similarly, the particularities of labour market regulation should also be expected to 
matter; in highly regulated systems, the ‘citizenship premium’ may be expected to be 
larger than in those systems where access to the labour market generally is less 
restricted. For example, whereas it is common to state your citizenship status in job 
applications in some countries, such as Germany or Austria, in other countries, like 
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Norway or Sweden, this is not the case (OECD, 2011). In other words, citizenship 
acquisition is far less relevant for successful socio-economic integration in the latter 
countries. This may explain why the literature finds empirical evidence for a citizenship 
premium in Germany, and not in Sweden (Engdahl, 2011; Scott, 2008; Steinhardt, 
2012). Similarly, the de facto opportunities that naturalisation provides, in terms of 
access to restricted jobs, the housing market or credit, which may increase immigrant 
mobility and thus improve labour market opportunities, differ between countries. 
Again, in the Swedish context, naturalisation has a very limited impact on these benefits 
(Scott, 2008).  
The relevance of citizenship acquisition for labour market outcomes is not only 
conditioned by the institutional setting of the destination context, but also by the 
demographic composition of its migrant population. Sweden houses a relatively large 
number of refugees, who may be highly motivated to naturalise in order to reinforce 
their legal status in the host country. However, refugees are also particularly 
disadvantaged in the labour market (e.g. Krahn, Derwing, Mulder, & Wilkinson, 2000; 
Wooden, 1991), which may go some way to explaining why Scott (2008) finds a negative 
relationship between citizenship and labour market integration in Sweden, while studies 
in some other countries do not (e.g. Bratsberg et al., 2002; Steinhardt, 2012). Another 
example is the relevance of co-ethnic communities. Just as there are initially fewer 
obstacles to establishing social ties with co-ethnics compared to natives, so too is it 
easier to find and attain employment under an employer who shares your language and 
cultural background (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2012; Edin, Fredriksson, & Åslund, 2003). 
The benefit of the host country citizenship to demonstrate the possession of some 
country-specific human capital, cultural knowledge and basic language mastery (as 
required in many naturalisation procedures) is in that case much less valuable. In other 
words, there are fewer incentives for migrants to invest in their labour market 
opportunities through naturalisation when residing in communities with a high co-
ethnic population, since their disadvantages are mitigated through opportunities 
offered by co-ethnic workplaces. Moreover, processes of accentuation, resulting from 
the societal change inherent in the act of migration, may motivate migrants to actively 
seek these work environments with shared values, cultural codes and habits from the 
country of origin (Shanahan & Macmillan, 2008). The impact of ethnic communities on 
immigrants’ propensity to naturalise has so far only been analysed by Yang (1994), who 
found a positive association between the ethnic composition of a community and 
citizenship acquisition. Yang argues that a large immigrant community facilitates 
naturalisation by providing its members with information concerning benefits, 
procedures and experiences of naturalisation (Yang, 1994, p. 457). Whether 
communities also condition the relative impact of naturalisation remains an open 
question however. 
What is clear from all of this is that the theoretical lacunae lie not so much in 
omitted variables, but rather in a theoretical framework that ties the separate strands 
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of literature focusing either on characteristics of individuals or countries together in a 
systematic fashion. In this regard, the sociological life course paradigm provides the 
conceptual tools to simultaneously grasp the biographical and ecological aspects of 
citizenship, while a model of subjective utility maximization allows us to utilize these 
tools to systematically formulate hypotheses for analysis.  
CONCLUSION 
Findings from the literature on the core question of the effect of citizenship for 
immigrants’ socio-economic integration are ambiguous. Instead of arguing for or 
against the existence of a so-called citizenship premium, this chapter explores the 
potential of the sociological life course paradigm to strengthen the theoretical 
foundation of research on citizenship and socio-economic integration. We argue that 
the development of a more comprehensive theoretical model may aid the identification 
of the conditions under which citizenship is effective. A review of the state-of-the-art 
reveals two strands of literature. A first, longstanding strand focuses on individual 
incentives for naturalisation based on the origin context and personal characteristics, 
but fails to account for the societal and institutional conditions of the destination 
country in which these individuals are embedded. A second, more recent strand of 
literature focuses on properties of the destination context in terms of citizenship 
policies, migration history, the political landscape, and changes in these characteristics 
over time, but ignores differences in the demographic composition of the migrant 
populations in these countries. When combining these micro and meso/macro 
approaches to citizenship acquisition and labour market integration though life course 
concepts and principles, a comprehensive theoretical framework appears that allows 
for the formulation of hypotheses that explain why some immigrants naturalise and 
benefit from citizenship, while others do not. More specifically, a life course perspective 
emphasizes the biographical and ecological aspects of naturalisation, where variation in 
citizenship acquisition rates and labour market outcomes can be explained by the social, 
institutional and demographic context in which immigrant lives are embedded. The 
added benefit of such an approach is that it provides potential to go beyond merely 
observing empirical ambiguity in the literature, thus increasing the comparative scope 
of research on naturalisation and socio-economic integration.  
Methodologically, a life course approach to immigrant naturalisation calls for 
longitudinal individual-level data and dynamic microanalyses embedded in multilevel 
models of social processes (Wingens et al., 2011, p. 6). This notion builds well on the 
recent emphasis in the literature on the importance of longitudinal data to account for 
self-selection concerning unobservable characteristics (e.g. Helgertz et al., 2014; 
Steinhardt, 2012). As such, a life course approach to citizenship is highly compatible 
with contemporary methodological considerations in the state-of-the-art. However, 
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these high demands on the required quality of data also pose potential challenges, 
given that suitable longitudinal dataset are only available in a limited set of countries. As 
a result, much of the literature focuses on specific countries, such as Sweden, Norway, 
Germany or the USA, for which these particular types of data are relatively accessible 
(Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Engdahl, 2011; Helgertz & 
Bevelander, 2016; Scott, 2008; Steinhardt, 2012). Furthermore, the comparability of the 
findings from these studies is limited given that these datasets are structured according 
to national specificities and do not facilitate cross-national comparisons. In other words, 
opportunities to analyse the biographical and ecological aspects of naturalisation and 
labour market outcomes are constrained by the limits of available datasets. While these 
constraints may be addressed through the use of ‘big data’ approaches, combining 
register data with available surveys, access to these types of data is limited so far to 
only a small set of European countries, such as the Netherlands and Scandinavian 
countries.  
Finally, we reiterate our initial question: is citizenship an important instrument for 
the socio-economic integration of immigrants into the host society? We would argue 
that there is no definitive answer, and indeed, that it is the wrong question. Instead, the 
literature would benefit by focusing more on identifying to whom and under which 
conditions citizenship matters. Doing so requires the development of a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework and, in this regard, we see a life course approach 
to immigrant naturalisation and socio-economic integration as the most promising step. 
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Chapter 3 
The Ecology of Immigrant Naturalisation: 
A Life course Approach in the Context of 
Institutional Conditions9 
  
                                                                
9 This chapter has been published as: Peters, F., Vink, M., & Schmeets, H. (2016). The Ecology of Immigrant 
Naturalisation: A Life Course Approach in the Context of Institutional Conditions. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 42(3), 359-381. In 2017, this paper received an Honourable Mention for the Best Paper 
Award by the migration and citizenship section of the American Political Science Association.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Citizenship acquisition has been the subject of growing political and academic interest. 
Given concerns of some countries regarding levels of integration of immigrants, 
naturalisation is considered a potential vehicle that may mitigate these issues by 
facilitating and expediting the process of socio-economic and socio-cultural integration. 
As such, the question of immigrant naturalisation is well established in the field of 
migration. Most research focuses on personal and contextual determinants of 
naturalisation (Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Bloemraad, 2002; Chiswick, 1978; 
Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Mazzolari, 2009; OECD, 2008; Portes & Curtis, 1987; Street, 
2014; Yang, 1994). Personal characteristics include years of residence, age, marital 
status and education, while contextual characteristics focus on socio-economic and 
political properties of the country of origin, and the ability to hold dual citizenship.  
However, there is surprisingly limited attention in the literature to the relevance of 
the destination context, and more specifically on citizenship policies which determine 
the institutional opportunity structure in which naturalisation takes place. This notable 
caveat may be linked to the predominant use of cross-sectional data focusing on a 
single host country, constraining opportunities for the analysis of the destination 
context. Furthermore, studies that perform a cross-national comparison are typically 
based on aggregate data, and as a result, compositional differences between countries 
– in terms of for instance education or wealth – are not taken into account (Aleksynska 
& Algan, 2010; Janoski, 2010; Reichel, 2011). Limited individual-level research on the 
impact of institutional conditions shows that policy indeed matters in the European 
context, as more restrictive citizenship policies deter citizenship acquisition (Dronkers & 
Vink, 2012; Vink et al., 2013; Reichel & Perchinig, 2015). However, these studies are 
based on cross-sectional data, and a deeper understanding of the relevance of policy 
requires a longitudinal analysis of citizenship acquisition under transforming 
institutional conditions. 
In this chapter we look at the case of the Netherlands, where the introduction of a 
naturalisation test in 2003 significantly restricted the conditions under which 
immigrants could naturalise. We use longitudinal, individual-level data from Statistics 
Netherlands to analyse determinants of citizenship acquisition of almost all registered 
first generation immigrants in the Netherlands. These high-quality population register 
data offer unique opportunities for a dynamic analysis of naturalisation rates of 
different migration cohorts under varying institutional conditions. The chapter is 
structured as follows: first, we present an overview of the literature on citizenship 
acquisition, and introduce the theoretical framework and hypotheses. We then provide 
a description of the Dutch context in terms of citizenship legislation, and more 
specifically the amendment of the Dutch Nationality Act on April 1, 2003. Next, we 
detail the dataset and operationalisation of our theoretical concepts. Subsequently, 
results from the analyses are presented, starting with personal and contextual 
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determinants of naturalisation, before addressing the impact of citizenship policy. We 
conclude by considering the implications and limitations of this contribution. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Traditionally, research on citizenship acquisition has predominantly focused on 
immigrants’ demographic characteristics and socio-economic achievement in the 
destination country, both as indicators of socio-cultural integration and as predictors of 
naturalisation (e.g. Portes & Curtis, 1987). However, following the line of argument that 
naturalisation is the result of successful integration implies a process of inevitability that 
defeats any notion of choice on the part of immigrants, and cannot explain why highly 
integrated immigrants would not naturalise. Indeed, in his seminal work on citizenship 
acquisition, Yang (1994) argues for the importance of rational calculation in the 
consideration to naturalise. His suggestion is the introduction of a cost-benefit model of 
subjective utility maximisation, which forms the basis of the contemporary theoretical 
framework on citizenship acquisition. Benefits comprise political and socio-economic 
rights and privileges, while costs include the effort spent in an application process that 
can prove quite long and strenuous, the potential loss of the former nationality and the 
rights it offered, and increased citizen obligations in the host country. 
The literature has identified a number of determinants that condition these 
perceptions of utility, chief among them the economic and political situation in the 
country of origin (e.g. Bueker, 2005; Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1986; 
Logan et al., 2012). A lack of economic freedom, political security and low standards of 
living in the country of origin may discourage migrants to return. In this regard, 
citizenship of the host country offers security by providing unrestricted access to its 
territory. In other words, the potential benefits of citizenship are much greater for 
migrants from less developed or politically unstable countries because the rights and 
privileges associated with citizenship acquisition are particularly relevant to their 
situation. In contrast, migrants from the European Union (EU) will be less inclined to 
acquire citizenship of another EU country, since the added benefit is comparatively 
small. Indeed, a large portion of the variation in naturalisation rates between migrant 
groups is explained by origin characteristics (Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Devoretz & 
Pivnenko, 2008; Dronkers & Vink, 2012; Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Logan et al., 
2012; Vink et al., 2013). 
Additionally, the relevance of immigrants’ country of origin also relates to the ability to 
maintain one’s original citizenship upon acquiring another (Bloemraad, 2004; Jones-
Correa, 2001; Mazzolari, 2009). In many countries, citizenship policies dictate that the 
voluntary acquisition of a new citizenship automatically results in the loss of the former. 
Furthermore, citizenship policies in the country of destination may require immigrants to 
renounce their original citizenship to be eligible for naturalisation. In these cases, 
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naturalisation has relatively severe implications, such as a more permanent disconnection 
from one’s relatives or origin country. A cost-benefit model would thus predict the 
toleration of dual citizenship to increase the propensity to naturalise, although empirical 
findings regarding the impact of dual citizenship toleration are ambiguous (Dronkers & 
Vink, 2012; Logan et al., 2012; Mazzolari, 2009; Scott, 2008; Yang, 1994). 
Although the origin context is an important determinant of citizenship acquisition, 
there still exist substantial differences in naturalisation rates within groups of migrants 
from similar countries. In the context of a cost-benefit model, the utility of citizenship 
depends partly on one’s personal life situation. In this regard, age, years of residence, 
marital status, having children and education have all been shown to influence the 
propensity to naturalise in various national contexts, by conditioning the perceived value 
and meaning of citizenship (Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Chiswick & Miller, 2009; 
Devoretz & Pivnenko, 2008; Dronkers & Vink, 2012). Furthermore, when assessing the 
potential utility of citizenship, it is important to consider the broader social context in 
which immigrant lives are embedded. From a life course perspective, individuals do not 
exist independently but are interconnected through a network of social relations (Elder, 
1994). In this context of linked lives, the relevance and potential impact of citizenship is 
bound in a mutually shared context with others, such as one’s partner (Wingens et al., 
2011). Therefore, if a migrant has a native or naturalised partner, who already has a 
substantial interest in staying in the destination country, either by being born there, or by 
having invested in meeting the requirements for naturalisation, this will likely play an 
important part in the consideration to invest in a long-term settlement in the destination 
country through naturalisation (Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016). As such, motives for 
naturalisation can also be intergenerational in nature. Migrants with young children may 
want to maintain a stable life situation for their children to grow up in, and are thus less 
likely to emigrate in the foreseeable future (Portes & Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994). 
Furthermore, naturalisation can promote opportunities for upward social mobility in 
countries where children naturalise in conjunction with their parents (Saurer & Felfe, 
2014; Street, 2014). Yet, there is still limited systematic attention in the literature for this 
social aspect of the decision-making process. Most research assumes that individuals 
arrive at conclusions independently, a shortcoming coined ‘methodological individualism’ 
by Joseph Schumpeter (see von Hayek [1943] for an elaborate discussion). However, given 
the fact that citizenship acquisition implies costs and effort and can be a life changing 
event, it can be argued that third parties who play a major role in an individuals’ life factor 
into the decision-making process. 
Until recently, the relevance of the destination context has enjoyed limited systematic 
attention beyond the toleration of dual citizenship. Citizenship policies in the destination 
country provide a legal framework conditioning who is de facto eligible for naturalisation. 
These conditions usually refer to a minimal period of uninterrupted legal residence, but 
may also include the successful completion of a language- or integration requirement, as 
well as financial costs. The exact requirements depend on the destination country in 
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question, and can vary significantly, especially across European countries (Vink & de 
Groot, 2010). In the context of a cost-benefit model, one can expect that in countries 
where citizenship policy is more restrictive, migrants will be less likely to naturalise. In this 
regard, individual-level research on citizenship policies shows that liberal policies increase 
the odds of naturalisation, while restrictive policies indeed produce the opposite effect 
(Bauböck et al., 2013; Bloemraad, 2002; Dronkers & Vink, 2012; Reichel & Perchinig, 2015; 
Vink et al., 2013). Our hypothesis reads: after a restriction of the citizenship law, 
immigrants are less likely to acquire destination country citizenship. 
However, the impact of citizenship policies depends on the extent in which these 
institutional conditions are relevant and influential obstacles to naturalisation in the 
first place, which will not be equal among immigrants. As mentioned, the underlying 
motivation to naturalise is quite different among immigrants depending on for instance 
their country of origin. To reiterate: migrants from less developed or politically unstable 
countries naturalise quickly and often because citizenship acquisition provides crucial 
political and socio-economic privileges that are particularly relevant to their situation 
(Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Vink et al., 2013). Therefore, it 
is likely that constraints to citizenship acquisition for these migrants will be 
predominantly institutional in nature, and that transforming opportunity structures due 
to changes in citizenship law will particularly affect their decision to naturalise. In other 
words, migrants for whom citizenship acquisition is an important step in their life 
course, and who are thus highly motivated to naturalise, are principally affected by the 
institutional conditions that stipulate its availability, since these represent the most 
significant – if not only – obstacle to naturalisation. In contrast, migrants from more 
developed countries have many reasons not to naturalise – only one of which are 
restrictive policies – and enjoy more liberty to simply be indifferent about 
naturalisation. Also, migrants from less developed countries may, due to a lack of 
resources in terms of education or wealth, find it increasingly difficult to successfully 
complete all the necessary requirements for eligibility as citizenship policies become 
more complex and demanding. Thus, these migrants are particularly dependent on 
policies that make naturalisation a realistic proposition or not. This implies the following 
interaction hypothesis: the negative effect of a restriction of the citizenship law is 
stronger for immigrants from less developed countries of origin. 
CONTEXT 
The first citizenship policy in the Netherlands – the Dutch Nationality Act – came into 
force on January 1, 1985, and was implemented with the aim of improving the legal 
position of immigrants through naturalisation, thus facilitating their societal integration 
(van Oers, 2014). Under this legislation, immigrants were eligible for citizenship 
acquisition when at least 18 years of age, residing legally in the Netherlands for an 
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uninterrupted period of 5 years (three if married to a Dutch national), and having made 
an attempt at renouncing his or her original citizenship. Also migrants should not pose a 
threat to national security (i.e. have no criminal record), have a basic knowledge of the 
Dutch language and generally be accepted into Dutch society. The final two 
requirements would be demonstrated through a short interview, in which a municipal 
official appraised the abilities of the applicant by way of a short conversation. Although 
there were general guidelines, the integration interview was not standardised, and 
therefore subject to the interpretation of the municipal official in question. As a result, 
the examination was in practice lenient on certain groups, such as women or the 
elderly, and only a small number of applicants were refused on the basis of insufficient 
capabilities demonstrated during the interview. Furthermore, the interview was not 
meant to test the successful completion of the integration process, but rather to assess 
a general progression towards that goal. Migrants who were able to have a simple 
conversation in Dutch about everyday life, and had some social contact with natives, 
would fulfil the language and integration requirement. In general, the requirements for 
naturalisation under the Dutch Nationality Act of 1985 reflect the notion that citizenship 
acquisition was an important part of the integration process. 
This policy appeared to be successful in the sense that the number of naturalisations 
rose considerably after its implementation (van Oers, 2014; van Oers et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, in 1997 and 1998, steps were taken towards a more restrictive citizenship 
policy, with the re-instalment of the renunciation requirement in 1997 (since dual 
citizenship had been tolerated from 1991 onwards), and the call for a more demanding 
examination of language capabilities and levels of integration. This resulted in the revised 
Dutch Nationality Act, which was implemented on April 1, 2003. The most notable 
difference between the Dutch Nationality Act of 1985 and 2003 was the formalisation of 
the integration interview into a so-called ‘naturalisation test’. As part of the naturalisation 
test, knowledge about Dutch society and writing skills were required as well as oral 
capabilities. Training courses are rather expensive, varying from a few hundred to over 
2,000 euro. Furthermore, whereas the integration interview was free of charge, the 
naturalisation test would cost 260 euros (more if re-examination was required). As such, it 
can be stated that Dutch citizenship policy became more restrictive after April 1, 2003. 
However, it should be noted that this policy change was implemented under the notion 
that the former, relatively liberal approach to immigrant integration had failed. The 
stricter requirements for naturalisation were thus meant to eventually improve 
immigrants’ integration into Dutch society, not exclude particular migrant groups from the 
opportunity to become Dutch citizens. Nevertheless, official figures from Statistics 
Netherlands show that the number of naturalisations decreased substantially after the 
introduction of the revised Dutch Nationality Act in 2003, from 42,000 in 2002, to 25,000 
in 2003 and 21,000 in 2004. However, no systematic research has been done to assess the 
extent in which this policy amendment actually caused the number of naturalisations to 
decline, and if so, which migrant groups were principally affected. 
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DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
We analyse citizenship acquisition in the Netherlands using register data on first 
generation immigrants between 1995 and 2011. Specifically constituted by Statistics 
Netherlands for this research, this dataset is based on municipal population registers, 
and complemented by data from the Dutch System of Social Statistical Datasets. 
Conjointly, it contains information on immigration, citizenship, demography, and other 
relevant personal and contextual characteristics of almost all registered first generation 
immigrants in the Netherlands over time. We keep track of individuals per day from the 
moment they become eligible for citizenship acquisition until their potential moment of 
naturalisation, emigration, or the final point in the dataset (January 1, 2012). Since, as 
mentioned above, eligibility differs between migrants (normally after 5 years of 
residence, but 3 years for migrants with a Dutch partner), the moment at which an 
individual enters the dataset is subject to this criteria. 
The analysis focusses on immigrants who migrated to the Netherlands between 
1995 and 2002. In light of the residence requirement, the vast majority of these 
migrants were not eligible for citizenship acquisition prior to the first year of 
observation (1998). In order to follow migrants for a substantial period of time, and 
given the fact that the dataset only provides information until 2012, we decided to 
exclude migrant cohorts after 2002. To ensure that later cohorts do not suffer 
disproportionately from right-truncation due to a shorter tracking period, we fix the 
period of observation to a maximum of 10 years for all cohorts. 
We define an individuals’ country of origin by birth. Only immigrants of whom both 
parents were born abroad are included, since immigrants of whom one parent was born 
in the Netherlands are expected to be similar to natives. Consequently, they could be 
positively selected in terms of skills and resources relevant to citizenship acquisition. 
Furthermore, we exclude all migrants born in Suriname before 1975 or in the 
Netherlands Antilles, since they are often Dutch citizens by birth. To prevent any further 
cases of potential citizenship acquisition by different means than the explicit decision to 
naturalise, we exclude all immigrants who naturalise before the age of 18. 
We focus on first generation immigrants for two reasons: second and further 
generation immigrants can attain citizenship by descent. However, this study is interested 
in the explicit decision to naturalise. Also, this decision is thought to be fundamentally 
different for second or further generation immigrants, since citizenship acquisition 
indicators differ between generations (Bauböck et al., 2013; Dronkers & Vink, 2012). 
The dependent variable in this research is citizenship of the destination country, 
which is a dichotomous variable that measures whether a migrant has acquired Dutch 
citizenship. The independent variables can be classified as either personal or contextual 
characteristics. Personal variables include gender, age, the citizenship status of the 
partner, having young children and the level of education. The age of migrants is 
determined at the moment of migration. With regard to the partner, we distinguish 
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between migrants with no partner, a native partner, a foreign-born Dutch partner (a 
naturalised migrant), and a foreign-born foreign partner (a non-naturalised migrant). 
We measure the impact of the naturalisation of the partner over time by including a 
specific category for the year in which the partner acquires Dutch citizenship, the 
subsequent 3 years, and a final category for all the following years. 
We define children as young until the age of 18, because until then, they can acquire 
citizenship through their parents. Furthermore, we only classify migrants as having 
young children when these children are actually part of the household, in which case 
they are presumed to be an important and influential part of their parents’ lives. 
Unfortunately, information on the educational level of immigrants, especially of the first 
generation, is limited mostly to survey data in the Netherlands. Using information from 
various surveys, as well as the incomplete educational register, we were able to ascertain 
the educational level of about 44,000 individuals from migrant cohort 2000 onwards. 
Contextual variables relate to characteristics of the country of origin. We include 
measurements for the countries’ level of development, political stability, toleration of dual 
citizenship and membership of the EU, and keep track of changes in these characteristics 
per year. Given that for a number of smaller origin countries, the dataset only includes a 
very limited number of migrants, we aim to capture variation at the origin country level by 
including general characteristics of these countries. While we do not exclude that there 
may be additional variation at the level of individual origin countries, on the basis of the 
literature we assume that these characteristics capture most of the relevant origin country 
variation (Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1986; 
Logan et al., 2012; Vink et al., 2013; Yang, 1994). The level of development of a country is 
measured using the Human Development Index (HDI), which is based on gross domestic 
product, as well as indicators for life expectancy and educational levels. The index provides 
a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where a higher score indicates a higher level of development. 
Although gross domestic product is often used to measure a country’s economic condition, 
we argue that the HDI draws a more comprehensive, multidimensional picture. Political 
stability is measured using the Kaufmann Index (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011), 
indicating the probability that a government will be overthrown in the foreseeable future 
by unconstitutional or violent means. Similar to the HDI, the Kaufmann index is a 
continuous scale, ranging from approximately −2.5 to 2.5, where a higher score equals 
more stability. We also use the Global Dual Citizenship database (Vink, de Groot, & Luk, 
2015), which provides information on the possibility of holding dual citizenship for nearly all 
origin countries between 1960 and 2015. It should be noted that migrants from countries 
that tolerate dual citizenship are normally required in the Netherlands to renounce their 
original citizenship when naturalising. However, Dutch citizenship law includes a large 
number of exceptions to this rule and as such, dual citizenship is still possible for many 
migrants who wish to attain Dutch citizenship. Hence this variable distinguishes between 
migrants whose origin country citizenship policy either allows for dual citizenship, or not, 
but does not determine whether individuals will hold dual citizenship after naturalisation, 
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given that this depends on a complex set of rules and the specific situation of immigrants. 
All of the above variables have been included in the analysis after checking for potential 
multicollinearity, which is well within acceptable parameters (VIF < 2.0) (O’brien, 2007). 
Table A1 contains descriptive statistics for migrants who naturalise and those who 
do not, revealing a familiar and expected pattern. Values are shown for the final 
measurement of each individual (i.e. at the moment of naturalisation, when emigrating 
from the Netherlands, or at the end of 2011). 33% of female migrants are naturalised, 
which is more often than male immigrants, of which 29% is naturalised. Furthermore, 
naturalised migrants are generally younger. Migrants with a native Dutch partner are 
naturalised about twice as often as migrants with a foreign partner or no partner. 
However, during the year in which the foreign partner naturalises, 91% acquires Dutch 
citizenship as well. In the following years, this gradually declines to slightly above the 
level of migrants with a native Dutch partner. Furthermore, having children matters; 
36% of migrants with young children are naturalised, compared to 26% amongst those 
with no children. The country of origin of naturalised migrants is characterised by a low 
level of development and stability, and a tolerance for dual citizenship. Also, migrants 
originating from outside the EU are naturalised considerably more often than their 
counterparts (40% compared to 5%). Note that the number of individuals per quartile is 
not exactly equal, since migrants with the same country of origin share equal values on 
the HDI and Kaufmann index, and thus produce a slight overflow across the quartile 
points. Finally, migrants from later cohorts naturalise less often, ranging from 34% for 
migrant cohort 1995 to 28% for migrant cohort 2002. These findings generally 
correspond to our theoretical expectations, where migrants make a rational decision to 
naturalise based on perceived utility in light of personal and contextual conditions. To 
analyse these data in further detail, we use Cox proportional hazards regression with 
time dependent covariates (Cox, 1972). 
ANALYSIS 
Origin and personal characteristics 
Table 1 shows the results of the regression analysis, providing hazard ratios associated 
with the covariates on the risk of naturalisation. Note that the size of the effect should 
always be interpreted in light of the measurement of the covariate in question. Starting 
with personal characteristics in Model 1, the analysis shows that migrants who 
immigrate at an older age are less likely to naturalise (a decrease of about 2% per year 
of age). This corresponds to the notion that the period of time in which one may enjoy 
the benefits associated with citizenship acquisition becomes shorter when one migrates 
at a later stage in the life course, up to a point where migrants may feel it no longer 
weighs up to the necessary effort to acquire it. 
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Table 1. Cox proportional hazards regression on the risk of naturalisation, cohorts 1995-2002. 
 Model 1  Model 2 
  Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error 
Gender         
Male 0.016 1.016  0.008 0.013 1.014  0.008 
Female ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Age at migration -0.016 0.984***  0.001 -0.016 0.984***  0.001 
Partner         
No partner ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Native Dutch partner 0.526 1.692***  0.013 0.504 1.656***  0.013 
Foreign born foreign partner -0.272 0.762***  0.013 -0.288 0.750***  0.013 
Year naturalisation partner 2.200 9.024***  0.015 2.175 8.803***  0.015 
1 year after naturalisation partner 0.878 2.407***  0.030 0.862 2.368***  0.030 
2 years after naturalisation partner 0.620 1.858***  0.035 0.592 1.807***  0.035 
3 years after naturalisation partner 0.359 1.432***  0.035 0.311 1.365***  0.036 
> 3 years after naturalisation partner -0.161 0.852***  0.014 -0.132 0.876***  0.014 
Children < 18 in household         
Yes ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
No 0.002 1.002  0.009 0.013 1.013  0.009 
Dual nationality         
No automatic loss ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Automatic loss -0.020 0.980*  0.009 -0.032 0.968***  0.009 
Development country of origin -1.525 0.218***  0.032 -1.438 0.237***  0.032 
Stability country of origin -0.205 0.814***  0.005 -0.232 0.793***  0.005 
EU         
Yes -1.632 0.196***  0.021 -1.639 0.194***  0.021 
No ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. 
Migrant cohort         
Cohort 1995     ref. ref.  ref. 
Cohort 1996     -0.001 0.999  0.016 
Cohort 1997     -0.065 0.937***  0.016 
Cohort 1998     -0.301 0.740***  0.016 
Cohort 1999     -0.297 0.743***  0.016 
Cohort 2000     -0.403 0.668***  0.016 
Cohort 2001     -0.451 0.637***  0.016 
Cohort 2002     -0.429 0.651***  0.016 
***: p < 0.001 N = 231,122 N = 231,122 
*: p < 0.05 Events = 72,098 Events = 72,098 
  Observations = 1,152,036 Observations = 1,152,036 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Logrank = 99,559 (p < 0.00001) Logrank = 101,743 (p < 0.00001) 
 
The results also show that migrants with a native or foreign-born Dutch partner are 
more likely to naturalise themselves compared to migrants with no partner. Most 
interesting is the temporal dynamic for migrants with a foreign-born Dutch partner. In 
the year in which the partner acquires Dutch citizenship, migrants are more than nine 
times as likely to naturalise as well compared to those with no partner, all else constant. 
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In subsequent years, this effect gradually declines, but remains significant for at least 
three more years. These results support the notion that the decision to naturalise is not 
just made individually, but at least partly at the family level. Since a Dutch partner 
already has a strong interest in staying in the country of destination, emigrating from 
the Netherlands is not done as lightly. If a migrant is likely to remain in the Netherlands 
for an extended period of time, then acquiring Dutch citizenship to enjoy similar rights 
to natives becomes interesting and lucrative. 
Migrants with a foreign-born foreign partner are about 24% less likely to naturalise 
compared to migrants with no partner. If the decision to naturalise is partly made at the 
family level, one can assume that this can have both a positive or negative impact. 
Whilst in families in which the partner naturalises there apparently exists the (shared) 
notion that citizenship acquisition is valuable, in families where the partner does not 
naturalise, this is for some reason not the case. In that sense, migrants with no partner 
have more options, since their propensity to naturalise is influenced neither positively 
nor negatively by a partner’s life situation and ambitions for the future. Generally, these 
results support findings in the Swedish context on the relevance of the partner 
(Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016). 
Contrary to our expectation, having young children is not significantly associated 
with the propensity to naturalise, even though the bivariate analysis showed that 
migrants with young children are naturalised more often. Further analyses show that 
migrants with children are overrepresented in all categories of the other personal and 
contextual characteristics that are positively associated with citizenship acquisition. In 
general, migrants with children are younger at the moment of migration and often have 
a Dutch partner. Also, they generally originate from less developed, politically less 
stable and non-EU countries of origin, and policies in their origin countries often allow 
them to retain their original citizenship when acquiring another. As such, having 
children has no additive effect on the propensity to naturalise. 
Turning from personal to contextual characteristics in Model 1, we observe a 
significant impact of both the level of development and political stability of the country 
of origin. As expected, the relationship is negative, where a higher level of development 
or stability decreases the chance of naturalisation. Migrants from less developed or 
politically unstable countries will be more inclined to naturalise in order to secure their 
legal right to stay in the country of destination, and obtain a formal guarantee not to be 
sent back to their country of origin in the future. In contrast, migrants from more 
developed countries might consider eventually returning to their origin country. 
Furthermore, migrants from countries that do not allow for dual citizenship status are 
2% less likely to acquire citizenship of the destination country, indicating that the 
renunciation requirement is considered an obstacle to naturalisation. Finally, migrants 
from the EU are more than 80% less likely to naturalise, all else constant. 
The Ecology of Immigrant Naturalisation 
59 
The impact of citizenship policy 
Some of the above characteristics have so far received limited systematic attention – 
most notably the relevance of the partner – but the majority of the personal and 
contextual characteristics are widely accepted in the literature. However, where most 
research stops here, we argue that it is crucial to go one step further and address the 
relevance of the destination context. To that end, we investigate the impact of 
citizenship policy in the Netherlands, and more specifically the impact of the revision of 
the Dutch Nationality Act on April 1, 2003, which introduced a formal naturalisation test 
as a requirement for citizenship acquisition. To analyse the relationship between 
citizenship policy and naturalisation, we divide the population of our dataset into three 
groups, namely migrant cohorts 1995–1997, cohorts 1998–1999 and cohorts 2000–
2002. Given the fact that migrants are eligible for naturalisation after 5 years of 
uninterrupted residence, and 3 years for migrants with a Dutch partner, the first cohort 
group (1995–1997) would have been able to naturalise prior to the policy change in 
2003. However, for cohort group 1998–1999, only migrants who immigrated early in 
1998, or those with a Dutch partner would have been eligible for naturalisation under 
the more liberal Dutch Nationality Act of 1985. Migrants who came to the Netherlands 
after April 1, 1998 and who had no Dutch partner would have been forced to 
successfully complete the naturalisation test (and pay the associated financial costs) in 
order to acquire Dutch citizenship. Finally, almost all migrants from the final cohort 
group (2000–2002) became eligible for naturalisation after the policy change in 2003. 
As such, these three cohort groups represent the transition from the relatively liberal to 
the more restrictive citizenship legislation. 
Naturalisation among these cohort groups is compared using Kaplan Meier analyses. 
The associated survival curves, which indicate the cumulative naturalisation over time, 
are illustrated in Figure 3. The proportion of non-naturalised immigrants after 10 years 
of residence (520 weeks) is lowest for migrants from cohort group 1995–1997 (42%), 
who were able to naturalise under the old citizenship policy, and highest for migrants 
from cohort group 2000–2002 (58%), who were almost exclusively forced to naturalise 
under the more restrictive legislation. As expected, cohort group 1998–1999 occupies a 
position between the other groups. Interestingly the survival curves for cohort group 
1995–1997 and 1998–1999 are almost identical during the first 5 years of residence 
(260 weeks), and subsequently diverge. This coincides with the moment in which the 
policy change was implemented for migrant cohort 1998–1999. These findings provide 
general support for the notion that citizenship policy indeed matters, and that migrants 
were less likely to naturalise under the more restrictive institutional conditions 
stipulated by the revised Dutch Nationality Act of 2003. 
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Figure 2a.  Cumulative naturalisation migrant cohort 
1995-1997 by level of development origin country. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Figure 2b.  Cumulative naturalisation migrant cohort 
2000-2002 by level of development origin country. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
 
Although the survival curves illustrate the cumulative naturalisation of the cohort 
groups in general, they do not account for potential differences in composition between 
migrants from these cohort groups. As such, the differences between the survival 
curves in Figure 3 may be due to variation in terms of personal and contextual 
characteristics, rather than differences in the institutional context. To account for this 
potential ecological fallacy, we incorporate the separate migrant cohorts into the 
regression model. The results are shown in Table 1, Model 2, and confirm the findings 
from the Kaplan Meier analyses. There is no statistical difference between migrants 
who came to the Netherlands in 1995, and those who immigrated in 1996. Although 
migrants from cohort 1997 are about 6% less likely to naturalise, they are comparatively 
similar to the cohorts 1995 and 1996. These are migrants who were able to naturalise 
before the policy change in 2003. The subsequent cohort groups are less likely to 
naturalise than cohorts 1995–1997, all else constant, where the impact is stronger for 
cohorts 2000–2002, who are about 35% less likely to naturalise, than for cohorts 1998–
1999, for whom the propensity to naturalise is approximately 26% lower. These findings 
are robust when controlling for right-truncation, which is slightly more prevalent among 
migrants from high developed and stable countries of origin. This confirms that the 
effect shown in Figure 3 is not solely due to compositional differences between the 
cohort groups, at least as far as our covariates are concerned. 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative naturalisation by migrant cohorts. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
 
However, the question is not just if policy matters, but crucially to whom it matters? We 
hypothesise that the transition towards a more restrictive citizenship policy particularly 
affects migrants from less developed countries, who are highly motivated to naturalise 
because the benefits associated with citizenship acquisition are particularly relevant to 
their situation. This hypothesis is confirmed cross-nationally in the European context 
(Vink et al., 2013), but has so far not been analysed longitudinally. To that end, we split 
the outer cohort groups (1995–1997 and 2000–2002) by level of development. 
Migrants are categorised along the mean of development per cohort group. We expect 
that, although the later cohort group is in general less likely to naturalise compared to 
the earlier cohort group, this effect is largely driven by migrants from less developed 
countries. 
Figure 2a and Figure 2b show the survival curves of both cohort groups by level of 
development. In Figure 2a, we see that migrants from cohort group 1995–1997, and 
who originate from less developed countries, naturalise much more quickly than their 
counterparts from high developed countries. Whereas almost 70% of migrants from 
high developed countries is not naturalised after 10 years of residence, this is 30% for 
migrants from less developed countries after the same period of time. However, when 
comparing the survival curves of migrants from high and low developed countries for 
the cohort group 2000–2002 (Figure 2b) the difference is much smaller. Especially 
during the first 5 years of residence, the curves are almost identical. After 10 years of 
residence, about 50% of migrants from less developed countries are not naturalised. In 
contrast, there is hardly any difference for migrants from high developed countries 
between the cohort groups. As such, these findings confirm the notion that the policy 
change primarily affected migrants from less developed countries. Naturalisation was 
principally delayed for these migrants, which is apparent in the continuous decline of 
the survival curve in Figure 2b. It is likely that additional time was needed to accumulate 
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the necessary skills, knowledge and financial means for naturalisation, which increased 
compared to the more liberal institutional context before 2003. However, to a certain 
extent, migrants were demotivated to naturalise altogether, as Figure 2a and Figure 2b 
show that the survival curves for the cohort groups differ for migrants from low 
developed countries, even after 10 years of residence. 
In general, three main conclusions can be derived from this analysis of the impact of 
citizenship policy. First, citizenship policy matters; migrants are less likely to naturalise 
under a more restrictive citizenship policy. These findings remain robust when keeping 
personal and contextual characteristics constant. Second, the impact of citizenship 
policy is not equal among immigrant groups. The difference between migrants who 
could naturalise under relatively liberal conditions and those who could not is 
exclusively driven by migrants from less developed countries. Third, the transition 
towards a more restrictive citizenship policy drives migrants to postpone, and in some 
cases put off naturalisation altogether. 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
In this final paragraph, we perform a number of robustness analyses to assess the 
stability of our findings. First, Figure 2a and Figure 2b reveal that the impact of 
citizenship policy is conditioned by the level of development of the origin country. 
However, the Kaplan Meier analyses do not control for compositional differences 
between these migrant groups and as such, the findings from Figure 2a and Figure 2b 
are not necessarily the product of differences in the institutional context. Therefore, we 
perform a separate regression analysis for migrants from low and high developed 
countries to control for personal and contextual characteristics. This has the added 
benefit that it provides insight into potential variation in the relevance of these 
characteristics between the migrant groups. Table A2 reveals a familiar pattern for 
migrants from less developed countries; migrants from cohorts 1998–1999 are about 
20% less likely to naturalise compared to migrants from cohorts 1995–1997, all else 
constant. This discrepancy is increased to about 35% for cohorts 2000–2002. Note that 
migrants from cohorts 1995 and 1996 no longer statistically differ from those who 
immigrated in 1997. However, the pattern is strongly reversed for migrants from high 
developed countries, as shown in Table A3. Migrant cohorts 1996–1999 are 
approximately 15% less likely to naturalise compared to cohort 1995, all else constant, 
while cohorts 2000–2002 are about 10% more likely to naturalise. These findings 
strongly relate to the survival curves from Figure 2a and Figure 2b, where migrants from 
less developed countries are less likely to naturalise under the more restrictive 
citizenship policy, while migrants from high developed countries are hardly affected in 
their propensity to naturalise under the same conditions. Overall, it can be concluded 
that the findings from Figure 2a and Figure 2b cannot be solely attributed to 
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compositional differences between these migrant groups in terms of included personal 
and contextual characteristics. 
Furthermore, the separate regression analyses reveal that for migrants from less 
developed countries, male immigrants are almost 20% more likely to naturalise than 
female immigrants. This effect is reversed for migrants from high developed countries, 
where males are 37% less likely to naturalise. Also, whereas having children has no 
additive effect on the propensity to naturalise of migrants from less developed 
countries, migrants from high developed countries without children are about 7% less 
likely to naturalise. The impact of dual citizenship also differs between these migrant 
groups: whereas automatic loss of the original nationality results in a decreased 
propensity to naturalise of about 6% for migrants from less developed countries, the 
same condition increases the propensity to naturalise for migrants from high developed 
countries by 15%. Subsequent bivariate analyses reveal that migrants from high 
developed countries who automatically lose their original citizenship when acquiring 
another, indeed naturalise more often than their counterparts, while this pattern is 
reversed for migrants from less developed countries. In general, these findings 
emphasise that both the relevance of personal and contextual characteristics need to 
be understood in the context of immigrant life courses – which are markedly different 
for migrants from high and low developed countries. 
Second, we know from the literature that the educational level of immigrants is an 
important determinant of naturalisation, where low educated migrants are less likely to 
naturalise. Unfortunately, information on the level of education is only available for a 
subsample of migrants from cohorts 2000 onwards. Table A4 shows that the education 
subsample is compositionally similar to the main sample; migrants for whom the level 
of education is known are on average slightly younger when migrating to the 
Netherlands, and more often originate from outside the EU. Table A5 shows that the 
educational level of immigrants matters; middle and high educated migrants are 75% 
and 46% more likely to naturalise than those with low levels of education, all else 
constant. Crucially, controlling for education does not cancel the relevance of all other 
personal and contextual characteristics. As such, it seems that the level of education is 
indeed an important predictor of citizenship acquisition, but there is no reason to 
assume that the absence of education to the main analyses results in misleading or 
incomplete findings with regard to the characteristics included in this model. 
Third, our results show a difference in the propensity to naturalise between 
migrants under the more liberal and restrictive institutional conditions. However, in 
light of the pending policy change, migrants may have decided to naturalise quickly 
prior to April 1, 2003, while the more liberal citizenship policy was still in effect. As such, 
differences in the propensity to naturalise between the migrant cohorts may be largely 
due to this ‘rush into naturalisation’, instead of the more restrictive institutional context 
after the policy change. Figure 3 seems to confirm this notion, given the slight offset in 
the survival curve of migrants from cohort group 1995–1997 after 5 years of residence. 
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To account for this, we added a dummy for the year prior to the policy change (from 
April 1, 2002 until April 1, 2003) to the main model. Table A6 shows that migrants were 
about 37 % more likely to naturalise in the year prior to the policy change, all else 
constant, suggesting that some migrants indeed anticipated the policy change, and 
decided to quickly naturalise under the more liberal conditions. However, the 
differences between the migrant cohorts remain, where the later cohorts are less likely 
to naturalise. 
Finally, although our analysis reveals that migrants from less developed countries 
are particularly affected by a restrictive change in citizenship policy, we hypothesise 
that the reason for this is that these migrants are, for various reasons, particularly 
motivated to naturalise. As such, an increased residence requirement, the introduction 
of a naturalisation test, or an increase in financial costs will be principally considered an 
obstacle to citizenship acquisition for these migrant groups. Following this line of 
reasoning, the selective impact of citizenship policy should not just apply to migrants 
from less developed countries, but also to other migrant groups who are highly 
motivated to naturalise, such as migrants from politically unstable countries. Figure A1a 
and Figure A1b illustrate the survival curves for migrant cohorts 1995–1997 and 2000–
2002, split by the level of political stability of the origin country. Migrants are 
aggregated into low and high stability countries along the mean per cohort group. 
Results reveal a pattern that is similar to the analysis by level of development; migrants 
from cohorts 1995–1997 are more likely to naturalise than those from cohorts 2000–
2002. However, crucially, migrants from politically less stable countries are more 
affected by the policy change than those from stable countries of origin, as is apparent 
from the limited difference between the survival curves in the latter cohort group 
compared to the former. After 300 weeks (approximately 6 years) of residence, less 
than 40% of migrants from cohort group 1995–1997, who originate from less stable 
countries are not naturalised, compared to 70% after the same period for cohorts 
2000–2002. Of migrants from cohort group 1995–1997, who originate from politically 
stable countries of origin, 65% is not naturalised after 300 weeks of residence, 
compared to about 80% for cohorts 2000–2002. Even after 10 years of residence (520 
weeks), the difference between the survival curves of the cohort groups is twice as 
large for migrants from less stable countries, compared to those from more stable 
countries of origin. These findings confirm the notion that restrictive citizenship policies 
particularly affect migrants who are strongly motivated to naturalise. More generally, 
these results emphasise that not only economic, but also political characteristics of the 
country of origin are an important aspect in the decision to naturalise or not. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we analysed determinants of citizenship acquisition in the Netherlands 
using register data from Statistics Netherlands. Neither a longitudinal research design, 
nor these unique register data, has so far been used in the Dutch context for 
naturalisation research. The analysis was divided into two parts: first we analysed the 
relevance of personal and contextual characteristics to the propensity to naturalise. 
Besides traditional characteristics, we put specific emphasis on social relations as a key 
element in the decision-making process. Results confirm earlier findings on prevalent 
characteristics in the literature, where the decision to naturalise is largely based on the 
perceived utility of citizenship acquisition in light of the country of origin and one’s 
personal life situation. Migrants from less developed or politically unstable countries are 
more likely to naturalise, as are migrants who do not lose their original citizenship upon 
acquiring another, and those originating from outside the EU. Furthermore, migrants 
who are younger when immigrating to the Netherlands are more likely to naturalise. 
Our analysis also points towards the relevance of one’s partner. Migrants with a Dutch 
partner (either native or naturalised) are more likely to naturalise than those with no 
partner. However, for migrants with a foreign-born foreign partner this relationship is 
reversed. Furthermore, migrants with a foreign-born Dutch partner particularly 
naturalise during the year in which the partner acquires Dutch citizenship. In 
subsequent years, the effect gradually declines, but remains positive for at least 3 years. 
These results point towards the risk of assuming that the utility of citizenship is 
evaluated in a social vacuum. Our analysis suggests that migrants who live together, and 
are an important part of each other’s lives, also make important decisions together. 
Studies that ignore this social aspect of the decision-making process fail to do justice to 
the complexity of immigrant lives. Furthermore, marital status is not a viable substitute 
to measure this social dynamic, since the effect of the partner on the propensity to 
naturalise is not uniformly positive. 
However, our most important findings refer to the second part of the analysis: the 
relevance of citizenship policy. More specifically, we focus on the revised Dutch 
Nationality Act of April 1, 2003, which introduced a naturalisation test and generally 
stipulated more restrictive conditions for citizenship acquisition. We compared migrant 
cohorts who were eligible for naturalisation prior to this policy amendment, and those 
who were forced to acquire Dutch citizenship under the more restrictive regulations. 
The conclusions of this analysis are twofold: first, we show that policy matters. Migrant 
cohorts who became eligible after the policy change, and thus faced more restrictive 
institutional conditions, naturalised less quickly and less often than those under the 
more liberal policy. In other words, it is important to account for the institutional 
context of the destination country, which provides a framework of rules and regulations 
determining who is able to naturalise under particular conditions. Clearly these 
requirements factor into the decision – or even the ability – to naturalise or not. 
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Second, and most importantly, the impact of policy is not equal across migrant groups. 
Due to large differences in the underlying motivation to naturalise, migrants from less 
developed countries benefit from citizenship acquisition most, and are highly motivated 
to naturalise. As such, their ability to quickly naturalise depends strongly on the 
conditions set by citizenship policies, which make this a realistic proposition or not. 
Indeed, our analysis shows that migrants naturalise later and less often under more 
restrictive institutional conditions, especially those migrants from less developed and 
politically unstable countries of origin. These findings are consistent with earlier cross-
national findings in the European context (Vink et al., 2015), but this is the first 
longitudinal analysis to confirm this relationship. Furthermore, the results are highly 
robust.  
As such, citizenship policies of the destination context play an important role in 
immigrant naturalisation, yet few micro-level studies specifically address their 
respective contexts. More explicit theorisation and analyses on the relevance of the 
destination context may help explain empirical variation between countries that cannot 
be explained by personal and origin characteristics. Furthermore, our analysis of the 
relevance of education has, due to data-limitations, been addressed less than ideally. 
Further research is needed to assess the robustness of our findings in light of a better 
measurement of education, as well as other socio-economic characteristics (Reichel & 
Perchinig, 2015). 
Finally, these findings also raise important new questions for policy-makers. If 
indeed citizenship acquisition has the potential to facilitate and expedite the integration 
process, and citizenship policies stipulate the conditions under which citizenship 
acquisition is de facto possible, then restrictive citizenship policies may potentially 
hamper opportunities for full participation and integration of immigrants. Our analysis 
indeed shows that more restrictive citizenship policies demotivate migrants to 
naturalise. This is particularly the case for migrants who may find it difficult to meet the 
requirements for naturalisation due to a lack of resources and skills, namely those from 
less developed or politically unstable countries. These are also the very migrants who 
are in need of citizenship the most. The revision of the Dutch Nationality Act in 2003 
was a direct response to the perceived failure of previous integration policies, and the 
implementation of civic integration requirements was part of a political agenda to 
improve immigrant integration. Yet, given our findings, one could question the success 
of these measures. After all, we find that migrants for whom citizenship acquisition is a 
potentially valuable asset to their integration were particularly deterred by the more 
restrictive citizenship policy. As such, it would seem that the consequence of the policy 
reform was not so much that integration of immigrants was facilitated or improved, but 
rather that Dutch citizenship became more exclusive. 
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Chapter 4 
Anticipating the Citizenship Premium: 
Before and After Effects of Immigrant 
Naturalisation on Employment10 
 
 
 
  
                                                                
10 This chapter is published as: Peters, F., Vink, M., & Schmeets, H. (2017). Anticipating the Citizenship 
Premium: Before and After Effects of Immigrant Naturalisation on Employment. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1367650. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research consistently shows that migrants are at a disadvantage compared to natives in 
the labour market when it comes to return rates on their level of education and labour 
market experience (Heath & Cheung, 2007; Lancee, 2012; van Tubergen et al., 2004). 
Policy-makers of receiving countries have a strong incentive to facilitate the quick and 
successful incorporation of immigrants into the labour market, both to ensure migrants’ 
self-sufficiency and independence from welfare benefits, and to promote their 
opportunities for full participation and integration. In this regard, acquiring citizenship 
of the destination country can potentially facilitate the process of economic integration 
(OECD, 2011). This chapter analyses how and to what extent citizenship is relevant for 
the labour market integration of immigrants in terms of employment.  
Many studies have found that there is a positive association between citizenship 
acquisition and labour market integration (e.g. Bakker, Dagevos, & Engbersen, 2016; 
Fougère & Safi, 2009; Helgertz et al., 2014; Steinhardt, 2012), yet the mechanisms 
through which citizenship affects economic integration remain unclear. The established 
theoretical framework focusses on how citizenship acquisition facilitates access to the 
labour market, reduces administrative costs in the hiring process and functions as a 
positive signalling device, but these mechanisms fail to explain substantial empirical 
ambiguity. Indeed, an examination of the literature reveals that (a) the positive 
economic impact of citizenship is not observed for all migrant groups or (b) in all 
countries and (c) the extent to which naturalisation has an effect differs per migrant 
group and national context, and in some cases is even observed to be negative 
(Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011; Engdahl, 2011; Helgertz et al., 2014; Scott, 2008). This 
ambiguous picture has so far been predominantly attributed to the methodological 
challenge of an analysis of the economic consequences of naturalisation. Individuals 
who naturalise may differ from those who do not in terms of non-trivial characteristics 
such as motivation or ability, which are hard to measure and control for, thus 
introducing the risk of overestimating the relevance of citizenship (Bratsberg et al., 
2002, pp. 581–582). However, even when accounting for this ‘self-selection’ bias using 
panel data, the contradictory findings persist, as some migrants enjoy a so-called 
citizenship premium, whereas others do not. As such, a substantial amount of literature 
suggests at least some effect of naturalisation, but there is still limited understanding in 
the literature as to why, when and for whom citizenship matters or not.  
In this chapter, we go beyond the signalling argument, and argue that better labour 
market outcomes prior to the moment of naturalisation are not solely due to self-
selection, but also reflect a human capital investment by immigrants in order to meet 
the requirements of naturalisation. Moreover, immigrants anticipate the rewards and 
opportunities that citizenship will offer in the future. As such, we expect the probability 
of employment to increase before, and not only after naturalisation, even when 
controlling for endogeneity in the naturalisation process. This ‘anticipation effect’ 
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manifests prior to the moment of naturalisation because it reflects the outcome of the 
decision to naturalise rather than citizenship acquisition itself. To test this new 
theoretical approach, we initially follow the state-of-the-art empirical strategy as 
developed by Bratsberg et al. (2002), and subsequently adjust this strategy to analyse a 
potential anticipation effect in greater detail.  
We use data from Dutch population registers and the Dutch System of Social 
Statistical Datasets, containing almost all registered first-generation immigrants in the 
Netherlands (N = 94,320), which allows us to track and compare the citizenship status 
and labour market performance of these immigrants over time. The chapter is 
structured as follows: first, we briefly outline the Dutch context, followed by the 
theoretical framework and hypothesis. We continue by detailing the dataset, 
operationalisation and methodology. Subsequently, results from the analyses are 
presented, and finally we discuss the conclusions and implications of our findings. 
CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
The number of foreign-born individuals migrating to the Netherlands has fluctuated over 
the last decades, from roughly 95,000 in 1998 and 71,000 in 2005 to 132,000 in 2011. 
Figures from Statistics Netherlands show that on January 2011, roughly 1,735,000 foreign-
born individuals resided in the Netherlands, constituting 10.4% of the entire population.  
Under the conditions of the revised Dutch Nationality Act of April 2003, migrants are 
eligible for citizenship acquisition when at least 18 years of age, having a residence 
permit for an undefined period of time and residing legally in the Netherlands for an 
uninterrupted period of 5 years. If an individual is the registered partner of a Dutch 
national for three consecutive years, only a non-temporary residence permit and 
principal residence in the Netherlands is required. Furthermore, migrants should 
renounce their original citizenship (although numerous exceptions to the renunciation 
requirement exist) and not constitute a danger to public order (i.e. have no criminal 
record). Being employed before or at the moment of naturalisation is not a requirement 
for citizenship acquisition. Migrants do have to pass a language and integration 
requirement by successfully completing a formalised naturalisation test. To pass this 
test, migrants have to be able to read, write and speak Dutch at level A2 of the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, and possess sufficient 
knowledge of the Dutch society. These requirements constitute a significant hurdle to 
naturalisation, particularly for migrants who are most interested to naturalise (see 
Chapter 3 for details). As such, citizenship acquisition is not simply an isolated and 
abrupt legal status transition, but rather a process that requires careful planning and 
preparation, starting the moment a migrant decides to naturalise in the future. In terms 
of formal benefits, Dutch citizenship provides a secure legal status and full voting rights, 
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as well as access to a small number of professions that are restricted to non-citizens, 
namely jobs in the army and high-ranking positions in law and the public sector, such as 
judges and members of parliament. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Citizenship in the context of immigrant employment 
Immigrants generally perform worse in the labour market than natives. These 
disadvantages are often explained in the framework of human capital theory (Becker, 
1964). Human capital, understood as an individuals’ endowment of intrinsic ability in 
terms of capacities and skills, as well as educational qualifications and work experience, 
is generally poorer for migrants compared to natives for various reasons. Skills 
concerning the successful navigation of the labour market, as well as formal and 
informal credentials, are not equally relevant or valued across national contexts 
(Friedberg, 2000). Migrants are also generally at a disadvantage with regard to mastery 
of the native language (van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2005). Furthermore, employers may be 
less inclined to hire a foreign-born job candidate due to the perceived risk of short-term 
emigration, or in the context of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972).  
Within this framework of labour market disadvantages of immigrants, citizenship 
acquisition is perceived by policy-makers as a potentially promising vehicle to mitigate 
at least some of these issues, and promote immigrant integration (OECD, 2011). The 
literature has identified three mechanisms by which citizenship of the host country 
contributes to the labour market opportunities of immigrants (Liebig & von Haaren, 
2011). First, naturalised migrants gain access to jobs that require citizenship of the host 
country, such as professions in the police force, the army or the public sector. Second, 
employers face administrative costs when hiring a foreigner, such as the verification of 
worker rights, which are not relevant to naturalised migrants. Third, citizenship may 
play an important role in the hiring process within the framework of statistical 
discrimination by functioning as a positive signalling device. Employers may assume 
naturalised migrants are positively selected, placating feelings of uncertainty with 
regard to hiring the foreign-born individual. 
The ambiguous economic impact of citizenship 
The above arguments constitute a common theoretical framework in the literature on 
citizenship and labour market integration. However, empirical findings do not 
universally support the notion of a citizenship premium. For instance, most longitudinal 
studies reveal some positive effects of naturalisation, but also show that the 
relationship is to a varying degree (and in some cases entirely) attributable to self-
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selection (Bratsberg et al., 2002; Engdahl, 2014; Scott, 2008; Steinhardt, 2012). 
Moreover, the citizenship premium is sometimes only observed for particular migrant 
groups, such as those from economically less developed countries of origin (Fougère & 
Safi, 2009). It is hard to compare these studies in the literature given notable 
differences in the types of data, methods and controls, but it is clear that there is 
substantial empirical heterogeneity between contributions, even when accounting for 
endogeneity in the naturalisation process (see Helgertz et al. [2014, p. 343] for an 
overview). Surprisingly, there is almost no theorising in the literature on potential 
explanations for these contradictory findings, which might answer why and for whom 
citizenship matters. Whereas most of the literature focusses on the relationship 
between naturalisation and wages, the main underlying mechanism – namely positive 
signalling – seems particularly relevant in the context of having employment or not. 
Hiring an immigrant implies risk due to potentially unfamiliar qualifications and possible 
short-term emigration. Employers thus look at indicators for motivation, commitment 
and the intention to stay. The naturalised status is an example of such an indicator, but 
so is being employed. Citizenship of the host country is therefore particularly relevant 
to non-employed migrants, since the current occupation of employed individuals has a 
positive signalling effect in its own right. Moreover, positive signalling matters most 
when employers have limited information on the basis of which they can assess the 
suitability of a migrant for a job. This will particularly be the case for immigrants who 
are still trying to secure their first job after migration, for whom no record of their 
occupational performance in the host country exists. In other words, signalling will 
particularly facilitate access to the labour market rather than occupational mobility. As 
such, there seems to be a mismatch between the prevalent object of study, namely 
earnings, and the main theoretical mechanism that explains the relationship between 
citizenship acquisition and labour market integration, which is particularly relevant in 
the context of acquiring employment.  
Furthermore, the traditional mechanisms in the literature imply a causal 
relationship, where citizenship acquisition precedes positive labour market outcomes. 
However, many studies suggest an increase in economic integration already prior to 
naturalisation, even when controlling for endogeneity (Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 
198; Engdahl, 2014, p. 20; Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 353). In that context, we argue for a 
more complex understanding of the mechanisms underlying the citizenship premium.  
Anticipating naturalisation  
The main mechanism through which citizenship is commonly expected to affect the 
economic integration of immigrants is positive signalling. As such, the literature considers 
the citizenship premium to be predominantly the product of employers’ perception of 
immigrants, which is assumed to be more positive when citizenship is acquired. From this 
notion generally follows the assumption that citizenship should have a positive impact on 
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the chances of employment of immigrants after naturalisation (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 
344). Indeed, it is argued that the moment of naturalisation marks the threshold where 
employers are able to identify that a particular migrant is committed to stay and 
integrate into the host society. Given the inherently selective process of naturalisation, 
studies in this field of literature typically account for so-called self-selection. The 
assumption here is that migrants who naturalise perform better in the labour market 
even before naturalisation due to characteristics that are associated with both an 
increased propensity to naturalise and better labour market outcomes, but which are not 
explicitly linked to the moment of naturalisation itself. Figure 4 schematically illustrates 
this point, where migrants who naturalise already exhibit an advantage in the labour 
market (line d) compared to migrants who never naturalise (line e), even before the 
moment of naturalisation. This advantage remains equal over time, and is the result of 
endogenous characteristics such as motivation or ability (Bratsberg et al., 2002, pp. 572–
573). These characteristics are unrelated to the moment of naturalisation, even though 
they are related to the propensity to naturalise. The notion of the citizenship premium as 
traditionally understood in the literature then assumes that – besides the positive 
selection into naturalisation – the employability of immigrants increases after citizenship 
acquisition due to more positive outcomes of statistical discrimination.  
However, citizenship acquisition is not an abrupt legal status transition, but rather a 
process that requires careful planning and preparation leading up to naturalisation. The 
decision to naturalise is typically understood as the result of a cost–benefit consideration. 
But qualitative research on motivations for naturalisation shows that what appears to be 
instrumental reasons for naturalisation can actually signal attachment and interest in full 
membership, and is conceptualised by immigrants as a logical step on the road towards 
building a life in the host country (Aptekar, 2015, p. 65). Furthermore, immigrant lives do 
not exist in a vacuum. Plans and ambitions for the future are made in the context of the 
life course (Wingens et al., 2011). Important choices in the lives of immigrants, including 
the decision to permanently settle and naturalise, are embedded in a broader social and 
institutional framework. Countries can channel political incorporation through policies of 
diversity and newcomer settlement, facilitating structured mobilisation by friends, family, 
communities and local leaders (Bloemraad, 2006). As such, citizenship acquisition takes 
place in a broader social and societal context in which the decision to naturalise in the 
future is not trivial. Furthermore, citizenship policies provide the opportunity structure 
under which citizenship acquisition is de facto possible. Most European countries have 
formalised the conditions for eligibility into not only a minimum period of (legal) 
residence, but also obligatory language and civic integration requirements. These 
conditions imply that migrants need to invest in themselves, most notably in linguistic 
terms, if they wish to naturalise in the future. Moreover, migrants who have decided to 
naturalise in the future are likely to invest in host-country specific human capital to make 
use of the opportunities that citizenship acquisition will offer, such as unrestricted access 
to the labour market. Indeed, multiple studies show that migrants have an economic 
Chapter 4 
74 
incentive to acquire citizenship of the host country, as naturalisation has the potential to 
increase earnings for some migrant groups (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 353; Bratsberg et al., 
2002, p. 582; Steinhardt, 2012, p. 819). This human capital development in anticipation of 
acquiring citizenship will increase the probability of employment leading up to the 
moment of naturalisation. For instance, investment in mastery of the native language – 
which is a prevalent requirement for naturalisation in European countries – has often 
been shown to yield positive labour market outcomes (e.g. Kee & von Ophem, 1996). This 
effect is illustrated in line c of Figure 4. What fundamentally separates this anticipation 
effect from what is traditionally perceived as self-selection (represented by line d) is 
timing. Migrants who naturalise differ from those who do not in terms of unmeasured 
capacities and skills that positively affect their probability of employment (line d and e). 
But these effects are not part of the naturalisation process. In other words, self-selection 
is related to the propensity to naturalise but not the act of naturalisation itself. In contrast, 
the anticipation effect reflects the consequences of the decision to naturalise, and is 
therefore intimately linked to the process of naturalisation. Finally, lines a and b of Figure 
4 illustrate the traditional notion that the citizenship premium not only manifests as an 
anticipation effect, but also as a one-time upward shift (line a) or gradual increase (line b) 
in the probability of employment following naturalisation. Our expectation is thus that 
under conditions where naturalisation requires demonstrable integration skills, citizenship 
acquisition has a positive effect on the probability of having employment of immigrants 
during the period leading up to the moment of naturalisation, even when controlling for 
endogeneity in the naturalisation process.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Schematic illustration citizenship premium. 
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DATA AND METHODS  
We use register data from Statistics Netherlands to analyse the relevance of citizenship 
for the probability of employment of immigrants in the Netherlands. These data provide 
information on almost all registered foreign-born residents of the Netherlands from 
1999 until 2011, and is based on municipal population registers, complemented by 
information from The System of Social Statistical Datasets. We keep track of individuals 
per 6 months, starting from the moment of arrival in the Netherlands, and until they 
either emigrate or reach the end of the observation period (January 2012).  
We focus on migrants who arrived in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2002 for 
two reasons. First, almost all migrants from these cohorts are eligible for citizenship 
under the same conditions. Second, we are interested in the labour market 
performance of immigrants before and after naturalisation. Given the fact that we only 
have employment data from 1999 onwards, we are unable to analyse the period before 
naturalisation in its entirety for migrants arriving before this point in time. We analyse 
cohorts no later than 2002 to be able to track immigrants of all cohorts for more than 9 
years. The maximum period of observation is fixed at 10 years for all cohorts. The 
analysis focusses on foreign-born immigrants who have not yet acquired Dutch 
citizenship before the observation period (N = 94,320). Hence, migrants born in 
Suriname before 1975, and those born in the Netherlands Antilles are excluded from 
the analysis, since these migrants are often Dutch citizens by birth. We perform 
separate analyses for men and women to account for differing labour market 
orientations between genders, as well as potential gender discrimination in the labour 
market.  
The dependent variable in the analysis is employment. The focus on employment as 
opposed to other forms of economic integration (such as earnings) is an explicit 
decision made for two reasons: first, the potential relationship between citizenship and 
wages is a fundamentally different research question, focusing on a different research 
population (namely migrants with employment). Second, the main mechanism 
explaining the relationship between citizenship and economic integration in the 
literature is predominantly relevant in the context of acquiring employment rather than 
wages. Indeed, the few studies focusing on both employment and income show that 
citizenship matters in terms of employment, but less so for annual earnings conditional 
on being employed (Engdahl, 2011, 2014). We dichotomise between having 
employment in contrast to not being employed. Employed individuals are employees 
and the self-employed, whereas the non-employed are those who seek work and 
individuals who are inactive in the labour market by choice. Hence, the analysis focusses 
on the active labour force, complemented by those who are not active by choice, such 
as domestic workers or individuals who have become demotivated due to negative 
experiences in the labour market. While the latter, inactive group may not be seeking 
employment, we include them for two reasons. First, we have no definitive way to 
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distinguish between those who seek employment, and those who could, but choose not 
to. Second, we are interested in the role of citizenship to the probability of being 
employed, including for those migrants who are less active in the labour market, for 
instance due to demotivating experiences (Lancee, 2012, pp. 58–59). We exclude 
migrants who are inactive and clearly identifiable as such, namely students, retirees and 
individuals with health problems or disabilities that impede their participation in the 
labour market. In accordance with the literature (e.g. Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 347), we 
also exclude migrants younger than 20 and older than 50 years at the moment of arrival 
in the Netherlands. These boundaries were chosen to further focus the selection on 
those who could be active in the labour market, and who likely have similar incentives 
to integrate into the labour market (Engdahl, 2014, p. 11).  
The independent variables can be categorised as either individual or contextual 
characteristics. Individual characteristics include citizenship, age at the moment of 
migration, years since migration, the citizenship status of the potential partner and 
having young children in the household, while contextual characteristics include the 
level of economic development and EU-membership of the origin country. We keep 
track of changes in individual characteristics per 6 months, and in contextual 
characteristics per year.11  
Our empirical strategy follows the state-of-the-art method developed by Bratsberg 
et al. (2002). In line with earlier research in this field of literature (Helgertz et al., 2014; 
Steinhardt, 2012), we use (distributed) logistic individual fixed-effects regression, and 
distinguish between three parameters of interest that measure the relevance of 
citizenship. The first parameter (𝑎𝑎1) is an interaction between a time-invariant dummy 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) set to unity if a migrant naturalises within the observation period, and years since 
migration (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). As such, this parameter provides an indication of a potentially steeper 
slope of years since migration for migrants who naturalise (line c of Figure 4). Note that 
this effect is already present prior to naturalisation. The second parameter (𝑎𝑎2) 
captures any additional growth in the probability of employment surrounding the 
moment of naturalisation. This is an interaction between a dummy set to unity in the 
year that a migrant acquires citizenship and all subsequent years (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and a variable 
for years since naturalisation (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The latter is a continuous variable that is 
negative prior to naturalisation, positive after naturalisation, and 0 in the year of 
citizenship acquisition. A positive coefficient thus indicates a steeper increase in the 
probability of employment after naturalisation (line b), whereas a negative coefficient is 
indicative of the slope after naturalisation being less steep compared to migrants who 
are not naturalised. Finally, the third parameter (𝑎𝑎0) is a dummy set to unity in the year 
a migrant is naturalised and all subsequent years (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), thus capturing a potential one-
                                                                
11 Due to the relatively small cohort selection, there is a strong relationship between years since migration 
and the observation years. Detailed analyses confirm multicollinearity when the observation years are added 
to the models (VIF > 7) (O’brien, 2007). For this reason, we refrain from including dummies for the 
observation years in our analyses. 
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time shift in the probability of employment after naturalisation (line a). We include 
individual fixed-effects (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) in all our models to control for unmeasured time-invariant 
heterogeneity between individuals (the difference between line d and line e). 
Furthermore, we control for variables which feature substantial change over time, and 
thus are not captured by the individual fixed-effects (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). First, we include the partner 
status, distinguishing between having no partner, a foreign-born foreign partner (a non-
naturalised partner), a foreign-born Dutch partner (a naturalised partner) and a native 
partner. When a migrant has one or more children below the age of 18 in the 
household, we classify them as having children. Furthermore, given substantial 
differences in the propensity to naturalise between migrant groups (Vink et al., 2013), 
we perform separate analyses for migrants from different origin contexts, focusing on 
the level of economic development and EU-membership of origin countries. Although 
most studies in the literature focus on origin regions (e.g. Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011; 
Engdahl, 2014; Helgertz et al., 2014), we argue that these predominantly measure 
different levels of development. The level of development of the origin country is 
measured through the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2014). The HDI combines 
information on gross domestic product, indicators for life expectancy and general 
education levels, providing a scale between 0 and 1, where a higher score equals a 
higher level of development. We keep track of changes in EU-membership of origin 
countries over time. The main econometric equation is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  γ𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Table A7 in the annex contains descriptive statistics for male and female immigrants, 
respectively. We observe a higher proportion of employed individuals among male 
immigrants. As expected, migrants who naturalise eventually perform better in the 
labour market, although this is not yet the case many years prior to the actual moment 
of naturalisation. Furthermore, the relevance of the additional individual and contextual 
characteristics corresponds to findings in the literature (Kogan, 2011; van Tubergen et 
al., 2004).  
To analyse these data in further detail, we use logistic individual fixed-effects 
regression, which is the method used in the state-of-the-art literature (Bratsberg & 
Raaum, 2011; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Engdahl, 2014; Helgertz et al., 2014; Steinhardt, 
2012). This method allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity 
between individuals. This includes characteristics of the country of origin and the 
migration motive, but also concepts that are difficult to measure, such as motivation or 
ability. Since the fixed-effects regression focusses on differences within individuals over 
time, this implies that individuals who do not vary on the dependent variable are 
excluded from the model. Hence, migrants who always or never have employment 
during the observation period cannot be taken into account in the fixed-effects analysis. 
To increase transparency regarding potential selection bias resulting from omitted 
individuals due to non-variance, we perform a detailed comparison between the group 
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with and without variance on the dependent variable. We discuss those analyses in the 
paragraph ‘robustness analyses’. 
ANALYSIS  
Table 2 contains the results of the logistic individual fixed-effects regression, providing 
estimates for the three parameters on citizenship outlined in the ‘data and methods’ 
section, as well as a number of control variables. Results show that immigrants who 
naturalise enjoy a one-time boost in the probability of employment after citizenship 
acquisition, constituting an increase of 12% and 13% for men and women, respectively, 
all else constant. This effect is consistent with the notion that naturalised migrants are 
attractive to employers due to reduced administrative costs and positive signalling, and 
in line with some earlier longitudinal research (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 352). 
Furthermore, the interaction between years since migration and whether a migrant 
naturalises during the observation period indicates that migrants who naturalise 
integrate substantially faster in the labour market than their counterparts even before 
the moment of naturalisation, which is a common observation in the literature (e.g. 
Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 196; Engdahl, 2014, p. 18; Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 352). 
Finally, the coefficient of the interaction between years since naturalisation and 
whether a migrant is naturalised or not is negative for both men and women, indicating 
that the probability of employment develops faster for migrants who are not (yet) 
naturalised. This goes contrary to the traditional interpretation of the citizenship 
premium, although this pattern is frequently observed in the literature (e.g. Bratsberg & 
Raaum, 2011, p. 196; Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 852; Scott, 2008, p. 118). We hypothesise 
that the positive effects prior to naturalisation are due to the investment that migrants 
make in anticipation of acquiring citizenship. Citizenship acquisition is not an abrupt 
legal status transition, but a process that starts the moment migrants decide to 
naturalise. The formal linguistic and civic requirements for citizenship acquisition imply 
that migrants need to invest in themselves leading up to naturalisation. Moreover, 
migrants who have decided to naturalise may invest in host-country specific human 
capital to enjoy the economic benefits associated with naturalisation (Helgertz et al., 
2014, p. 353; Bratsberg et al., 2002, p. 582; Steinhardt, 2012, p. 819). The steeper slope 
prior to naturalisation provides empirical support for these assumptions. Furthermore, 
the diminishing returns after citizenship acquisition may be due to the fact that 
naturalised migrants have undergone an accelerated integration trajectory leading up 
to naturalisation, and that migrants who do not naturalise thus catch up afterwards. As 
mentioned, the hypothesised anticipation effect is fundamentally different from self-
selection. The generally high levels of motivation and commitment of migrants who 
naturalise results in a stronger baseline position for these migrants, but this 
endogeneity effect is unrelated to the act of naturalisation. The anticipation effect, 
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however, is an integral part of the naturalisation process, reflecting the consequences 
of the decision to acquire citizenship of the host country.  
The relevance of the other time-varying characteristics corresponds to the patterns 
from the descriptive statistics, as well as previous findings in the literature (Kogan, 
2011; van Tubergen et al., 2004). The longer migrants reside in the host country, the 
higher their probability of having employment. Having a partner is positively associated 
with the probability of having employment for both men and women. This is particularly 
true if the partner is native-born, in which case migrants are more than twice as likely to 
be employed compared to migrants with no partner. In accordance with earlier findings 
in the literature, the relevance of having a partner is more pronounced for men than for 
women (Kogan, 2011). Having children in the household has a positive, but limited 
effect on the employment probability of male immigrants (an increase of 3%). As 
expected, this effect is strongly reversed for female immigrants, who are almost 54% 
less likely to be employed when having young children (Kogan, 2011). Clearly, having 
children has dissimilar employment implications in the life course of men and women. 
Table 2. Logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment of male and 
female immigrants, cohorts 1999-2002. 
 Men Women 
  Coef. Std. error Exp. coef.   Coef. Std. error Exp. coef.   
Naturalisation         
Yes 0.117 0.017 1.124***  0.123 0.016 1.131***  
No ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
Years since migration* naturalisation 
during observation period 
0.278 0.003 1.320***  0.230 0.003 1.259***  
Years since 
naturalisation*naturalisation 
-0.177 0.006 0.838***  -0.170 0.006 0.844***  
Years since migration 0.095 0.001 1.100***  0.149 0.002 1.161***  
Partner         
No partner ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
Foreign-born foreign partner 0.346 0.011 1.413***  0.334 0.013 1.397***  
Foreign-born Dutch partner 0.838 0.015 2.312***  0.516 0.017 1.675***  
Native-born Dutch partner 0.820 0.016 2.270***  0.766 0.013 2.151***  
Children < 18 in the household         
Yes 0.031 0.010 1.031***  -0.768 0.010 0.464***  
No ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
**: p < 0.01 N = 48,969 N = 45,351 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 707,644 Observations = 697,992 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 772,533 -2 Log-likelihood = 758,587 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
 
On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that citizenship matters. But are these 
findings driven by migrants from a particular origin context? In other words, to whom 
does citizenship matter? To answer this question, we perform separate analyses for 
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migrants from more/less developed (Table 3) and EU/non-EU (Table 4) countries of 
origin. In terms of development, migrants have been categorised along the median of 
male and female immigrants respectively.12  
We find some evidence of heterogeneity in naturalisation effects by descent. More 
specifically, the coefficient of the one-time effect of citizenship acquisition is higher for 
male immigrants from more developed countries, and female immigrant from EU 
countries of origin. However, the discrepancy with the reference category is almost 
equal for female immigrants from more and less developed countries, and smaller for 
male immigrants from the EU. The slope for migrants who have not (yet) naturalised is 
steeper for those from less developed and non-EU countries of origin compared to their 
naturalised counterparts, with the exception of women from high developed countries. 
Migrants from all origin contexts enjoy an accelerated integration trajectory already 
prior to naturalisation. A comparison between groups on the basis of these coefficients 
should be considered with care, since the baselines are not necessarily comparable 
across the origin groups. The results, therefore, do not allow for conclusions whether 
citizenship has a stronger effect for migrants from one origin context compared to the 
other. These findings do show that the results from Table 2 are not exclusively driven by 
migrants from a particular origin context.  
Although these findings provide a first indication of an anticipation effect, the 
interaction between years since migration and whether a migrant naturalises during the 
observation period does not reveal the exact shape of the pattern before and after 
naturalisation. To analyse this in detail, we perform a distributed logistic individual 
fixed-effects regression in which we measure citizenship categorically, based on the 
amount of time between a given observation point and the moment of naturalisation. 
Since this analysis is specifically designed to illuminate how citizenship matters rather 
than whether it matters or not (which is the main focus of Tables 2–4), we focus on 
migrants who naturalise during the observation period. The reference group are 
migrants in the period more than 3 years prior to naturalisation.  
  
                                                                
12 Note that the sum of individuals of the separate groups does not exactly equal the aggregate number of 
individuals, whereas the number of observations does. The reason for this is that both the level of 
development and EU-membership of origin countries exhibit minor changes over time. As a result, some 
individuals have observations in both groups. 
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The results in Figure 5 show that – in line with our expectation – the labour market 
performance of immigrants improves leading up to naturalisation (detailed coefficients 
of the figures are reported in Tables A8-A10). More specifically, the probability of 
employment of migrants who naturalise is lower more than 3 years prior to 
naturalisation compared to all subsequent time points. Consistent with the notion of 
anticipation, the labour market performance peaks in the year prior to naturalisation. At 
that point, both male and female immigrants are more than twice as likely to have 
employment compared to more than 3 years prior to naturalisation. Note that the 
coefficients are relatively large due to the focus on naturalising immigrants. After 
naturalisation, the coefficients start to drop, particularly for male immigrants, meaning 
that the additive effect of naturalisation eventually decreases. This may explain why the 
slope after naturalisation is less steep for naturalised migrants compared to their non-
naturalised counterparts. Migrants who naturalise enjoy an accelerated integration 
trajectory rather than a systematic advantage (with the exception of the one-time effect 
after naturalisation, which is stable over time), allowing migrants who do not naturalise 
to eventually catch up.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Distributed logistic individual fixed-effects regression on the probability of having paid employment of 
male of female immigrants, cohorts 1999-2002.† 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
 
To what extent is the pattern from Figure 5 driven by migrants from a particular origin 
context? Figures 6 and 7 provide the results of separate analyses by the level of 
development and EU-membership of the origin country, respectively (see Table A9 and 
A10 in the annex for details). Again, the positive slope prior to naturalisation is apparent 
for immigrants from both more and less developed countries of origin. These findings 
thus show that the temporal pattern is similar between these origin groups. It is harder 
to derive conclusions from the separate analyses of migrants from EU and non-EU 
countries of origin, since the confidence intervals for EU migrants are substantial. The 
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main reason for this is that migrants from the EU generally have a low propensity to 
naturalise and as such, the N of this group is smaller. In line with the findings from 
Figure 5, we observe an increase in the probability of employment leading up to the 
moment of naturalisation for both EU and non-EU migrants. We can conclude that the 
pattern from Figure 5 is not solely driven by migrants from a specific origin context. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Distributed logistic individual fixed-effects regression on the probability of having employment of male 
and female immigrants from low/high developed countries who naturalise during the observation period, cohorts 
1999-2002.† 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Figure 7.  Distributed logistic individual fixed-effects regression on the probability of having employment of male and 
female immigrants from non-EU/EU countries who naturalise during the observation period, cohorts 1999-2002.† 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Speed of naturalisation: when does citizenship matter? 
We observe an increase in the probability of employment leading up to the moment of 
naturalisation, but that does not necessarily imply that anticipation is the underlying 
factor that drives these results. The mechanism behind the anticipation effect is 
assumed to be investment in relevant skills and knowledge in anticipation of acquiring 
citizenship. Since migrants also gradually accumulate host-country specific human 
capital over time, this would imply that accelerated investment in these skills becomes 
less relevant the longer migrants reside in the host country. Investing in for instance 
language capabilities is more likely to matter after 4 years of residence than after 10 
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years. Therefore, if anticipation is one of the driving mechanisms behind the citizenship 
premium, then the effect of citizenship should be conditioned by the speed with which 
one naturalises. In other words, citizenship should particularly matter if migrants 
naturalise relatively quickly. In contrast, if the citizenship premium solely exists as 
positive signalling, then the speed with which one naturalises should not matter, since 
only the status of citizen is relevant, rather than the way in which it is acquired. The 
same is true if the citizenship premium is principally attributable to self-selection, since 
endogeneity exists irrespective of whether a migrant naturalises quickly or not. As 
mentioned, self-selection is related to the propensity to naturalise, but not the 
naturalisation process, whereas anticipation is. 
To analyse this, we perform a distributed logistic regression in which the 
naturalisation variable is replaced by a time-invariant ‘speed of naturalisation’ variable 
(Table A11). To simulate the individual fixed-effects of the main analysis, we added a 1-
period lag of the dependent variable to the model, which captures the relevance of 
unmeasured characteristics that affect the labour market performance within 
individuals. Although migrants normally become eligible for naturalisation in the 
Netherlands after 5 years of residence, migrants can naturalise earlier if they have a 
Dutch partner for 3 consecutive years, and reside in the Netherlands.  
We observe that the relevance of citizenship is comparatively higher as migrants 
naturalise earlier. In the sixth year of residence, when most migrants become eligible 
for naturalisation in the Netherlands, the probability of employment is 24% and 36% 
higher for male and female immigrants, respectively compared to their counterparts 
who do not naturalise during the observation period. For migrants who naturalise in the 
eighth year or later, this relative advantage has decreased to 10% for both men and 
women. Note that, as expected, immigrants who naturalise in the first 3 years of 
residence perform slightly worse than their counterparts who naturalise in the fourth 
year. We assume that for these migrants, not enough time has passed to fully invest in 
oneself, and enjoy an anticipation effect to the same degree as those who naturalise 
after 4 years. In general, these findings show that the speed of naturalisation matters, 
and that the relevance of citizenship varies in accordance to our expectations in the 
context of anticipation. This gives further credence to the notion of an anticipation 
effect, since the manner in which citizenship is acquired is assumed to be irrelevant in 
the traditional causal interpretation of the citizenship premium in the literature. 
The effect of employment on naturalisation 
An alternative explanation for the increased probability of employment in the period 
leading up to naturalisation is that being employed increases the likelihood of 
naturalisation. Employment may provide the means to meet the financial costs 
associated with naturalisation such as the fee, as well as costs of the language and 
integration course and exam. Moreover, having employment may improve skills and 
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knowledge – notably language capabilities – required for citizenship acquisition. The 
employment effects prior to naturalisation could thus be the motivator of the decision 
to naturalise rather than its consequence. To analyse this alternative mechanism, we 
compare migrants who became eligible for citizenship acquisition before and after a 
restriction in citizenship policy in the Netherlands, namely the introduction of a 
naturalisation test in 2003. More specifically, we compare migrant cohorts 1996–1997 
and 2001–2002. In light of the residence requirement of 5 years, migrants from the 
former cohort group became eligible for citizenship acquisition prior to the policy 
change, whereas the latter group had to perform the naturalisation test (see Chapters 3 
and 5 for a similar approach). If the increasing coefficients prior to naturalisation are 
principally due to the fact that employment provides the ability to meet the financial 
requirements, than we would not expect the positive labour market outcomes prior to 
naturalisation to differ before and after the introduction of the naturalisation test. 
Indeed, these mechanisms should be stable over time. However, if the effect prior to 
naturalisation is principally due to improving (linguistic) skills, then we would expect a 
stronger effect under the institutional conditions where these skills are a requirement 
for naturalisation. Both anticipation and employment arguably have the potential to 
improve linguistic capabilities, but this strategy does allow us to disentangle specific 
employment mechanisms such as financial means. In other words, we expect a steeper 
slope prior to naturalisation for cohort 2001–2002 than cohort 1996–1997 if the 
development of language capabilities is an important underlying mechanism, and no 
difference if only financial means matter. Since we only have labour market information 
from 1999 onwards, we can only observe migrants from the early cohort group after 
their initial years of residence. However, the vast majority of these migrants will not yet 
be eligible for naturalisation in 1999 in light of the residence requirement. Results in 
Table A12 reveal a steeper slope prior to naturalisation than afterwards for all migrant 
cohorts, but the discrepancy between the slopes is more pronounced for the later 
cohorts (under the more restrictive institutional conditions) than for the earlier cohorts 
(under the more liberal conditions). These results are thus consistent with the notion 
that our previous findings prior to naturalisation are not solely due to employment-
specific effects. 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
In this paragraph, we perform a number of robustness analyses to assess the stability of 
our findings. First, as is common in this field of literature (e.g. Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011; 
Engdahl, 2011, 2014), one of the consequences of performing a fixed-effects regression 
is that individuals with no variation on the dependent variable drop out of the analysis. 
These omitted individuals introduce the risk of selection bias, as migrants who remain in 
the analysis are not necessarily representative of the population. In that context, we 
Chapter 4 
88 
compared migrants with and without variance on the dependent variable. Table A13 in 
the appendix shows the results of a logistic regression without fixed-effects for all 
immigrants (both with and without variance on the dependent variable), again with a 1-
period lag of the dependent variable to simulate the fixed-effects, and additional 
controls for time-invariant characteristics. In accordance with the main analyses, we 
observe a rising probability of employment leading up to naturalisation, consistent with 
anticipation. However, the coefficients of naturalisation are generally smaller compared 
to the main analysis. Detailed analyses reveal that this is due to the 1-period lag, which 
serves the same function as the individual fixed-effects (controlling for omitted variable 
bias), but does so in a different way. Indeed, this variable also captures changes over 
time in relevant unobserved characteristics. However, both the main analysis and these 
robustness analyses clearly show an increase in the probability of employment leading 
up to naturalisation. As such, we have no reason to assume that the anticipation effect 
is attributable to omitted individuals as a result of the fixed-effects.  
Second, we follow immigrants from all cohorts for a maximum period of 10 years. 
When migrants emigrate before this point in time, they drop out of the data set from 
that point onwards. However, it could be argued that migrants who emigrate do so in 
many cases because of, for instance, negative experiences in the labour market. Since 
these unsuccessful migrants are unlikely to acquire citizenship and tend to perform 
worse in the labour market, the observed relevance of citizenship in our main analysis 
could be driven by these emigrating individuals. In light of this, we performed an 
analysis for men and women who remain in the Netherlands for the entire observation 
period. Table A14 shows that 1,792 male and 1,462 female individuals drop out of the 
data set due to right-truncation. However, the results of the analyses for migrants who 
remain in the Netherlands are highly similar to those in the main model, including the 
relevance of citizenship. As such, we conclude that our findings are not driven by 
unsuccessful migrants who emigrate during the observation period.  
The differentiated analysis of migrants naturalising under liberal or restrictive 
institutional conditions shows that the positive labour market outcomes prior to 
naturalisation are not solely due to employment-specific effects such as increased 
financial means. But that still does not confirm that the accelerated integration 
trajectory prior to naturalisation is due to investment in anticipation of acquiring 
citizenship rather than employment increasing the propensity to naturalise. To analyse 
this in further detail, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. More 
specifically, we include an alternative measurement for ‘naturalisation during the 
observation period’ that is strongly related to the propensity to naturalise, but not to 
the potential source of bias (in our case, employment). Doing so enables us to 
disentangle the effects of investment in anticipation of acquiring citizenship on the one 
hand, and effects resulting from having employment on the other hand. We follow the 
approach of Just and Anderson (2012, p. 499) by using the geographical distance 
between the host country and the origin country as an instrument for naturalisation. 
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Literature suggests that migrants from more distant origin countries are more likely to 
naturalise due to increased costs associated with return migration (Yang, 1994, p. 473). 
Conversely, a shorter distance provides more opportunities to maintain ties with the 
origin country, and disincentives migrants to fully integrate into the host country 
through naturalisation. Our data confirm this expectation with a positive and 
statistically significant bivariate correlation between geographical distance and 
naturalisation. However, we expect no association between geographical distance 
between the origin and host country and employment (holding time-invariant country 
characteristics such as economic development constant through the individual fixed-
effects). As such, we argue that this is a suitable instrument to isolate potential bias 
resulting from the association between naturalisation and employment. We 
dichotomise distance in kilometres by the median of men and women, respectively. 
Results in Table A15 show that the findings with the IV approach are similar to the main 
model. Note that the one-time effect after naturalisation is stronger, and the 
discrepancy in the slope between migrants who are naturalised and those who are not 
is smaller. However, the coefficient measuring anticipation is still positive and 
statistically significant. Assuming that geographical distance between the origin and 
host country is a valid instrument, this confirms that the positive labour market 
outcomes prior to naturalisation are not solely attributable to employment increasing 
the propensity to naturalise. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Does citizenship acquisition matter for having employment or not? We observe a one-
time boost in the probability of employment after naturalisation, consistent with the 
notion of positive signalling, and in line with some earlier findings in the Norwegian 
(Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 196) and Swedish (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 352) context. 
Second, we find confirmation for the prevalent empirical observation that migrants who 
naturalise are positively selected in terms of unobserved characteristics that affect both 
their propensity to naturalise and their labour market outcomes (e.g. Bratsberg et al., 
2002, pp. 572–573). This again highlights that isolating these characteristics is essential 
to avoid an overestimation of the citizenship premium. However, our most important 
conclusion is that the probability of employment develops faster prior to naturalisation 
than afterwards, even when controlling for the endogeneity of naturalisation. This too is 
a recurring observation in the literature that is commonly considered inconsistent with 
the notion of a citizenship premium (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 344). By contrast, we argue 
that this effect is an integral part of the process of naturalisation, reflecting the 
consequences of the decision to acquire citizenship in the future. Migrants actively plan 
their lives and anticipate potential rewards and opportunities of naturalisation by 
investing in their own human capital development. Moreover, these investments will 
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often be necessary in light of the formal linguistic and civic requirements for 
naturalisation. Our results suggest that these investments result in an accelerated 
integration trajectory that already bears fruit in the labour market prior to 
naturalisation. Furthermore, citizenship matters most when acquired early in the 
settlement process, consistent with the notion that accelerated investment in host-
country specific human capital loses its relevance after a longer period of residence in 
the host country. This provides further support for the mechanism of anticipation, since 
the manner in which citizenship is acquired is assumed to be irrelevant for the effects of 
both self-selection and positive signalling.  
Further research is needed to assess the extent to which the anticipatory 
mechanisms apply for other forms of socio-economic integration. The focus on 
employment rather than wages in this chapter is an explicit decision, since the 
traditional mechanisms underlying the citizenship premium are predominantly relevant 
in the context of having employment or not. Moreover, an analysis of wages implies a 
fundamentally different research design (focusing on migrants with employment). Since 
the mechanisms explaining the relationship between citizenship and employment likely 
differ from those of other forms of socio-economic integration, our results cannot 
necessarily be translated to other economic indicators.  
Our findings raise important questions regarding the restriction of access to Dutch 
citizenship in the Netherlands over the last decades (van Oers et al., 2013), as well as 
the recent debate in the Dutch parliament to increase the residence requirement for 
citizenship acquisition. Since positive effects on the probability of employment manifest 
not only as a result of citizenship itself, but also due to the active investment migrants 
themselves make in anticipation of acquiring citizenship, the citizenship premium 
depends on a balance between requirements to incentivize migrants to invest in 
themselves, and the feasibility of these requirements to encourage migrants to 
naturalise. Restricting access to citizenship too much is likely to delay the accelerated 
integration process to a point where it becomes redundant. Indeed, citizenship 
particularly matters if acquired early in the settlement process. This will be particularly 
important for marginalised migrant groups for whom restrictive citizenship policies 
represent significant and daunting obstacles, such as those from less developed and 
politically unstable countries of origin (Vink et al., 2013). These are also the very 
migrants who generally hold a weak position in the labour market, and thus need 
citizenship most. 
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Chapter 5 
Naturalisation and Immigrant Earnings: 
Why and To Whom Citizenship Matters13 
  
                                                                
13 This chapter is submitted for publication and is currently under review (revise & resubmit). 
This chapter is embargoed at request
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Chapter 6 
Naturalisation and the Transition to 
Homeownership: An Analysis of Signalling and 
Legal Status Discrimination in the Dutch 
Housing Market14 
  
                                                                
14 This chapter is submitted for publication and is currently under review. 
This chapter is embargoed at request
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Discussions on citizenship are often phrased in a universalistic language. Citizenship 
guarantees equal status and protection of the law by transcending particularity and 
difference. In that sense, all citizens are peers in the political public (Youngh, 1989). The 
promise of citizenship is thus substantial: a status where individuals have the same 
opportunities as their fellow citizens to build their lives and pursue private ends. The 
stark reality of inequality within citizenship challenges this ideal. Empirically, migrants 
suffer from taste-based and statistical discrimination by employers and lenders 
(Aalbers, 2007; Blommaert, Coenders, & van Tubergen, 2014; Ross & Tootell, 2004; 
Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016), yet naturalised migrants continue to perform worse in the 
labour and housing market (Enchautegui & Giannarelli, 2015; OECD, 2011). 
Furthermore, individuals with a migrant background are more likely to be socially 
excluded (Hutcheson & Jeffers, 2013), are underrepresented in legislatures that are 
supposed to speak for them (Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2009), and are more likely to be 
convicted of crime (Light et al., 2014) than their native-born counterparts. Critics of the 
universalist notion of citizenship may thus argue that substantively, citizenship 
constitutes a hollow promise; a status that continues to harbour the inequalities it 
supposedly transcends. Others may point towards the transferal of rights and benefits 
from citizenship to legal residency, and the rise of supranational institutions, as 
evidence that nation-centric citizenship has lost much of its relevance in a globalised 
and privatised world (Bosniak, 2000; Schuck, 1989; Spiro, 2007). Both the empirical 
observation that citizenship in practice fails to rule out discriminatory practices and act 
as a mainstreaming device, and the gradual decoupling of rights and benefits 
traditionally associated with citizenship, provide serious arguments to be sceptical 
about the ability of citizenship to ensure justice, equality and security. However, while 
citizenship may not meet its universalistic ideal, it does not necessarily follow that 
access to and holding citizenship is thus irrelevant (Bloemraad, 2017, p. 546). While 
inequalities based on origin, religion, education and class are clearly not erased by 
naturalisation, citizenship may serve to attenuate such discrepancies, and promote 
opportunities for full participation and integration. Literature suggests that citizenship 
acquisition improves the labour market performance of immigrants (Bratsberg et al., 
2002; Helgertz et al., 2014; Steinhardt, 2012), increases civic engagement and political 
efficacy (Hainmueller et al., 2015) and promotes social integration and self-
identification with the political community (Bloemraad & Wright, 2014; Manning & Roy, 
2010; Maxwell & Bleich, 2014). However, empirical findings in this field of literature are 
characterised by substantial ambiguity, and the key question of whether (and 
particularly why) citizenship matters for immigrant integration remains unresolved. In 
that context, this thesis aims to advance our understanding of the citizenship premium 
by modelling legal status transitions as life course events, which are embedded in the 
social context of migrants’ origin and family situation on the one hand, and the 
institutional context of citizenship policies and membership regulations on the other 
hand. The key innovation is that the social and institutional context shapes the pathway 
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into citizenship, which in turn matters for its associated outcomes. These assumptions 
are tested using Dutch administrative data from Statistics Netherlands, covering almost 
all registered first generation immigrants in the Netherlands. More specifically, I pose 
the following central research question: What are the determinants of citizenship 
acquisition, and what is the relevance of naturalisation for the socio-economic 
integration of first generation immigrants in the Netherlands? 
Theoretical contribution: a life course perspective to immigrant naturalisation 
and socio-economic integration 
A substantial field of literature is dedicated to the question whether a citizenship 
premium exists or not (Chiswick, 1978; Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Fougère & Safi, 
2009; Scott, 2008). In light of ambiguous findings, more recent studies have invested in 
the development of a more complex empirical model that accounts for omitted variable 
bias (Bratsberg & Raaum, 2010; Bratsberg et al., 2002; Engdahl, 2014; Helgertz et al., 
2014; Steinhardt, 2012). While these studies clearly illustrate that naturalised migrants 
indeed constitute a self-selected group that is already better integrated prior to 
naturalisation, controls for endogeneity do not explain why some migrants enjoy a 
citizenship premium, while others do not. In other words, the (justified) focus on 
disentangling the direction of the association between naturalisation and integration 
has left the theoretical framework underdeveloped. I therefore argue for more focus on 
the question to whom and under which conditions citizenship matters. To that end, this 
thesis pioneers in introducing life course concepts and principles (Elder, 1974) to this 
field of literature in Chapter 2, which provide a useful starting point to develop a 
framework that explains varying outcomes of naturalisation. A life course perspective to 
immigrant naturalisation and integration combines two strands of literature. One strand 
focusses on individual incentives for naturalisation based on personal and origin 
characteristics (e.g. Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Yang, 1994), 
while the other emphasizes institutional, historical and political properties of the 
destination context (e.g. Aleksyndra & Algan, 2010; Janoski, 2010; Reichel, 2011). In 
isolation, neither approach is able to answer the core question on the conditioned 
relevance of citizenship. However, life course concepts and principles allow for a 
dynamic synthesis of both strands of literature, providing guidelines for the formulation 
of a theoretical framework that explains variation in citizenship acquisition rates and 
integration outcomes by emphasizing the social and institutional context in which 
immigrant lives are embedded. 
The temporal dynamic inherent in such an approach requires longitudinal data. By 
observing individuals over time, the interrelated development of human biographies in 
transforming societal conditions can be analysed (Diewald & Mayer, 2009). The use of 
such data aligns well with the emphasis in the literature on the methodological 
importance of longitudinal data to account for self-selection into naturalisation. In light 
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of these considerations, I make use of register data from Statistics Netherlands, which 
allows for controls on omitted variable bias. Moreover, the administrative nature of the 
data circumvents problems that typically complicate the collection and analysis of 
survey data among immigrants, such as underrepresentation, non-response and social 
desirability. Furthermore, the Netherlands is an ideal context to apply this novel life 
course approach, given significant variation in citizenship policies and naturalisation 
rates over the last decades, and the extent to which immigrant integration has 
historically been the subject of contention in Dutch politics (Entzinger, 2003; van Oers, 
2014; van Oers et al., 2013). 
Empirical contribution: answering the research question 
To answer the central research question, this thesis consists of four empirical chapters, 
based on published and submitted research articles. Chapter 3 focusses on 
determinants of citizenship acquisition. First, I analyse the relevance of personal and 
origin characteristics for the propensity to naturalise, with a specific focus on the social 
dynamic of naturalisation decisions. Results confirm that a cost-benefit framework is a 
good predictor of citizenship acquisition. Particularly migrants for whom the utility of 
citizenship is greatest, such as those from economically less developed, politically 
unstable and non-EU countries of origin, are likely to naturalise. The same is true when 
the costs associated with citizenship acquisition are relatively low, for instance when 
migrants are exempted from the renunciation requirement, and thus (may) retain their 
original citizenship upon naturalisation. Migrants who are younger at the moment of 
migration also have a higher propensity to naturalise, as the period of time in which 
they may enjoy the benefits associated with citizenship acquisition is longer. 
Conversely, the necessary investment may not be worth it for migrants in a later stage 
of the life course. The analysis also shows that having a native or naturalised partner is 
positively associated with immigrant naturalisation. The effect is particularly strong in 
the year in which the foreign-born partner acquires citizenship. These findings suggest 
that the decision to naturalise is at least partly made at the family level. This has 
important implications for the traditional theoretical framework, which is based on the 
notion of individual utility maximization. If important life course decisions, such as the 
choice to permanently settle and naturalise, are not solely motivated by personal gain, 
then a more developed theoretical framework is needed to capture the social 
complexity of immigrant lives. The results also highlights that measuring the family 
dynamic through marital status obscures important variation, since having a non-
naturalised partner is negatively associated with the propensity to naturalise. 
However, the most important findings in this chapter concern the relevance of 
citizenship policy. We exploit a restriction in citizenship policy in the Netherlands on 
April 1, 2003, namely the introduction of a naturalisation test. Naturalisation rates 
dropped markedly after this point in time, but it remains unclear whether this was due 
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to the policy change, and if so, which migrant groups were particularly affected. Results 
confirm that citizenship policies matter for the propensity to naturalise. Migrants are 
less likely to acquire Dutch citizenship after the introduction of the naturalisation test. 
Moreover, those who did naturalise under the more restrictive institutional conditions 
needed more time to do so. Furthermore, the relevance of citizenship policy is 
conditioned by origin country characteristics. More specifically, restrictive citizenship 
policies only matter to migrants from less developed and politically unstable countries 
of origin. These are the same migrants who stand to benefit from citizenship most, and 
are highly interested in naturalisation to reinforce their legal status and remove 
structural obstacles to integration. 
Findings in Chapter 3 suggest that migrants for whom the host country citizenship 
may be a valuable asset to their integration are particularly dependent on the 
institutional conditions that make naturalisation a realistic proposition or not. To 
analyse in detail whether naturalisation indeed facilitates socio-economic integration of 
immigrants, Chapter 4 investigates a potential citizenship premium in terms of 
employment. Analyses confirm that migrants are more likely to be employed after 
naturalisation, all else constant. These findings are consistent with the prevalent notion 
in the literature that citizenship acquisition facilitates integration through increased 
labour market access, reduced administrative costs and positive signalling towards 
employers (Liebig & von Haaren, 2011). I also find evidence of positive selection into 
naturalisation. Migrants who naturalise have endogenous characteristics that are 
positively associated with both the propensity to naturalise and labour market 
outcomes. They may for instance be more motivated, skilled or intelligent. These 
analyses again highlight that failing to account for self-selection into naturalisation 
results in an overestimation of the citizenship premium. However, the most important 
finding is that the labour market performance of immigrants already starts to improve 
prior to naturalisation, not only afterwards. While this is not an uncommon observation 
in the literature (e.g. Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 344), any positive labour market outcomes 
prior to citizenship acquisition are typically considered inconsistent with the notion of a 
citizenship premium. Indeed, how can the effect of a treatment condition (the host 
country citizenship) precede the treatment (naturalisation)? However, this dichotomous 
before-after approach to the citizenship premium ignores the relevance of the pathway 
to citizenship (i.e. the process through which citizenship is acquired). I argue that the 
positive effects prior to naturalisation reflect a human capital investment by migrants in 
anticipation of the formal civic and linguistic requirements of naturalisation, and the 
potential rewards and opportunities that citizenship will offer in the future. As such, 
migrants not only benefit from the legal status transition itself, but also enjoy an 
accelerated integration trajectory leading up to naturalisation. In line with this 
reasoning, citizenship matters most when it is acquired early in the settlement process, 
as investment in host-country specific human capital (most notably language 
capabilities) loses its relevance after a longer period of residence in the host country. 
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In Chapter 5, I delve deeper into the employment outcomes of naturalisation by 
analysing earnings from labour. This is the most common operationalisation of labour 
market integration in the literature, yet empirical support for an income effect is 
inconsistent (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 343). I explore three explanations for this empirical 
ambiguity. First, I argue that the signalling potential of citizenship is less relevant for 
employed migrants, whose employment status serves as a positive signalling device in 
its own right. Second, in so far as citizenship matters for the earnings of immigrants, I 
argue that it matters particularly to migrants who face structural obstacles in the labour 
market. Employers may assume that individuals from economically less developed 
countries of origin are negatively selected with regard to their productivity and general 
labour market performance. These migrants thus stand to benefit from citizenship most 
to mitigate their relatively weak reputation in the labour market. Third, analogous to 
Chapter 4, I argue that immigrant earnings already improve leading up to naturalisation, 
as migrants invest in their labour market potential in anticipation of citizenship 
acquisition. Since the literature typically dismisses all positive effects prior to 
naturalisation as self-selection bias, the state-of-the-art analytical models may 
underestimate the citizenship premium. Like many studies in the literature (Bratsberg & 
Raaum, 2011, p. 197; Bratsberg et al., 2002, p. 582; Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 352; 
Steinhardt, 2012, p. 818), I find no support for a citizenship premium in terms of income 
from labour after naturalisation. Yet so far, the literature provides no clear explanation 
for these findings. In line with my expectations, I do observe a positive effect for 
migrants from economically less developed countries of origin and for unemployed 
migrants. Moreover, the income from labour of immigrants already improves prior to 
naturalisation, and peaks around the moment of citizenship acquisition, consistent with 
the notion of anticipation. These findings thus suggest that citizenship matters for 
immigrant earnings, but that not all migrants benefit equally (or at all), and that the 
effects particularly manifests as a result of the intention to permanently settle and 
naturalise, rather than the legal status transition itself. 
Finally, Chapter 6 broadens the conceptual scope of immigrant integration by 
breaking with the state-of-the-art’s exclusive focus on the labour market. More 
specifically, this chapter analyses whether citizenship acquisition matters for immigrant 
homeownership. While a substantial field of literature has investigated determinants of 
the so-called ethnic gap in homeownership (Aalbers, 2007; Charles & Hurst, 2002; 
Constant et al., 2009; Coulson & Dalton, 2010; Ross & Tootell, 2004), citizenship has so 
far not received much systematic attention. I start by building on the traditional 
theoretical framework of the citizenship premium, and hypothesise that the host 
country citizenship sends a positive signal towards lenders, and attenuates potential 
ethnic discrimination. However, I argue that creditworthiness cannot be solely based on 
citizenship status. As such, naturalisation will only matter for migrants who fulfil the 
basic financial requirements for credit in the housing market. Empirical findings show 
that citizenship acquisition increases the probability of homeownership, but only for 
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employed migrants. Moreover, the host country citizenship does not matter for 
migrants with a native-born Dutch partner. This suggests that legal status discrimination 
may be one of the underlying mechanisms behind the citizenship premium in the 
housing market, as migrants with a native partner are less likely to be discriminated 
against on ethnic grounds. Finally, both cultural distance between the origin and host 
country and the global financial crisis decrease the probability of homeownership of 
immigrants. However, possession of the host country citizenship is not able to 
attenuate those disadvantages. In other words, citizenship facilitates access to the 
housing market, but does not remove all structural obstacles to homeownership. 
How do these findings relate to the central research question: what are the 
determinants of citizenship acquisition, and what is the relevance of naturalisation for 
the socio-economic integration of first generation immigrants in the Netherlands? 
Starting with the second part of the question, it can be concluded that citizenship 
matters. Naturalisation has the potential to contribute substantially to the socio-
economic integration of immigrants. Citizenship acquisition facilitates access to the 
labour market by increasing the odds of employment by about 13 percent. While the 
effects are more limited in terms of occupational mobility, male and female immigrants 
from economically less developed countries of origin still enjoy 3 and 5 percent higher 
earnings respectively. On top of that, the labour market performance of immigrants 
already starts to improve prior to naturalisation, as migrants invest in their human 
capital development to meet the formal civic and linguistic requirements, and to utilize 
the rewards and opportunities that citizenship will offer. Therefore, possession of the 
host country citizenship matters most if it is acquired relatively early in the settlement 
process, when accelerated investment in these skills can make a difference. For 
instance, while the probability of employment for migrants who naturalise after 5 years 
of legal residence (the current residence requirement in the Netherlands) is 34 and 38 
percent higher for male and female immigrants respectively compared to their non-
naturalising counterparts, this is limited to only 10 percent for those who naturalise 
after 8-10 years of legal residence. Naturalisation also facilitates housing market 
integration of employed immigrants, as the probability of homeownership is 25 percent 
higher after naturalisation, all else constant. While these advantages do not level the 
playing field with natives, it would be wrong to conclude that citizenship is a hollow 
promise that has no substance in practice, or that it has been eclipsed by post-national 
processes of globalisation and privatisation. The legal status transition from non-citizen 
to citizen does not miraculously erase structural and socially generated inequalities, but 
it does have the potential to attenuate them, and provide opportunities for upward 
mobility. This is particularly true for vulnerable migrant groups, such as those from 
economically less developed countries of origin, who face structural obstacles in the 
labour market, and for whom the host country citizenship is a valuable asset to mitigate 
their disadvantaged position. However, the same migrants who stand to benefit from 
naturalisation most are also highly dependent on policies that stipulate the conditions 
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for access to citizenship. This brings me to the first part of the research question. 
Migrants naturalise less quickly and less often under more restrictive institutional 
conditions. Yet the relevance of citizenship policies is not equal for all migrant groups. 
Particularly migrants for whom the utility of citizenship is greatest are deterred by more 
restrictive requirements. In contrast, institutional variation does not substantially affect 
naturalisation rates of migrants who do not need citizenship as much, and who are 
generally less interested in naturalisation. The potential for citizenship to function as a 
vehicle for immigrant integration thus constitutes a balancing act. If there are no 
requirements for naturalisation, citizenship is unlikely to play a role in the integration 
process, as any rights and entitlements linked to the status would be meaningless. Yet if 
institutional conditions are too restrictive, then the very migrants who need it most may 
find it difficult to meet these requirements. Moreover, since investment in anticipation 
of naturalisation is one of the driving mechanisms behind the citizenship premium, the 
criteria for access to citizenship play an important role in potential positive outcomes of 
the status. Certain requirements for naturalisation are more likely to facilitate 
integration than others. For instance, some mastery of the native language is a 
precondition for participation in many spheres of society. As such, basic linguistic 
requirements and a short period of residence to develop these skills may play a positive 
role. Yet high financial costs to apply for naturalisation only serve to make citizenship 
more selective, and a long residence requirement will erode the added benefit of 
accelerated investment in host-country specific human capital. Moreover, if linguistic 
requirements are too high, and no financial support is offered for study materials and 
language training, then it is unsurprising if particularly disadvantaged migrant groups 
are unable to naturalise, or do not consider naturalisation a reasonable proposition. In 
that case, the potential for citizenship to stimulate and incentivise their integration is 
wasted.  
Limitations 
The findings of this thesis should be considered in light of a number of limitations. First, 
analogous to some research in this field of literature (predominantly in Nordic 
countries), this thesis exploits individual-level register data. The advantages of such an 
approach can hardly be overstated. Administrative data is inherently inclusive, and 
ensures that even migrant groups who are difficult to reach (because of size, language 
barriers or other socio-cultural obstacles to participation in surveys) do not need to be 
added artificially through imputation or weighing strategies, or worse, are ignored 
altogether. Register data are also characterised by a high observation frequency and 
panel data structure. Depending on the register in question, characteristics of 
individuals can often be tracked and observed on a monthly basis, and in some cases 
per day. This allows for hitherto unfeasible levels of detail, and provides important 
methodological opportunities (including, but not limited to, the ability to control for 
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self-selection bias without losing too many degrees of freedom, and a more detailed 
comparison of the period before and after naturalisation). In light of these advantages, 
it is easy to ignore the limitations of such an approach. First, the inclusive nature of 
administrative data is limited to the registered population, and thus per definition 
excludes undocumented immigrants. Notwithstanding that these migrants are also 
difficult to reach by more traditional means (e.g. in surveys), this inherent selectivity 
needs to be acknowledged. For starters, it is important to emphasize that the research 
population only constitutes ‘legal’ immigrants who are registered in a Dutch 
municipality. How large the blind spot is remains largely an open question. By their very 
nature, the size of the undocumented population is hard to ascertain.20 However, given 
the fact that access to citizenship is conditioned on a period of legal residence, any 
theorisation on the determinants of citizenship acquisition and associated outcomes 
does not apply to the illegal population. These migrants would therefore need to be 
excluded from the research population even if the data were available. As such, there is 
no reason to assume that the empirical findings in this thesis are biased, but it is 
important to recognise that they are only relevant for a specific group of migrants, 
namely those that reside in the host country legally. 
The development of register-based forms of census taking and data collection is a 
relatively new phenomenon. The range of characteristics collected from various 
institutions, and available for statistical analysis, continues to increase. Yet the extent to 
which these characteristics can be traced back in the past varies widely. This issue will 
resolve itself over time, but until then, researchers are at times restricted in their 
methodological opportunities, and dependent on creative empirical strategies when 
information is only available for a limited window of time, or for specific migrant 
cohorts. An example in this thesis would be the analysis of homeownership, of which 
data is only available from 2003 onwards. While the research population (cohorts 1999-
2002) could generally only naturalise after 2003 in light of the residence requirement 
for naturalisation in the Netherlands, there is no information on homeownership during 
the period leading up to naturalisation. A systematic analysis of a potential anticipation 
effect in the housing market is therefore not possible. Another example is the data on 
labour market integration (including employment and earnings), which is only available 
in its current form from 1999 onwards. This complicates a comparative analysis of 
migrants who could naturalise under more liberal and restrictive institutional conditions 
(before and after April 1, 2003 respectively). In Chapter 4 and 5, I compare migrant 
cohorts 1996-1997 to cohorts 2001-2002, but labour market information on the initial 
years of residence of the former cohort group is missing. As such, a comparative 
analysis of the period leading up to naturalisation for migrants under varying citizenship 
regimes is not possible. This would be particularly interesting because institutional 
                                                                
20 Statistics Netherlands estimated that on January 1, 2001, between 46,000 and 116,000 individuals resided 
in the Netherlands illegally (Hoogteijling, 2002). 
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conditions are an integral part of the mechanism underlying anticipation. In other 
words, the relevance of anticipation is likely conditioned by the formal requirements for 
naturalisation. Whether this is the case, and which requirements affect integration 
outcomes leading up to naturalisation positively or negatively, remains the subject of 
speculation. 
Finally, the methodological design and empirical strategy of this thesis is exclusively 
quantitative in nature. This decision is motivated by two factors. First, an analysis of the 
determinants of legal-status transitions and associated socio-economic outcomes 
requires large-N data to test systematically. Whether and to what extent citizenship 
matters are quantifiable questions that can only be confirmed for a research population 
as sizable and diverse as all registered first-generation immigrants in the Netherlands 
through statistical analyses. In other words, the central research question of this thesis 
constitutes a puzzle that can only be solved quantitatively. Second, individual-level 
register data is restricted for privacy reasons. Access to such data sources is therefore 
highly conditional, and requires substantial planning and coordination with statistical 
offices to realize. Establishing the necessary infrastructure is therefore a significant 
investment, and once in place, is worthwhile to utilise in depth. However, that is not to 
say that the quantitative findings in this study would not benefit from a qualitative 
approach. Indeed, this thesis raises important follow-up questions that are specifically 
suited to a qualitative empirical design. Notable examples include the mechanisms 
underlying the established positive association between citizenship and socio-economic 
integration (or lack thereof), the question what exactly drives immigrants to invest in 
acquiring the host country citizenship or not, and why restrictive institutional conditions 
deter immigrants from naturalisation. While this thesis theorises on potential 
mechanisms, a solid grasp on the why questions requires complementary analyses of a 
qualitative nature. 
Moving forward: avenues of future research 
One of the key contributions of this thesis is the development of a theoretical 
framework that may help explain why some migrants naturalise and benefit from 
citizenship, while others do not.  I predominantly seek answers to that question in 
characteristics of the immigrants who naturalise (to whom does citizenship matter?), 
the relevant membership regulations that condition access to the host country 
citizenship (under which conditions does citizenship matter?) and the nexus between 
them (to whom do citizenship policies matter most?). For instance, a fast track to 
naturalisation facilitates integration for vulnerable migrant groups (such as those from 
less developed countries of origin), yet these migrants are particularly dependent on 
the institutional context that conditions access to citizenship. Moreover, too short a 
pathway to citizenship and a lack of (linguistic) requirements for naturalisation may 
disincentivise integration. The identification of a citizenship premium thus depends on a 
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complex interaction between the composition of the migrant population and citizenship 
policies of the host country, which may explain why we observe an effect of citizenship 
in some countries, but not in others. While this thesis takes a first step in that direction, 
a systematic analysis of these expectations requires a cross-national design, since 
institutional and compositional variation is limited by the focus on a single destination 
country. Such a comparative perspective is largely absent in the literature. This may be 
linked to difficulties in securing access to restricted administrative data sources in 
multiple countries at the same time. Moreover, variation in citizenship regimes 
complicates a simple comparison of empirical findings in different countries. For 
instance Helgertz et al. (2014) analyse a citizenship premium in the labour market by 
performing a bi-national comparison between Sweden and Denmark. Yet it is difficult to 
compare the migrant populations in both countries, who are selected on the basis of 
the residence requirement (which is at least 4 consecutive years in Sweden, compared 
to 6 [until 2002] and 8 years in Denmark). While this study finds no differences in 
naturalisation outcomes between both countries, it remains unclear whether 
institutional conditions indeed do not matter, or if compositional differences between 
the selected migrant populations of both countries plays a role. Our limited 
understanding of the relevance of citizenship policies for the socio-economic impact of 
naturalisation further complicates the interpretation of the findings. One could 
hypothesise that relatively liberal institutional conditions in Sweden disincentivise 
integration, while the long waiting period in Denmark erodes the added value of 
accelerated investment in host-country specific human capital. As such, we may not 
expect a citizenship premium in either country, yet it remains difficult to identify the 
underlying mechanisms. What is thus needed is a more controlled analysis of the 
impact of policy changes on legal status transitions and associated integration 
outcomes (Bloemraad, 2017; Vink, 2017). The development of such an integrated, 
comparative research agenda would require close collaboration between scholars to 
ensure that research populations, model specifications and operationalisations of key 
concepts are as closely aligned as possible with studies in other countries. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the relevance of citizenship regimes for the integration 
outcomes of naturalisation not only requires more coordination between scholars to 
standardise research designs and measurements, but also needs to go beyond the 
traditional focus on formal requirements for naturalisation. While the legal framework 
of rules and regulations, as laid down in constitutions and citizenship legislation, 
stipulates the formal conditions for eligibility, access to citizenship also depends on a 
set of informal norms and practices (Vink, 2017, p. 223). States’ normative stance 
towards immigrant integration and citizenship acquisition likely shapes the extent to 
which these processes are facilitated and encouraged (Bloemraad, 2002). Whether 
governments circulate information about the rewards and opportunities of the host 
country citizenship, for instance by coordinating with and supporting ethnic 
organisations and community leaders, may determine whether migrants are mobilised 
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to invest in naturalisation. Moreover, the ways in which administrations implement 
citizenship laws, and how state officials interpret and execute them, may incentivise or 
discourage citizenship acquisition. Such informal properties of the institutional context 
are generally ignored, likely because these conditions are difficult to measure and 
quantify. However, theorising on the relevance of these ‘soft’ contextual factors may 
prove necessary to explain differences in naturalisation rates between and within 
countries. Moreover, since the pathway to citizenship matters for the socio-economic 
outcomes of naturalisation, it may also serve as an important determinant of the 
citizenship premium. For instance, if citizenship acquisition is encouraged by state 
officials in a given municipality, and migrants naturalise more quickly and more often as 
a result, then the socio-economic outcomes of naturalisation are likely more positive 
compared to a similar municipality where naturalisation is not facilitated and thus 
delayed. 
Similar questions remain with regard to whom citizenship matters. Almost all of the 
literature, including this thesis, focusses on foreign-born immigrants. While there are 
good reasons for analysing first and later generation immigrants in isolation, as the 
latter group can often naturalise through a facilitated procedure, and determinants of 
citizenship acquisition differ between generations (Bauböck et al., 2013; Dronkers & 
Vink, 2012), almost nothing is known about the relevance of naturalisation for foreign-
born (1.5 generation) and native-born (2nd generation) descendants of immigrants. 
Whether or not they enjoy a citizenship premium, and if legal status transitions of the 
parents affect the life course of their children21, remain open questions.  
Furthermore, the state-of-the-art literature is almost exclusively focussed on labour 
market outcomes of naturalisation. While this thesis has taken a first step towards 
broadening the conceptual scope of socio-economic integration by analysing 
homeownership, a life course approach to legal status transitions can be applied to a 
wide range of integration indicators. The area that has probably received the most 
attention so far is living conditions of immigrants (Borjas, 2002; Feijten et al., 2008; 
Hutcheson & Jeffers, 2013). This includes the relevance of citizenship for the probability 
of homeownership, as explored in Chapter 6, but can be expanded to other indicators 
such as residential crowding, quality of the accommodation, and characteristics of the 
area of residence. Citizenship acquisition may matter directly through positive signalling 
towards lenders and landlords, or indirectly through positive labour market outcomes. 
Furthermore, contextual factors such as housing systems and welfare regimes, as well 
as social/public housing, likely matter for residential patterns of immigrants, and may 
condition the relevance of citizenship (Arbaci, 2007). For instance, spatial division of 
tenures and social/public housing contributes to ethnic segregation (Andersen, 
Andersson, Wessel, & Vilkama, 2015). In those cases, citizenship may be negatively 
associated with living in a neighbourhood with a large migrant population by improving 
                                                                
21 See Street (2014) for a qualitative study of intergenerational motives for naturalisation. 
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the odds of securing credit to finance a house. Conversely, when rented and tenure 
housing is more equally distributed, the impact of citizenship for homeownership may 
not matter as much for the ethnic composition of the area of residence.  
Another area that has received some attention is citizenship and civic engagement. 
Literature suggests a positive association, although empirical findings are largely based 
on cross-sectional data (Just & Anderson, 2012; Leal, 2002; Vermeulen & Berger, 2008; 
Wong, 2000). A recent study by Hainmueller et al. (2015) employs a natural experiment 
design in Switzerland to address the omitted variable bias that confounds these cross-
sectional studies. For several decades, naturalisation requests in Switzerland were 
granted or denied by popular vote of resident citizens by reviewing résumés of 
applicants. In this controlled setting, voters are thus unable to distinguish between 
migrants whose characteristics on their respective résumés are the same. Therefore, 
controlling for these observable characteristics isolates omitted variable bias. Results 
show that naturalisation increases political participation and efficacy, even when 
controlling for non-random selection into naturalisation. Moreover, citizenship 
acquisition matters most if it is acquired relatively quickly after the moment of 
migration. Street (2015) arrives at the same conclusion based on panel survey data in 
Germany, identifying a positive relationship between naturalisation and political 
participation. Moreover, the effect is particularly strong if the host country citizenship is 
acquired early in the life course. In other words, citizenship matters for the political 
integration of immigrants, but the outcomes of naturalisation cannot be understood in 
isolation of when and how the status is acquired. This suggests that the life course 
framework underlying the citizenship premium in the labour and housing market is also 
applicable to political outcomes of naturalisation, although the relevant mechanisms 
may differ. 
Literature suggests that citizenship acquisition also matters for feelings of identity 
and belonging (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Pietrantou, 2016). Similar to socio-economic 
and political outcomes of naturalisation, the institutional context may condition the 
relevance of citizenship for the social integration of immigrants. Formal requirements 
for naturalisation increasingly include cultural components, such as civic knowledge, 
integration contracts and loyalty oaths (Orgad, 2015, 2017). The underlying assumption 
seems to be a positive association between such institutional conditions and 
identification with the national culture. This implies the hypothesis that the effect of 
citizenship on cultural assimilation is amplified in countries with restrictive cultural 
requirements, or absent where these conditions are relatively liberal. Yet whether this is 
the case is as of yet unknown. 
Finally, the literature on the citizenship premium (including this thesis) focuses 
almost exclusively on legal status transitions at the national level, and has largely 
ignored membership at the local (residential) level (Bauböck, 2010, 2015). However, 
developing a theoretical framework that goes beyond its current monistic national focus 
may prove useful to explain varying outcomes of naturalisation. The reason for this is 
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that the socio-economic impact of naturalisation is conditioned by the pathway to 
citizenship. For instance, migrants who acquire the host country citizenship relatively 
early in the settlement process enjoy a more positive effect in the labour market. This 
has important implications for the institutional context of destination countries, as 
particularly vulnerable migrant groups, who stand to benefit from citizenship most, are 
dependent on citizenship policies that determine whether a fast track to naturalisation 
is a realistic proposition or not. However, the propensity to naturalise is not only 
conditioned by the relative accessibility of the status, but also by the rights and duties 
associated with it. For instance, migrants from the EU are unlikely to naturalise in 
another EU country, because these migrants already enjoy the benefits associated with 
EU citizenship. While controls for EU countries of origin are therefore common in the 
literature on the citizenship premium, the same is not true for rights and entitlements 
associated with local membership (i.e. legal residence). Yet it is arguable that from a 
cost-benefit perspective, migrants will be less likely to naturalise in countries where 
fewer rights are exclusively associated with citizenship. Examples include countries 
where the franchise is extended to non-citizens, or where access to healthcare and 
social welfare is universal. When instrumental incentives for naturalisation are limited, 
the propensity to naturalise largely depends on years of residence (Vink et al., 2013). As 
such, rights and entitlements at the local level may condition the extent to which 
citizenship functions as an effective instrument for socio-economic integration, as the 
comparatively limited advantages associated with citizenship acquisition delay the 
moment of naturalisation to a point where it is no longer relevant as a stepping stone 
for integration. 
In sum, a progressive research agenda of the citizenship premium could focus on a 
more systematic, comparative analysis of the relevance of citizenship policies – and 
associated pathways to citizenship – for the integration of immigrants. Moreover, the 
operationalisation of membership regimes should be expanded to include informal 
norms and practices, Examples include the extent to which governments circulate 
information about access to citizenship and the rewards and opportunities of 
naturalisation, the ways in which administrations implement citizenship law, and how 
state officials interpret and execute these regulations. Finally, literature suggests that 
the analytical models underlying the citizenship premium in the labour market are also 
relevant in other domains of life, such as political participation and socio-cultural 
integration. This should invite us to broaden the substantive scope of the state-of-the-
art by analysing the relevance of legal status transitions for alternative indicators of 
immigrant integration. 
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Table A1.  Naturalisation by personal- and contextual characteristics, cohorts 1995-2002. 
  Naturalised Not naturalised 
    N %  N % 
Gender Male 31,014 29.0 75,829 71.0 
 Female 41,084 33.1 83,195 66.9 
Age at migration 15-17 year 8,372 48.4 8,910 51.6 
 18-24 year 19,917 31.0 44,249 69.0 
 25-34 year 29,716 31.9 63,357 68.1 
 35-44 year 10,120 26.7 27,830 73.3 
 45-54 year 2,706 21.6 9,804 78.4 
 55-64 year 849 21.3 3,141 78.7 
 65-74 year 357 21.8 1,277 78.2 
 > 74 year 61 11.8 456 88.2 
Partner No partner 19,051 23.5 62,096 76.5 
 Native Dutch partner 18,867 39.6 28,819 60.4 
 Foreign born foreign partner 11,702 19.6 47,877 80.4 
 Year naturalisation partner 6,823 91.3 652 8.7 
 1 year after naturalisation partner 1,180 63.5 677 36.5 
 2 years after naturalisation partner 875 56.2 682 43.8 
 3 years after naturalisation partner 855 52.9 761 47.1 
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner 12,745 42.2 17,460 57.8 
Children < 18 in household Yes 40,520 36.4 70,759 63.6 
 No 31,578 26.3 88,265 73.7 
Dual nationality No automatic loss 49,507 31.9 105,547 68.1 
 Automatic loss 22,591 29.7 53,477 70.3 
Development country of origin First quartile 30,620 51.0 29,367 49.0 
 Second quartile 23,109 41.5 32,618 58.5 
 Thrid quartile 16,107 27.8 41,823 72.2 
 Fourth quartile 2,262 3.9 55,216 96.1 
Stability country of origin First quartile 27,763 47.6 30,516 52.4 
 Second quartile 19,555 34.0 37,915 66.0 
 Third quartile 20,280 35.1 37,571 64.9 
 Fourth quartile 4,500 7.8 53,022 92.2 
EU Yes 2,779 4.9 54,476 95.1 
 No 69,319 39.9 104,548 60.1 
Migrant cohort Cohort 1995 6,798 34.1 13,115 65.9 
 Cohort 1996 8,422 33.8 16,502 66.2 
 Cohort 1997 9,297 33.7 18,307 66.3 
 Cohort 1998 9,287 30.4 21,224 69.6 
 Cohort 1999 8,307 31.2 18,341 68.8 
 Cohort 2000 10,512 30.5 23,959 69.5 
 Cohort 2001 10,627 30.3 24,440 69.7 
 Cohort 2002 8,848 27.7 23,136 72.3 
Total   72,098 31.2 159,024 68.8 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A2.  Cox proportional hazards regression on the risk of naturalisation of migrants, from low developed 
countries, cohorts 1995-2002. 
    Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error 
Gender Male 0.178 1.195***  0.009 
 Female ref. ref. ref. 
Age at migration  -0.012 0.988***  0.001 
Partner No partner ref. ref. ref. 
 Native Dutch partner 0.278 1.320***  0.016 
 Foreign born foreign partner -0.356 0.701***  0.014 
 Year naturalization partner 2.156 8.634***  0.017 
 1 year after naturalisation partner 0.789 2.200***  0.034 
 2 years after naturalisation partner 0.535 1.708***  0.038 
 3 years after naturalisation partner 0.235 1.265***  0.038 
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner -0.304 0.738***  0.016 
Children < 18 in household Yes ref. ref. ref. 
 No -0.002 0.998  0.011 
Dual nationality No automatic loss ref. ref. ref. 
 Automatic loss -0.058 0.943***  0.011 
Migrant cohort Cohort 1995 ref. ref. ref. 
 Cohort 1996 0.020 1.020  0.019 
 Cohort 1997 -0.005 0.995  0.018 
 Cohort 1998 -0.225 0.798***  0.018 
 Cohort 1999 -0.209 0.811***  0.019 
 Cohort 2000 -0.352 0.703***  0.018 
 Cohort 2001 -0.454 0.635***  0.018 
 Cohort 2002 -0.464 0.629***  0.020 
***: p < 0.001   N = 113,837 
  Events = 53,252 
  Observations = 596,597 
Source: Statistics Netherlands.  Logrank = 41,924 (p < 0.00001) 
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Table A3.  Cox proportional hazards regression on the risk of naturalisation of migrants, from high developed 
countries, cohorts 1995-2002. 
    Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error 
Gender Male -0.457 0.633***  0.017 
 Female ref. ref. ref. 
Age at migration  -0.022 0.978***  0.001 
Partner No partner ref. ref. ref. 
 Native Dutch partner 0.320 1.377***  0.023 
 Foreign born foreign partner -0.235 0.790***  0.027 
 Year naturalisation partner 3.238 25.493***  0.034 
 1 year after naturalisation partner 1.928 6.875***  0.067 
 2 years after naturalisation partner 1.604 4.975***  0.086 
 3 years after naturalisation partner 1.146 3.144***  0.106 
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner 0.546 1.726***  0.033 
Children < 18 in household Yes ref. ref. ref. 
 No -0.069 0.934***  0.016 
Dual nationality No automatic loss ref. ref. ref. 
 Automatic loss 0.137 1.147***  0.015 
Migrant cohort Cohort 1995 ref. ref. ref. 
 Cohort 1996 -0.097 0.907**  0.034 
 Cohort 1997 -0.135 0.873***  0.034 
 Cohort 1998 -0.191 0.826***  0.034 
 Cohort 1999 -0.190 0.827***  0.034 
 Cohort 2000 -0.020 0.981  0.031 
 Cohort 2001 0.077 1.080*  0.030 
 Cohort 2002 0.095 1.100**  0.030 
*: p < 0.05   N = 117,285 
**: p < 0.01  Events = 18,846 
***: p < 0.001  Observations = 555,439 
  Logrank = 29,637 (p < 0.00001) 
Source: Statistics Netherlands.     
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Table A4.  Descriptive statistics total sample (cohorts 1995-2002) and education sample, cohorts 2000-2002. 
    Total sample  Education sample 
    % Mean % Mean 
Gender Male 46.2  45.0  
 Female 53.8  55.0  
Age at migration   29.43  26.83 
Partner No partner 35.1  39.1  
 Native Dutch partner 20.6  16.1  
 Foreign born foreign partner 25.8  23.9  
 Year naturalisation partner 3.2  3.1  
 1 year after naturalisation partner 0.8  1.1  
 2 years after naturalisation partner 0.7  0.8  
 3 years after naturalisation partner 0.7  0.8  
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner 13.1  15.1  
Children < 18 in household Yes 48.1  48.6  
 No 51.9  51.4  
Dual nationality No automatic loss 67.1  68.2  
 Automatic loss 32.9  31.8  
Development country of origin   0.694  0.661 
Stability country of origin   -0.456  -0.722 
EU Yes 24.8  14.2  
 No 75.2  85.8  
Education Low    48.1  
 Middle   29.3  
 High   22.6  
Source: Statistics Netherlands. N = 231,122 N = 43,942 
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Table A5.  Cox proportional hazards regression on the risk of naturalisation including education cohorts 2000-
2002. 
    Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error 
Gender Male -0.165 0.848***  0.017 
 Female ref. ref. ref. 
Age at migration  -0.013 0.987***  0.001 
Partner No partner ref. ref. ref. 
 Native Dutch partner 0.251 1.286***  0.027 
 Foreign born foreign partner -0.340 0.712***  0.025 
 Year naturalisation partner 1.706 5.505***  0.034 
 1 year after naturalisation partner 0.834 2.302***  0.057 
 2 years after naturalisation partner 0.423 1.527***  0.073 
 3 years after naturalisation partner 0.244 1.276**  0.081 
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner -0.107 0.898***  0.027 
Children < 18 in household Yes ref. ref. ref. 
 No -0.035 0.966  0.018 
Dual nationality No automatic loss ref. ref. ref. 
 Automatic loss -0.148 0.862***  0.018 
Development country of origin  -1.266 0.282***  0.064 
Stability country of origin  -0.216 0.805***  0.010 
EU Yes -1.376 0.253***  0.048 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
Education Low education ref. ref. ref. 
 Middle education 0.561 1.753***  0.018 
 High education 0.379 1.461***  0.023 
**: p < 0.01   N = 43,942 
***: p < 0.001  Events = 16,470 
  Observations = 191,581 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Logrank = 11,792 (p < 0.00001) 
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Table A6.  Cox proportional hazards regression on the risk of naturalisation including rush into naturalisation 
dummy, cohorts 1995-2002. 
    Coef. Exp. coef. Std. error 
Gender Male 0.014 1.014  0.008 
 Female ref. ref. ref. 
Age at migration  -0.016 0.984***  0.001 
Partner No partner ref. ref. ref. 
 Native Dutch partner 0.511 1.667***  0.013 
 Foreign born foreign partner -0.284 0.753***  0.013 
 Year naturalisation partner 2.201 9.038***  0.015 
 1 year after naturalisation partner 0.869 2.385***  0.030 
 2 years after naturalisation partner 0.597 1.817***  0.035 
 3 years after naturalisation partner 0.254 1.289***  0.036 
 > 3 years after naturalisation partner -0.122 0.885***  0.014 
Children < 18 in household Yes ref. ref. ref. 
 No 0.008 1.008  0.009 
Dual nationality No automatic loss ref. ref. ref. 
 Automatic loss -0.033 0.968***  0.009 
Development country of origin  -1.402 0.246***  0.032 
Stability country of origin  -0.240 0.786***  0.005 
EU Yes -1.630 0.196***  0.021 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
Migrant cohort Cohort 1995 ref. ref. ref. 
 Cohort 1996 -0.018 0.982  0.016 
 Cohort 1997 -0.092 0.913***  0.016 
 Cohort 1998 -0.300 0.741***  0.016 
 Cohort 1999 -0.273 0.761***  0.016 
 Cohort 2000 -0.352 0.703***  0.016 
 Cohort 2001 -0.398 0.672***  0.016 
 Cohort 2002 -0.371 0.690***  0.016 
Period 01-04-2002 - 01-04-2003 Yes 0.314 1.369***  0.013 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
***: p < 0.001   N = 231,122 
  Events = 72,098 
  Observations = 1,247,745 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Logrank = 104,121 (p < 0.00001) 
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Table A7.  Descriptive statistics on employment of male and female immigrants in percentages, cohorts 1999-
2002. 
    Men* Women** 
Naturalisation No naturalisation 58.0 52.9 
 > 3 years prior to naturalisation 39.2 33.0 
 3 years prior to naturalisation 54.7 44.3 
 2 years prior to naturalisation 60.4 51.8 
 1 year prior to naturalisation 66.5 57.9 
 year of naturalisation 69.9 60.9 
 1 year after naturalisation 72.3 63.3 
 2 years after naturalisation 74.3 65.6 
 3 years after naturalisation 75.5 67.2 
 > 3 years after naturalisation 76.3 68.0 
Age at migration 20-24 year 60.0 50.7 
 25-29 year 61.3 54.5 
 30-34 year 57.2 52.0 
 35-39 year 54.5 50.9 
 40-44 year 52.6 51.8 
 45-50 year 51.5 50.6 
Years since migration 0-1 years 47.6 38.6 
 2-3 years 53.3 50.1 
 4-5 years 58.8 53.5 
 6-7 years 67.0 59.7 
 8-9 years 71.0 63.9 
Partner No partner 48.5 47.7 
 Foreign-born foreign partner  59.2 49.0 
 Foreign-born Dutch partner 70.6 45.3 
 Native-born Dutch partner 71.9 61.7 
Children < 18 in household Yes 63.4 46.8 
 No 54.9 58.0 
Development country of origin Lowest quartile 50.9 42.9 
 Second quartile 55.4 48.8 
 Third quartile 61.5 54.7 
 Highest quartile 64.9 62.0 
EU country of origin Yes 64.9 63.3 
 No 56.3 48.1 
Total  58.2 52.2 
*: N = 48,969 
*: Observations = 707,644 
**: N = 45,351 
**: Observations = 697,992 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A9a.  Distributed logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment, 
male immigrants who naturalise during the observation period from low/high developed countries, cohorts 
1999-2002†. 
 Men 
  Low development  High development 
  Exp. coef. 95% conf. intervals Exp. coef. 95% conf. intervals 
Naturalisation         
> 3 years prior to naturalisation ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. 
3 years prior to naturalisation 1.744***  0.501 0.611 1.716***  0.479 0.601 
2 years prior to naturalisation 1.919***  0.589 0.715 2.010***  0.631 0.765 
1 year prior to naturalisation 2.330***  0.775 0.917 2.455***  0.824 0.972 
year of naturalisation 2.140***  0.679 0.843 2.583***  0.865 1.033 
1 year after naturalisation 2.034***  0.618 0.802 2.604***  0.863 1.051 
2 years after naturalisation 1.904***  0.538 0.750 2.411***  0.774 0.986 
3 years after naturalisation 1.795***  0.465 0.705 2.040***  0.593 0.833 
> 3 years after naturalisation 1.317***  0.146 0.404 2.006***  0.565 0.827 
***: p < 0.001 N = 8,736 N = 8,900 
 Observations = 131,217 Observations = 122,593 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 132,876 -2 Log-likelihood = 121,020 
†: Controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Table A9b.  Distributed logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment, 
female immigrants who naturalise during the observation period from low/high developed countries, cohorts 
1999-2002†. 
 Women 
  Low development  High development 
  Exp. coef.   95% conf. intervals Exp. coef.  95% conf. intervals 
Naturalisation         
> 3 years prior to naturalisation ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. 
3 years prior to naturalisation 1.517***  0.362 0.472 1.627***  0.428 0.546 
2 years prior to naturalisation 1.887***  0.574 0.696 2.181***  0.713 0.847 
1 year prior to naturalisation 2.195***  0.715 0.857 2.609***  0.885 1.033 
year of naturalisation 2.115***  0.669 0.829 2.586***  0.866 1.034 
1 year after naturalisation 2.034***  0.618 0.802 2.552***  0.841 1.033 
2 years after naturalisation 1.956***  0.567 0.775 2.413***  0.773 0.989 
3 years after naturalisation 1.713***  0.422 0.654 2.280***  0.704 0.944 
> 3 years after naturalisation 1.523***  0.292 0.550 1.828***  0.470 0.736 
***: p < 0.001 N = 10,021 N = 9,862 
 Observations = 138,628 Observations = 137,327 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 141,434 -2 Log-likelihood = 137,932 
†: Controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A10a.  Distributed logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment, 
male immigrants who naturalise during the observation period from EU/non-EU countries, cohorts 1999-
2002†. 
 Men 
  Non-EU  EU 
  Exp. coef. 95% conf. intervals Exp. coef. 95% conf. intervals 
Naturalisation         
> 3 years prior to naturalisation ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. 
3 years prior to naturalisation 1.696***  0.487 0.569 1.401**  0.110 0.564 
2 years prior to naturalisation 1.900***  0.597 0.687 1.735***  0.312 0.790 
1 year prior to naturalisation 2.252***  0.761 0.863 2.519***  0.661 1.187 
year of naturalisation 2.197***  0.728 0.846 2.442***  0.601 1.185 
1 year after naturalisation 2.147***  0.697 0.831 2.382***  0.550 1.186 
2 years after naturalisation 2.000***  0.619 0.767 2.155***  0.417 1.119 
3 years after naturalisation 1.751***  0.476 0.644 2.138***  0.368 1.152 
> 3 years after naturalisation 1.473***  0.295 0.479 1.978**  0.255 1.109 
**: p < 0.01 N = 13,924 N = 821 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 244,522 Observations = 9,288 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 246,168 -2 Log-likelihood = 9,580 
†: Controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Table A10b.  Distributed logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment, 
female immigrants who naturalise during the observation period from EU/non-EU countries, cohorts 1999-
2002†. 
 Women 
  Non-EU  EU 
  Exp. coef.   95% conf. intervals Exp. coef.  95% conf. intervals 
Naturalisation         
> 3 years prior to naturalisation ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. 
3 years prior to naturalisation 1.576***  0.414 0.496 1.264**  0.060 0.408 
2 years prior to naturalisation 2.050***  0.673 0.763 1.567***  0.267 0.631 
1 year prior to naturalisation 2.467***  0.852 0.954 1.878***  0.432 0.828 
year of naturalisation 2.474***  0.847 0.965 1.852***  0.395 0.837 
1 year after naturalisation 2.433***  0.822 0.956 1.998***  0.447 0.937 
2 years after naturalisation 2.335***  0.774 0.922 1.984***  0.413 0.957 
3 years after naturalisation 2.149***  0.683 0.847 2.155***  0.464 1.072 
> 3 years after naturalisation 1.881***  0.540 0.724 1.674**  0.176 0.854 
**: p < 0.01 N = 15,276 N = 2,195 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 251,258 Observations = 24,697 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 258,812 -2 Log-likelihood = 23,720 
†: Controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A15.  Logistic individual fixed effects regression on the probability of having employment of male and 
female immigrants, cohorts 1999-2002.† 
  Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Exp. coef. Coef. Std. error Exp. coef. 
Naturalisation         
Yes 0.644 0.015 1.904***  0.596 0.014 1.815*** 
No ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
Years since migration*distance between  
origin and host country 
0.154 0.002 1.166***  0.052 0.002 1.053*** 
Years since naturalisation*naturalisation -0.011 0.005 0.989*  -0.021 0.005 0.979*** 
*: p < 0.05 N = 48,969 N = 45,351 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 707,644 Observations = 697,992 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 775,729 -2 Log-likelihood = 763,054 
†: Results include controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A16.  Descriptive statistics on mean Log labour income of male and female immigrants with employment 
in percentages, cohorts 1999-2002. 
    Men* Women** 
Naturalization No naturalization 3.386 3.215 
 > 3 years prior to naturalization 3.134 2.997 
 3 years prior to naturalization 3.184 3.041 
 2 years prior to naturalization 3.225 3.085 
 1 year prior to naturalization 3.269 3.117 
 Year of naturalization 3.287 3.144 
 1 year after naturalization 3.313 3.175 
 2 years after naturalization 3.341 3.200 
 3 years after naturalization 3.349 3.207 
 > 3 years after naturalization 3.359 3.217 
Age at migration 20-24 year 3.268 3.132 
 25-29 year 3.322 3.220 
 30-34 year 3.357 3.219 
 35-39 year 3.412 3.179 
 40-44 year 3.461 3.154 
 45-50 year 3.505 3.149 
Years since migration 0-1 years 3.285 3.111 
 2-3 years 3.328 3.151 
 4-5 years 3.349 3.178 
 6-7 years 3.382 3.219 
 8-9 years 3.406 3.243 
Partner No partner 3.230 3.254 
 Foreign-born foreign partner  3.432 3.189 
 Foreign-born Dutch partner 3.264 3.001 
 Native-born Dutch partner 3.365 3.192 
Children < 18 in household Yes 3.391 3.111 
 No 3.320 3.238 
Development country of origin Lowest quartile 3.209 3.038 
 Second quartile 3.274 3.116 
 Third quartile 3.382 3.227 
 Highest quartile 3.547 3.360 
EU country of origin Yes 3.464 3.299 
 No 3.293 3.114 
Total  3.349 3.185 
*: N = 58,164 
*: Observations = 587,572 
**: N = 44,335 
**: Observations = 432,591 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A18.  Percentages labour market sector by naturalisation of male and female immigrants with 
employment, cohorts 1999-2002. 
 Men  Women 
  Not naturalised Naturalised Not naturalised Naturalised 
Sector     
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.1 
Non-housing industry and energy 14.6 17.2 7.6 6.2 
Housing industry 2.9 3.3 0.4 0.7 
Transportation and catering 26.4 30.9 23.6 22.8 
Information and communication 5.7 2.6 4.1 2.7 
Financial services 2.4 1.4 2.7 3.4 
Rent and management of property 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Business services 35.7 30.0 36.9 30.9 
Public sector and care sector 7.6 10.2 18.6 28.5 
Culture, recreation and other 2.4 2.4 3.7 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 N = 51,217 N = 51,217 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Observations = 472,848 Observations = 472,848 
Table A19.  Percentages labour market sector by naturalisation of male and female immigrants with 
employment, cohorts 1999-2002. 
  Men Women 
Sector   
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 3.222 3.080 
Non-housing industry and energy 3.423 3.328 
Housing industry 3.410 3.196 
Transportation and catering 3.324 3.203 
Information and communication 3.543 3.448 
Financial services 3.719 3.510 
Rent and management of property 3.384 3.218 
Business services 3.343 3.124 
Public sector and care sector 3.411 3.258 
Culture, recreation and other 3.417 3.212 
Total 3.376 3.211 
 N = 51,217 N = 38,994 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Observations = 472,848 Observations = 350,518 
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Table A20.  Distributed individual fixed effects regression on Log labour income of male and female immigrants 
with employment. No right truncation. Cohorts 1999-2002. 
 Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Naturalisation       
Yes 0.005 0.003  0.007 0.003 * 
No ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Years since migration*naturalisation during 
observation period 
0.026 0.001 *** 0.021 0.001 *** 
Years since naturalisation*naturalisation -0.020 0.001 *** -0.014 0.001 *** 
*: p < 0.05 N = 43,113 N = 34,988 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 477,255 Observations = 366,696 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 427,605 -2 Log-likelihood = 239,812 
†: Results include controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Table A21.  Individual fixed-effects regression on Log labour income of male and female immigrants with 
employment, cohorts 1999-2002.† 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Naturalisation             
Yes -0.000 0.005  0.007 0.004 -0.007 0.005  -0.002 0.004 
No ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Years since migration* 
naturalisation during 
observation period 
0.023 0.002 *** 0.021 0.002 *** 0.021 0.002 *** 0.019 0.002 *** 
Years since naturalisation* 
naturalisation 
-0.012 0.002 *** -0.012 0.002 *** -0.011 0.002 *** -0.010 0.002 *** 
Education             
Low education       ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Middle education       0.041 0.005 *** 0.069 0.005 *** 
High education       0.165 0.006 *** 0.227 0.005 *** 
 
***: p < 0.001 N = 16,120 N = 14,870 N = 16,120 N = 14,870 
 Observations = 
119,192 
Observations = 
107,853 
Observations = 
119,192 
Observations = 
107,853 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 
123,220 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
75,525 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
122,439 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
73,726 
†: Model includes controls for years since migration, the partner status and having youngh children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A22.  Individual fixed-effects regression on Log labour income of male and female immigrants, cohorts 
1999-2002.† 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Naturalisation             
Yes 0.078 0.013 *** 0.072 0.013 *** 0.066 0.013 *** 0.053 0.013 *** 
No ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Years since migration* 
naturalisation during 
observation period 
0.116 0.004 *** 0.133 0.004 *** 0.112 0.004 *** 0.0127 0.004 *** 
Years since naturalisation* 
naturalisation 
-0.073 0.005 *** -0.088 0.005 *** -0.072 0.005 *** -0.085 0.005 *** 
Education             
Low education       ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Middle education       0.127 0.013 *** 0.180 0.013 *** 
High education       0.280 0.016 *** 0.451 0.015 ***  
***: p < 0.001 N = 18,087 N = 17,386 N = 18,087 N = 17,386 
 Observations = 
159,508 
Observations = 
158,654 
Observations = 
159,508 
Observations = 
158,654 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 
521,153 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
514,392 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
520,850 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
513,541 
†: Sample includes observations of migrants with and without employment. Model includes controls for years since 
migration, the partner status and having youngh children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Table A23.  Individual fixed-effects regression on Log labour income of male and female immigrants from 
countries that joined the EU in 2004, cohorts 1999-2002.† 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Naturalisation             
Yes -0.011 0.148 -0.027 0.044  -0.007 0.148  -0.031 0.044  
No ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Years since 
migration*naturalisation 
during observation period 
0.147 0.025 *** 0.135 0.008 *** 0.150 0.025 *** 0.131 0.008 *** 
Years since 
naturalisation*naturalisation 
-0.125 0.044 ** -0.102 0.014 *** -0.131 0.044 ** -0.094 0.014 *** 
Period after May 2007             
Yes       0.080 0.029 ** -0.087 0.022 *** 
No       ref. ref.  ref. ref.   
**: p < 0.01 N = 1,340 N = 2,253 N = 1,340 N = 2,253 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 
15,925 
Observations = 
34,611 
Observations = 
15,925 
Observations = 
34,611 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 
45,823 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
110,299 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
45,821 
-2 Log-likelihood = 
110,289 
†: Model includes controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A25.  Individual fixed-effects regression on Log labour income of male and female immigrants with 
employment, cohorts 1996-1997 and 2001-2002.† 
 Men  Women 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Naturalisation       
Yes 0.032 0.002 *** 0.027 0.002 *** 
No ref. ref.  ref. ref.  
Years since migration*distance origin 
country and host country 
0.006 0.001 *** 0.006 0.000 *** 
Years since naturalisation*naturalisation -0.004 0.001 *** -0.001 0.001 
***: p < 0.001 N = 58,164 N = 44,335 
 Observations = 587,572 Observations = 432,591 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 500,169 -2 Log-likelihood = 281,436 
†: Model includes controls for years since migration, the partner status and having young children in the household. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A26.  Descriptive statistics on homeownership of immigrants in percentages, last observation, cohorts 
1999-2002. 
  Event (homeownership) 
Naturalisation Yes 14,1 
 No 20,5 
Naturalisation during observation period Yes 21,6 
 No 18,0 
Gender Male 17.5 
 Female 20.7 
Age at migration 20-24 year 21.6 
 25-29 year 23.4 
 30-34 year 18.5 
 35-39 year 15.1 
 40-44 year 10.7 
 45-50 year 8.3 
Partner No partner 13.4 
 Foreign-born foreign partner  19.1 
 Foreign-born Dutch partner 15.5 
 Native-born Dutch partner 42.8 
Children < 18 in household Yes 18.8 
 No 19.4 
Employment Yes 26.9 
 No 11.1 
Disposable household income Lowest quartile 7.4 
 Second quartile 10.8 
 Third quartile 23.8 
 Highest quartile 34.4 
Development country of origin Lowest quartile 11.3 
 Second quartile 24.3 
 Third quartile 17.5 
 Highest quartile 24.1 
EU country of origin Yes 27.2 
 No 16.7 
After 01-01-2008 Yes 8.6 
 No 33.8 
Total  19.1 
N = 106,187 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A27.  Cox proportional hazard regression on the risk of homeownership of unemployed immigrants, 
cohorts 1999-2002.† 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Coef. Std. 
error 
Exp. coef. Coef. Std. 
error 
Exp. coef. Coef. Std. 
error 
Exp. coef. 
Naturalisation             
Yes 0.033 0.056 1.033 0.098 0.059 1.103 0.089 0.058 1.093  
No ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
Naturalisation during 
observation period 
            
Yes -0.020 0.035 0.980 -0.020 0.035 0.981 0.049 0.040 1.051  
No ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  ref. ref. ref.  
Naturalisation * native-born 
Dutch partner 
0.219 0.089 1.245 *         
Naturalisation * cultural 
distance 
    -0.001 0.001 0.999     
Cultural distance     -0.004 0.000 0.996 ***     
Naturalisation * after 01-01-
2008 
        -0.019 0.085 0.982  
*: p < 0.05 N = 76,444 N = 58,035 N = 76,444 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 286,149 Observations = 208,755 Observations = 286,149 
 Events = 5,834 Events = 4,909 Events = 5,834 
 -2 Log-likelihood = 116,433 -2 Log-likelihood = 95,633 -2 Log-likelihood = 116,439 
 †: Model includes controls for gender, age at migration, age at migration ^ 2, the partner status, having young 
children in the household, disposable household income, development country of origin, EU membership country of 
origin, of and the financial crisis. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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Table A28.  Cox proportional hazard regression on the risk of homeownership of employed immigrants, 
cohorts 1999-2002. 
  Coef. Std. error Exp. coef. 
Naturalisation    
Yes 0.222 0.031 1.248*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Naturalisation during observation period    
Yes 0.167 0.026 1.182*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Gender    
Male ref. ref. ref. 
Female 0.186 0.017 1.205*** 
Age at migration 0.062 0.011 1.064*** 
Age at migration ^ 2 -0.002 0.000 0.998*** 
Partner    
No partner ref. ref. ref. 
Foreign-born foreign partner 0.152 0.024 1.164*** 
Foreign-born Dutch partner 0.072 0.031 1.075* 
Native-born Dutch partner 0.465 0.024 1.592*** 
Partner shift    
Yes 0.251 0.031 1.285*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Children < 18 in the household    
Yes 0.168 0.020 1.183*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Disposable household income 1.520 0.039 4.572*** 
Development country of origin 2.130 0.087 8.413*** 
EU country of origin    
Yes 0.130 0.024 1.139*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
After 01-01-2008    
Yes -0.138 0.029 0.872*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
*: p < 0.05 N = 67,593 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 231,502 
 Events = 14,446 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. -2 Log-likelihood = 289,266 
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Table A29.  Cox proportional hazard regression on the risk of homeownership of employed immigrants, 
cohorts 1999-2002. 
  Coef. Std. error Exp. coef. 
Naturalisation    
Yes 0.336 0.049 1.399*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Naturalisation during observation period    
Yes 0.021 0.047 1.022 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Gender    
Male ref. ref. ref. 
Female 0.117 0.032 1.124*** 
Age at migration 0.022 0.022 1.022 
Age at migration ^ 2 -0.001 0.000 0.999** 
Partner    
No partner ref. ref. ref. 
Foreign-born foreign partner 0.215 0.044 1.240*** 
Foreign-born Dutch partner 0.168 0.052 1.183** 
Native-born Dutch partner 0.496 0.045 1.643*** 
Children < 18 in the household    
Yes 0.195 0.036 1.216*** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Disposable household income 2.112 0.087 8.261*** 
Development country of origin 1.920 0.148 6.822*** 
EU country of origin    
Yes -0.081 0.046 0.922 
No ref. ref. ref. 
After 01-01-2008    
Yes -0.120 0.044 0.887** 
No ref. ref. ref. 
Education    
Low ref. ref. ref. 
Middle 0.256 0.041 1.292*** 
High 0.483 0.041 1.621*** 
**: p < 0.01 N = 23,610 
***: p < 0.001 Observations = 66,244 
 Events = 4,348 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. -2 Log-likelihood = 77,511 
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Table A30.  Cox proportional hazard regression on the risk of homeownership of employed immigrants without 
right-truncation, cohorts 1999-2002. 
    Coef. Std. error Exp. coef. 
Naturalisation Yes 0.275 0.032 1.316*** 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
Naturalisation during observation period Yes 0.118 0.027 1.126*** 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
Gender Male ref. ref. ref. 
 Female 0.136 0.018 1.146*** 
Age at migration  0.047 0.012 1.048*** 
Age at migration ^ 2  -0.001 0.000 0.999*** 
Partner No partner ref. ref. ref. 
 Foreign-born foreign partner 0.231 0.025 1.259*** 
 Foreign-born Dutch partner 0.070 0.032 1.073* 
 Native-born Dutch partner 0.426 0.026 1.531*** 
Children < 18 in the household Yes 0.151 0.021 1.163*** 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
Disposable household income  1.763 0.043 5.828*** 
Development country of origin  2.439 0.093 11.465*** 
EU country of origin Yes 0.120 0.026 1.128*** 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
After 01-01-2008 Yes -0.155 0.030 0.857*** 
 No ref. ref. ref. 
*: p < 0.05   N = 53,215 
***: p < 0.001  Observations = 196,395 
  Events = 12,987 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. -2 Log-likelihood = 255,611 
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Figure A1a.  Cumulative naturalisation migrant cohorts  
1995-1997 by level of stability origin country. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
Figure A1b.  Cumulative naturalisation migrant cohorts 
2000-2002 by level of stability origin country. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
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In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de relatie tussen naturalisatie en sociaal-economische22 
integratie van eerste generatie23 migranten in Nederland. De integratie van 
nieuwkomers staat al geruime tijd hoog op de beleidsagenda. Ook in het regeerakkoord 
van het kabinet Rutte III neemt integratie een prominente positie in (Rijksoverheid, 
2017, pp. 54-55). Onderzoek toont consistent aan dat migranten een relatief zwakke 
positie bekleden op onder andere de arbeidsmarkt (Heath & Cheung, 2007; Lancee, 
2012) en de huizenmarkt (Boehm & Slottmann, 2004; Dawkins, 2005; Zorlu et al., 2014). 
Nederland is daarin geen uitzondering; migranten hebben minder vaak betaald werk, 
genieten een lager inkomen uit werk, en zijn minder vaak huiseigenaar dan personen 
zonder migratieachtergrond (CBS, 2016, pp. 54-59, 68-73; Uunk, 2017). Deze 
discrepantie is deels te wijten aan structurele obstakels die migranten ondervinden op 
de arbeidsmarkt en huizenmarkt. Zo zijn bestaande hulpbronnen van migranten zoals 
diploma’s, werkervaring en sociale contacten slechts beperkt relevant in het 
bestemmingsland, of worden niet als zodanig erkend (Friedberg, 2000). Bovendien 
hebben migranten dikwijls een achterstand op het gebied van taalbeheersing (van 
Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2005), en kan er sprake zijn van discriminatie door werkgevers of 
geldverstrekkers (Aalbers, 2007; Andriessen, Nievers, & Dagevos, 2012; Arrow, 1972). 
Vanuit dit oogpunt wordt naturalisatie door beleidsmakers gezien als een veelbelovend 
instrument om de integratie van migranten te bevorderen. Internationaal onderzoek 
laat zien dat genaturaliseerde migranten beter presteren op onder andere de 
arbeidsmarkt (OECD, 2011) en de huizenmarkt (Enchautegui & Giannarelli, 2015; 
Hutcheson & Jeffers, 2013) dan hun niet-genaturaliseerde tegenhangers. Dit positieve 
effect van naturalisatie wordt ook wel de naturalisatiepremie genoemd (OECD, 2011). 
Echter, er is nog veel onduidelijkheid in de literatuur over de vraag voor wie en waarom 
het staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland er toe doet. Niet alle migranten kiezen 
ervoor om te naturaliseren, en hoewel sommige migranten gebaat zijn bij naturalisatie 
in het integratieproces, is dat niet voor alle migranten het geval. Vanuit deze 
achtergrond wordt in dit proefschrift de volgende vraag onderzocht: wat zijn de 
verklarende factoren voor naturalisatie, en wat is de rol van naturalisatie voor de 
sociaal-economische integratie van eerste generatie migranten in Nederland? 
Migratie naar Nederland is de afgelopen decennia toegenomen, niet alleen in volume, 
maar vooral ook in diversiteit. Dit sluit aan bij een mondiale trend, waarbij migranten uit 
een groeiend aantal herkomstlanden zich richt op een slinkende groep bestemmings-
landen (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). Als gevolg van deze ontwikkeling is de vestiging van 
nieuwkomers een prominent onderwerp in de Nederlandse politiek. Dit manifesteert zich 
onder andere in een verschuiving van de rol van naturalisatie in het integratiedebat (van 
                                                                
22 Sociaal-economische integratie omvat in dit proefschrift betaald werk, inkomen uit arbeid en woningbezit. 
23 In dit proefschrift worden eerste generatie migranten gedefinieerd als personen van wie beide ouders in 
het buitenland geboren zijn, omdat tweede en verdere generaties kunnen naturaliseren via gefaciliteerde 
procedures, waaronder medenaturalisatie (de situatie waarbij minderjarige kinderen delen in de naturalisatie 
van hun ouder[s]). 
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Oers, 2014; van Oers et al., 2013). In de jaren tachtig werd het Nederlanderschap vooral 
gezien als een instrument ter bevordering van de integratie van migranten. Deze notie van 
naturalisatie als springplank voor verdere integratie ging gepaard met een relatief liberaal 
naturalisatiebeleid, bedoeld om migranten aan te sporen Nederlander te worden (Heijs, 
1995, p. 180). Echter, in de jaren negentig vond een verschuiving plaats van een 
‘minderhedenbeleid’, gericht op het faciliteren van integratie, naar een ‘integratiebeleid’, 
waarbij individuele verantwoordelijkheid voor het integratieproces centraal stond 
(Entzinger, 2003). Daarmee veranderde ook de rol van naturalisatie. Het Nederlander-
schap werd niet langer gezien als onderdeel van het integratieproces, maar als het 
eindpunt; de bekroning op voltooide integratie. De formele eisen voor naturalisatie 
werden vanuit dat oogpunt aangescherpt, met verscheidene beleidswijzigingen in de 
afgelopen twintig jaar. Cijfers van het CBS laten zien dat deze beleidswijzigingen gepaard 
gingen met fluctuaties in het aantal naturalisaties per jaar (CBS, 2017b). Het is echter 
onduidelijk in hoeverre beleid ook daadwerkelijk ten grondslag ligt aan het aantal 
migranten dat Nederlander wordt, en voor welke migranten strenge institutionele kaders 
belangrijke obstakels vormen voor het Nederlanderschap. Bovendien is er weinig bekend 
over het effect van naturalisatiebeleid voor de integratie van migranten. Zowel het 
prominente debat omtrent de vestiging van nieuwkomers, als de verscheidene wijzigingen 
in naturalisatiewetgeving in de afgelopen decennia, maakt dat de Nederlandse casus 
unieke mogelijkheden biedt om de rol van de institutionele context voor de naturalisatie-
premie te onderzoeken. 
In dit proefschrift analyseer ik registerdata uit het Stelsel van Sociaal Statistische 
Bestanden (Bakker et al., 2014) van het CBS. Het gebruik van administratieve 
databronnen voor onderzoek in de sociale wetenschappen is een relatief nieuw 
fenomeen dat belangrijke voordelen met zich meebrengt. Op de eerste plaats bevat 
registerdata de volledige geregistreerde populatie. Dit is met name waardevol wanneer 
de onderzoekspopulatie ondervertegenwoordigd is in meer traditionele databronnen, 
zoals vragenlijsten. Om diverse redenen, waaronder taalbeheersing, is dit dikwijls het 
geval voor eerste generatie migranten (Font & Mendez, 2014, p. 16; Kappelhof, 2014, 
2017). Bovendien biedt het administratieve karakter van de data deels een oplossing 
voor mogelijke sociale wenselijkheid. Verder wordt registerdata gekenmerkt door 
frequente observatiemomenten en een panel-structuur. Hoewel er ook beperkingen 
kleven aan het gebruik van registerdata, waaronder een beperkte conceptuele 
reikwijdte en mogelijke administratieve vertraging (Bakker, 2011), zijn deze data 
uitermate geschikt – en vooralsnog niet benut – om de relatie tussen naturalisatie en 
sociaal-economische integratie van migranten statistisch te onderzoeken.  
 
Nederlandse Samenvatting 
191 
Theoretische bijdrage: naturalisatie en sociaal-economische integratie in de 
context van de levensloop 
Er bestaat veel onderzoek naar de vraag of naturalisatie de integratie van migranten op 
de arbeidsmarkt bevordert (Chiswick, 1978; Bevelander & Veenman, 2008; Fougère & 
Safi, 2009; Scott, 2008). Resultaten uit dit onderzoeksveld schetsen echter geen 
eenduidig beeld; sommige studies bevestigen een positieve relatie, maar anderen niet. 
Om deze tegenstrijdige bevindingen te duiden is er de afgelopen jaren veel aandacht in 
de literatuur voor de analysemethode waarmee de naturalisatiepremie traditioneel 
onderzocht wordt. Meer specifiek is de gedachte dat het verband tussen naturalisatie 
en integratie verklaard wordt doordat beter geïntegreerde migranten vaker 
naturaliseren. Met andere woorden, integratie leidt tot naturalisatie in plaats van 
andersom. Om de naturalisatiepremie te onderzoeken moet dus de periode voor en na 
naturalisatie vergeleken worden in plaats van genaturaliseerde en niet-genaturaliseerde 
migranten. Internationaal onderzoek bevestigt dat sommige migranten beter presteren 
op de arbeidsmarkt nadat zij genaturaliseerd zijn in vergelijking met de periode voor 
naturalisatie (Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 196; Engdahl, 2014, p. 18; Helgertz et al., 
2014, p. 352). Deze studies bieden echter geen verklaring voor het feit dat sommige 
migranten profijt hebben van naturalisatie op de arbeidsmarkt, terwijl dat voor anderen 
niet het geval is. Met andere woorden, de focus in de literatuur op de verdere 
ontwikkeling van het analytisch model is belangrijk, maar geeft weinig inzicht in de 
vraag waarom en voor wie er sprake is van een naturalisatiepremie. Recente analytische 
ontwikkelingen in de literatuur moeten dus gepaard gaan met vergelijkbare 
theoretische vooruitgang zodat empirische resultaten beter gecontextualiseerd kunnen 
worden. Vanuit dat oogpunt verrijk ik in deze dissertatie het traditionele theoretische 
kader met concepten uit de sociologische levensloopbenadering (Elder, 1974). Deze 
benadering combineert twee gevestigde stromingen in de literatuur. Een stroming 
analyseert individuele drijfveren voor naturalisatie en herkomstkenmerken (Chiswick & 
Miller, 2009; Helgertz & Bevelander, 2016; Yang, 1994), terwijl de ander zich richt op de 
rol van institutionele, politieke en historische kenmerken van bestemmingslanden 
(Aleksyndra & Algan, 2010; Janoski, 2010; Reichel, 2011). Afzonderlijk zijn beide 
stromingen niet in staat een antwoord te geven op de vraag waarom sommige 
migranten een naturalisatiepremie genieten, en anderen niet. De dynamische 
levensloopbenadering biedt hierin uitkomst door te benadrukken dat individuen 
genesteld zijn in een bredere sociale en institutionele context. Motieven voor 
naturalisatie en de rol van staatsburgerschap in het leven van migranten hangen niet 
alleen af van de relatieve waarde van de nationaliteit van het bestemmingsland, maar 
worden ook geconditioneerd door timing in de levensloop (bijvoorbeeld leeftijd, de 
partner of kinderen), en de juridische en sociaal-economische kaders van het 
bestemmingsland (waaronder naturalisatiebeleid, maar ook bijvoorbeeld conjunctuur of 
toegang tot sociale voorzieningen). In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt toegelicht hoe een dergelijke 
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conceptualisering van naturalisatie in de context van de levensloop aanknopingspunten 
biedt om het effect van naturalisatie te duiden, en tegenstrijdige resultaten in de 
literatuur te verklaren. Deze benadering wordt vervolgens toegepast in vier empirische 
hoofdstukken.  
Empirische bijdrage: de naturalisatiepremie in Nederland 
Om uitspraken te doen over het effect van naturalisatie is het belangrijk eerst te 
begrijpen welke migranten naturaliseren en waarom. In Hoofdstuk 3 worden motieven 
voor naturalisatie geanalyseerd, met speciale aandacht voor de sociale en institutionele 
context waarin de afweging om het Nederlanderschap te verkrijgen gemaakt wordt. In 
2016 werden ruim 15.600 personen Nederlander door zelfstandige naturalisatie (CBS, 
2017b). Het Nederlanderschap biedt belangrijke privileges, waaronder ongelimiteerde 
toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt, stemrecht voor de Tweede Kamer- en Provinciale 
Statenverkiezingen en een gegarandeerde verblijfsstatus. Maar er zijn ook formele 
eisen waaraan voldaan moet worden alvorens men kan naturaliseren. Zo moeten 
migranten normaliter minimaal 5 jaar legaal in Nederland verblijven, en zal men op het 
moment van naturalisatie afstand moeten doen van de originele nationaliteit (hoewel 
Nederland veel uitzonderingen op de afstandseis kent). In hoeverre de voordelen van 
naturalisatie opwegen tegen de kosten is afhankelijk van de individuele situatie van 
migranten. Zo zijn vluchtelingen zeer gebaat bij de zekere verblijfsstatus die 
naturalisatie biedt, terwijl de afstandseis voor migranten uit welvarende landen een 
belangrijk obstakel vormt. Analyses bevestigen dat een kosten-baten model ook in 
Nederland een goede voorspeller van naturalisatie is. Migranten voor wie de voordelen 
van het Nederlanderschap een belangrijke rol in hun leven spelen, zoals migranten uit 
economisch laagontwikkelde, politiek instabiele of niet-EU landen, hebben een hoge 
kans om te naturaliseren. Omgekeerd zijn migranten die hun originele nationaliteit 
automatisch verliezen wanneer zij Nederlander worden minder geneigd te naturali-
seren. Verder laten de resultaten zien dat de beslissing om te naturaliseren een sociale 
component bevat. De kans om te naturaliseren is hoger wanneer migranten een partner 
van Nederlandse herkomst of een genaturaliseerde partner hebben. Het positieve 
effect is met name sterk in het jaar dat de partner Nederlander wordt. Dit impliceert dat 
de keuze om te naturaliseren in ieder geval deels in gezinsverband gemaakt wordt. Deze 
conclusie heeft belangrijke implicaties voor het traditionele theoretische model. 
Immers, wanneer motieven voor naturalisatie niet louter gebaseerd zijn op persoonlijk 
gewin schiet een model dat individuen als geïsoleerde eenheden beschouwd tekort. 
Met andere woorden, diepgaand inzicht in de vraag waarom migranten naturaliseren 
vraagt om een model dat recht doet aan de sociale complexiteit van het leven van 
mensen. 
De belangrijkste conclusie uit dit hoofdstuk heeft echter betrekking op de rol van 
naturalisatiebeleid. Hoewel er veel onderzoek is naar de relevantie van persoons- en 
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herkomstkenmerken voor de neiging van migranten om te naturaliseren, is er maar 
weinig bekend over de rol van de institutionele context van het bestemmingsland. 
Echter, naturalisatiebeleid bepaald onder welke voorwaarden migranten in aanmerking 
komen voor het staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland, en speelt dus een 
cruciale rol in het naturalisatieproces. Vanuit dit oogpunt is de invoering van de 
naturalisatietoets in Nederland op 1 april 2003 geanalyseerd. De voorwaarden voor 
naturalisatie werden na deze beleidswijziging strenger (van Oers, 2014), maar het is 
onduidelijk of dit ook een effect heeft gehad op het naturalisatiegedrag van migranten, 
en zo ja, welke migranten vooral de gevolgen van restrictief beleid ondervinden. Om dat 
nader te onderzoeken zijn migranten vergeleken die in aanmerking kwamen voor het 
Nederlanderschap voor en na de invoering van de naturalisatietoets. Analyses 
bevestigen dat migranten minder snel en minder vaak naturaliseren onder de strengere 
institutionele condities na 2003. Echter, het effect van streng beleid wordt 
geconditioneerd door herkomstkenmerken. Meer specifiek doet restrictief beleid er 
alleen toe voor migranten uit economisch laagontwikkelde en politiek instabiele 
herkomstlanden. Dit zijn dezelfde migranten die zeer geïnteresseerd zijn in 
naturalisatie, en het Nederlanderschap goed kunnen gebruiken om hun relatief zwakke 
positie op bijvoorbeeld de arbeidsmarkt of huizenmarkt te verbeteren. 
Resultaten in Hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat migranten voor wie het staatsburgerschap 
van het bestemmingsland een waardevolle bijdrage kan leveren aan hun integratie-
traject sterk afhankelijk zijn van de beleidscontext die toegang tot naturalisatie 
conditioneert. Om nader te onderzoeken of, en onder welke voorwaarden, naturalisatie 
een rol speelt voor de integratie van migranten is in Hoofdstuk 4 het effect van het 
Nederlanderschap voor de kans op betaald werk geanalyseerd. Resultaten bevestigen 
dat naturalisatie de kans op werk bevordert met 12 en 13 procent (Odds ratio 1,12 en 
1,13) voor respectievelijk mannen en vrouwen. Dit sluit aan bij de gevestigde theorie in 
de literatuur dat naturalisatie de kansen op de arbeidsmarkt vergroot door 
ongelimiteerde toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt te verschaffen en administratieve kosten 
voor werknemers te beperken. Bovendien kan de nationaliteit van het bestemmings-
land een positief signaal afgeven richting werkgevers met betrekking tot de 
vaardigheden en arbeidsethos van de migrant in kwestie (Liebig & von Haaren, 2011). 
Met andere woorden, werkgevers kunnen de genaturaliseerde status van een migrant 
zien als een indicatie voor wenselijke kenmerken, waardoor het in dienst nemen van 
deze migrant als minder risicovol beschouwd wordt. De analyses laten verder zien dat 
migranten die naturaliseren sowieso beter presteren op de arbeidsmarkt ongeacht hun 
nationaliteit, in de literatuur ook wel positieve selectie genoemd (Helgertz et al., 2014, 
p. 342; Steinhardt, 2012, p. 814). Het is dus belangrijk hiervoor te corrigeren zodat het 
effect van naturalisatie niet overschat wordt. De belangrijkste bevinding is echter dat de 
arbeidsmarktprestaties van migranten al verbeteren voordat zij daadwerkelijk 
naturaliseren, ook wanneer gecontroleerd wordt voor positieve selectie. Hoewel dit in 
internationaal onderzoek al eerder geconstateerd is (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 344), 
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ontbreekt vooralsnog een duidelijke verklaring hiervoor. Ik theoretiseer dat migranten 
anticiperen op de mogelijkheden en privileges die naturalisatie zal bieden – 
bijvoorbeeld op de arbeidsmarkt – door al in aanloop naar het moment van 
naturalisatie in hun arbeidsmarktpotentie te investeren. Zo zullen migranten 
bijvoorbeeld de ontwikkeling van hun taalkennis versnellen om gebruik te kunnen 
maken van de ongelimiteerde toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt. Bovendien moeten 
migranten hun kennis van de Nederlandse taal en samenleving ontwikkelen om te 
voldoen aan de formele eisen voor naturalisatie. De resultaten suggereren dat deze 
investeringen al vruchten afwerpen voordat migranten daadwerkelijk Nederlander 
worden. Conform deze gedachte is het effect van naturalisatie het grootst wanneer 
migranten relatief snel naturaliseren. Immers, extra investering in bijvoorbeeld 
taalkennis is vooral van meerwaarde in de beginfase van het vestigingstraject, 
aangezien migranten ook geleidelijk taalkennis opdoen door simpelweg in het 
bestemmingsland te verblijven. Ter vergelijking: de kans op werk van migranten die na 5 
jaar verblijf in Nederland naturaliseren – wanneer het gros van de migranten in 
aanmerking komt voor naturalisatie – is 34 procent hoger voor mannen (Odds ratio 
1,34), en 38 procent hoger voor vrouwen (Odds ratio 1,38), dan hun niet-
naturaliserende tegenhangers. Echter, onder migranten die na 8 tot 10 jaar 
naturaliseren is dit positieve effect geslonken tot 10 procent. Naturalisatie stimuleert 
dus de kans op werk, maar het maakt wel uit wanneer het Nederlanderschap verkregen 
wordt. De dichotome voor-na benadering die in de traditionele literatuur van de 
naturalisatiepremie gehanteerd wordt verhuld dus het belang van het traject dat aan 
naturalisatie vooraf gaat. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt het effect van naturalisatie in meer detail onderzocht door 
inkomen uit werk te analyseren. Dit is de meest gangbare operationalisatie van 
arbeidsmarktintegratie in de literatuur, maar er is geen consistent bewijs voor een 
positief effect van naturalisatie voor het inkomen van migranten (Helgertz et al., 2014, 
p. 343). Ik verken drie verklaringen voor deze empirische ambiguïteit. Op de eerste 
plaats stel ik dat het signaal-effect van naturalisatie minder relevant is voor migranten 
met betaald werk, aangezien de arbeidsmarktparticipatie van deze migranten al een 
positief signaal afgeeft richting werkgevers. Omdat het gros van de literatuur het effect 
van naturalisatie op inkomen analyseert – en zich dus per definitie op migranten met 
betaald werk richt – wordt de naturalisatiepremie mogelijk onderschat. Ten tweede zal 
naturalisatie vooral van belang zijn voor migranten die de meest structurele obstakels 
ondervinden op de arbeidsmarkt. Werkgevers associëren mogelijk meer risico bij het in 
dienst nemen van migranten uit economisch laag ontwikkelde landen. De nationaliteit 
van het bestemmingsland kan dergelijke vermeende risico’s beperken, en is dus vooral 
waardevol voor deze kwetsbare migranten met een zwakkere reputatie op de 
arbeidsmarkt. Ten derde suggereren de resultaten in Hoofdstuk 4 dat migranten het 
verkrijgen van het staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland anticiperen, en reeds in 
hun arbeidsmarktpotentie investeren in aanloop naar het moment van naturalisatie. 
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Echter, de meeste studies in de literatuur modelleren de naturalisatiepremie als een 
dichotoom voor-na fenomeen. Een mogelijk anticipatie-effect wordt daardoor verhuld, 
en het effect van naturalisatie onderschat. Conform veel internationaal onderzoek 
(Bratsberg & Raaum, 2011, p. 197; Bratsberg et al., 2002, p. 582; Helgertz et al., 2014, 
p. 352; Steinhardt, 2012, p. 818) vind ik geen empirische ondersteuning voor een 
positief effect op het gebied van inkomen uit werk na naturalisatie. In lijn met mijn 
verwachting is er wel sprake van een positief effect voor migranten uit economisch 
laagontwikkelde herkomstlanden. Het inkomen uit werk van mannen en vrouwen uit 
deze landen stijgt met respectievelijk 3 en 5 procent na naturalisatie. Bovendien groeit 
het inkomen al in aanloop naar het moment van naturalisatie, en piekt rond het 
moment dat men Nederlander wordt. Dit sluit aan bij de gedachte dat migranten het 
verkrijgen van het Nederlanderschap anticiperen, en al op voorhand hun kennis en 
vaardigheden ontwikkelen om ten volste gebruik te maken van de mogelijkheden die 
naturalisatie in de toekomst zal bieden. Meer algemeen laten de analyses zien dat 
naturalisatie er toe doet voor het inkomen uit werk van de meest kwetsbare 
migrantengroepen, maar dat het effect vooral voortkomt uit de intentie om in 
Nederland te blijven en hier een bestaan op te bouwen (en dus in bijvoorbeeld kennis 
van de taal en maatschappij te investeren), en minder uit bezit van de Nederlandse 
nationaliteit an sich. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt de conceptuele reikwijdte van het begrip integratie breder 
getrokken dan in de traditionele literatuur door een naturalisatiepremie op de 
huizenmarkt te onderzoeken. Meer specifiek wordt het effect van het Nederlander-
schap voor de kans op huizenbezit geanalyseerd, met speciale aandacht voor het 
signaal-effect van naturalisatie. Cijfers van het CBS laten zien dat personen met een 
migratieachtergrond beduidend minder vaak een eigen woning bezitten dan personen 
van Nederlandse herkomst. Op 1 januari 2015 was 60,9 procent van de huishoudens 
met een hoofdkostwinnaar van Nederlandse herkomst de eigenaar van een koophuis, 
terwijl dit onder migranten met een westerse en niet-westerse migratieachtergrond 
respectievelijk 44,9 en 25,1 procent bedroeg (CBS, 2017a). Hoewel er veel onderzoek is 
naar deze zogenoemde etnische kloof op de huizenmarkt (Aalbers, 2007; Charles & 
Hurst, 2002; Constant et al., 2009; Coulson & Dalton, 2010; Ross & Tootell, 2004), is er 
maar weinig bekend over de rol die naturalisatie speelt voor de kansen van migranten 
op een koophuis.  
Huizenbezit is financieel aantrekkelijk, en wordt in Nederland gestimuleerd door 
onder andere fiscale afterekbaarheid van hypotheekrente en collectieve bescherming 
van hypotheekschuld. Als gevolg van deze gunstige institutionele kaders is het aandeel 
huizenbezitters, evenals de hypotheekschuld per hoofd van de bevolking, in Nederland 
hoog (Norris & Winston, 2012). Toch bestaan er forse verschillen in huizenbezit tussen 
personen met en zonder migratieachtergrond. Een belangrijke verklaring voor deze 
etnische kloof op de huizenmarkt zijn de structurele moeilijkheden die migranten 
ondervinden op de arbeidsmarkt (Huijnk & Andriessen, 2016; Uunk, 2017). Dit verklaart 
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echter maar een deel van de puzzel. Een additionele verklaring is dat de migratie-
achtergrond zelf de kans op een hypotheek beperkt. De nationaliteit van het 
bestemmingsland zou mogelijk voor deze achterstandspositie van migranten kunnen 
compenseren. Echter, in artikel 7, lid 1c van de Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling is 
vastgelegd dat onderscheid in Nederland naar onder andere nationaliteit door 
instellingen die werkzaam zijn op het gebied van volkshuisvesting verboden is. Formeel 
gezien zou de nationaliteit van migranten dus geen verklaring moeten bieden voor 
verschillen in huizenbezit tussen personen met en zonder migratieachtergrond. Echter, 
in de praktijk lijken geldverstrekkers toch de nationaliteit van migranten mee te nemen 
in hun risicoafweging (College voor de Rechten van de Mens, 2016; van Dorst, 
Hoogendijk, Vreeburg & Verheul, 2017, pp. 22-23; Eerste Kamer, 2017, p. 3). Bezit van 
de Nederlandse nationaliteit kan gezien worden als een indicatie dat de migrant in 
kwestie gemotiveerd is, en gecommitteerd aan diens verblijf in Nederland. Met andere 
woorden, het Nederlanderschap geeft een positief signaal af richting geldverstrekkers, 
en kan mogelijke twijfels wegnemen met betrekking tot de migratieachtergrond van de 
aanvrager van een lening. 
De resultaten van mijn analyses bevestigen deze gedachtegang. Migranten met 
betaald werk die het Nederlanderschap verkrijgen hebben vervolgens 25 procent meer 
kans (Odds ratio 1,25) om huiseigenaar te worden dan hun niet-genaturaliseerde 
tegenhangers. Vermoedelijk zien geldverstrekkers het Nederlanderschap in hun 
risicoafweging als een indicatie voor kredietwaardigheid, en hebben daardoor minder 
twijfels bij de migratieachtergrond van de aanvrager. Echter, het effect van naturalisatie 
is zwakker voor migranten met een partner van Nederlandse herkomst. Deze migranten 
ondervinden mogelijk minder moeilijkheden op de huizenmarkt, en hebben het 
Nederlanderschap dus ook minder nodig bij het krijgen van een hypotheek. Verder doet 
naturalisatie er alleen toe voor migranten met betaald werk. Dit sluit aan bij de 
gedachte dat de nationaliteit van migranten niet kan dienen als een op zichzelf staande 
kwalificatie voor kredietwaardigheid. Als de vereiste financiële basis voor een lening 
ontbreekt, zal de nationaliteit van de kandidaat waarschijnlijk helemaal niet in acht 
worden genomen. Er lijkt met andere woorden sprake te zijn van discriminatie op grond 
van nationaliteit. Niet-Nederlandse migranten die in principe in aanmerking komen voor 
een lening hebben ongelijke kansen in vergelijking met hun Nederlandse tegenhangers 
met vergelijkbare achtergrondkenmerken. Verder ondervinden migranten meer 
moeilijkheden op de huizenmarkt tijdens en na de economische crisis. Datzelfde geldt 
voor migranten afkomstig uit landen die cultureel meer afwijken van Nederland. Echter, 
deze obstakels zijn niet afhankelijk van de nationaliteit van migranten. Kortom, 
naturalisatie lijkt migranten te helpen op de huizenmarkt, maar het lost niet alle 
problemen op. 
Hoe verhouden deze resultaten zich tot de centrale onderzoeksvraag: wat zijn de 
verklarende factoren voor naturalisatie, en wat is de rol van naturalisatie voor de 
sociaal-economische integratie van eerste generatie migranten in Nederland? Om te 
Nederlandse Samenvatting 
197 
beginnen bij het tweede gedeelte van de onderzoeksvraag; er kan geconcludeerd 
worden dat naturalisatie er toe doet voor de integratie van migranten. Het 
Nederlanderschap verhoogt de kans op werk, en heeft voor migranten uit economisch 
laagontwikkelde landen een positief effect in termen van inkomen uit arbeid. Bovendien 
stijgen de kansen op de arbeidsmarkt al in aanloop naar het moment van naturalisatie. 
Migranten investeren in hun arbeidsmarktpotentie anticiperende op de mogelijkheden 
die het Nederlanderschap zal bieden, en in het kader van de formele eisen voor 
naturalisatie. Om die reden doet naturalisatie er vooral toe wanneer het 
staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland relatief snel verkregen wordt. Naturalisatie 
faciliteert ook toegang tot de huizenmarkt door de kans op huizenbezit te vergroten. 
Hoewel naturalisatie daarmee niet alle obstakels van migranten op de arbeidsmarkt en 
huizenmarkt wegneemt, kan wel geconcludeerd worden dat het staatsburgerschap van 
het bestemmingsland een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren aan het oplossen van een 
aantal structurele obstakels die migranten ondervinden in het integratieproces. 
Naturalisatie kan met andere woorden functioneren als een springplank voor integratie, 
en deuren openen voor verdere opwaartse mobiliteit. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor 
migranten uit economisch laagontwikkelde herkomstlanden, die de meeste 
moeilijkheden hebben op de arbeidsmarkt, en een steuntje in de rug goed kunnen 
gebruiken. Echter, deze kwetsbare migranten zijn erg afhankelijk van de 
toegankelijkheid van naturalisatiebeleid om te kunnen naturaliseren.  
Dit brengt mij bij het eerste gedeelte van de onderzoeksvraag. Migranten 
naturaliseren minder snel en minder vaak onder restrictief naturalisatiebeleid. Het effect 
van streng beleid is echter niet gelijk voor alle migrantengroepen. Strenge eisen zijn 
vooral een obstakel om te naturaliseren voor migranten uit economisch laagontwikkelde 
en politiek instabiele herkomstlanden. Daarentegen doet naturalisatiebeleid er 
nauwelijks toe voor migranten uit hoogontwikkelde en politiek stabiele herkomstlanden. 
Deze migranten zijn weinig geïnteresseerd in naturalisatie, en hebben het 
staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland bovendien minder nodig. De positieve rol 
die naturalisatie kan spelen voor de integratie van migranten is dus afhankelijk van een 
balans tussen enerzijds eisen voor naturalisatie, om migranten te stimuleren om in hun 
integratie te investeren, en anderzijds de toegankelijkheid van deze eisen om migranten 
een realistisch perspectief op naturalisatie te bieden. Zo bezien zijn bepaalde eisen voor 
naturalisatie waardevoller voor de integratie van migranten dan anderen. Basale 
taalbeheersing is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor participatie in de samenleving. Een 
zekere mate van vereiste taalkennis kan migranten stimuleren om hier al in een vroeg 
stadium in te investeren. Wanneer taaleisen echter te hoog zijn, of (financiële) 
ondersteuning om deze kennis te ontwikkelen ontbreekt, zullen met name de migranten 
die het staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland het meest nodig hebben niet langer 
in staat zijn te naturaliseren, of wordt het moment van naturalisatie zodanig vertraagd 
dat het niet langer relevant is. Verder zal een lange verblijfstermijn of hoge kosten voor 
naturalisatie het staatsburgerschap van het bestemmingsland alleen exclusiever maken. 
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De positieve rol die naturalisatie kan spelen in het integratieproces van migranten wordt 
daardoor alleen maar beperkt. Kortom, naturalisatie kan een kickstart geven aan het 
integratieproces van migranten, maar het effect is wel afhankelijk van de juiste timing en 
functionele beleidscondities. 
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In light of the growing salience of international migration, policy-makers of destination 
countries have a strong incentive to ensure a quick and successful settlement process of 
newcomers. The Netherlands – being a country of net-immigration – is no exception. 
The integration of immigrants constitutes a prominent subject in the coalition 
agreement of the Dutch Rutte III government, recently sworn into office in October 
2017. According to this document (Rijksoverheid, 2017, p. 54), successful integration is 
characterized among other things by mastery of the native language and active 
participation in Dutch society, including (but not limited to) the labour market. Research 
consistently shows that particularly first generation immigrants perform worse than 
natives on these indicators of integration (CBS, 2016; Eurostat, 2017a, 2017b; Heath & 
Cheung, 2007). This is unsurprising, given that these migrants enjoyed their formative 
years abroad, and have resided in the host country for a comparatively short period of 
time. Yet it is in the interest of both immigrants themselves and host societies to 
develop ways to facilitate the integration process. Immigration has the potential to 
stimulate real (inflation adjusted) GDP per capita (Bove & Elia, 2017), decrease natives’ 
financial burden for public expenditures (Dustmann & Frattini, 2014) and reduce 
dependency ratios (the share of the population that is not in the labour force) in host 
countries (Gagnon, 2014).24 However, the positive fiscal and demographic outcomes of 
immigration depend on the formal and informal opportunities of immigrants to actively 
participate in society. In other words, immigrants can only provide an economic 
contribution to host countries if they are allowed to do so. In that context, citizenship 
may play an important role, for instance by providing unrestricted access to the labour 
market. Indeed, international research suggests a positive association between 
citizenship acquisition and income from labour (Bratsberg et al., 2002; Helgertz et al., 
2014; Steinhardt, 2012). Such positive outcomes associated with naturalisation are also 
known as the citizenship premium (OECD, 2011). 
Although there is a large field of literature that has analysed the effects of 
citizenship in the labour market (Helgertz et al., 2014, p. 343), these studies focus 
almost exclusively on the question whether a citizenship premium exists or not. Such 
research is of limited use for policy makers, because there is substantial heterogeneity 
in citizenship regimes and pathways to citizenship. For example, migrants may acquire 
citizenship early or late in the settlement process, through facilitated procedures, or at 
different stages of their life course. Citizenship policies differ between countries and 
over time, and may not be equally relevant to all migrant groups. This dissertation 
therefore sheds light on the question to whom and under which conditions 
naturalisation facilitates socio-economic integration. By putting emphasis on the 
question why (rather than whether or not) naturalisation matters, the focus shifts to a 
more context-specific understanding of the citizenship premium. This may aid the 
                                                                
24 See also Bodvarsson & van der Berg (2009) for a theoretical discussion. Note that aggregate economic 
outcomes of immigration depend on labour market characteristics of destination countries, as well as the skill 
structure of the native workforce vis-à-vis the migrant inflow (Dustmann, Glitz, & Frattini, 2008). 
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formulation of targeted policy, tailored to get the most out of migrants’ legal status 
transition from non-citizen to citizen. 
This dissertation focusses on the case of the Netherlands, where citizenship has 
historically played an important role in the integration debate. In the eighties, 
citizenship was predominantly seen as an instrument for integration. Requirements for 
naturalisation were thus relatively liberal to encourage migrants to naturalise (Heijs, 
1995, p.180). This changed in the nineties, when particularly the Christian Democratic 
CDA and Conservative Liberal VVD called for more restrictive requirements for 
naturalisation. Rather than a stepping stone, naturalisation was seen as the end-state of 
the integration process; the ‘crowning of the integration’, as the Christian Democratic 
parliamentarian Verhagen argued (Tweede Kamer, 2000, p. 51). In line with the notion 
of citizenship as the reward for successful integration, citizenship policies became more 
demanding, for instance with the (re-)instalment of the renunciation requirement 
(prohibiting dual citizenship), and the introduction of a naturalisation test. However, 
these policies were implemented with very little knowledge of the effect of institutional 
conditions on (1) immigrants’ propensity and ability to naturalise and (2) integration 
outcomes associated with naturalisation. This dissertation specifically addresses those 
questions. 
The relevance of citizenship in the labour market: work and income 
One of the main conclusions from this dissertation is that citizenship has the potential 
to stimulate the integration of immigrants in the labour market. Citizenship acquisition 
subsequently increases the probability of employment by about 13 percent (Odds ratio 
1.12 for men and 1.13 for women). Furthermore, male and female immigrants from 
economically less developed countries of origin enjoy 3 and 5 percent higher earnings 
respectively if citizenship is acquired. On top of that, the labour market performance 
already starts to improve substantially prior to naturalisation. For instance, the 
employment probability of immigrants who naturalise is already more than twice as 
high at the moment of naturalisation compared to more than three years prior to 
naturalisation. While these findings clearly show that citizenship matters, any effective 
policy making on this issue will also require insight into the underlying mechanisms. 
Indeed, while many migrants enjoy a citizenship premium in the labour market, others 
do not, and part of the positive effect already manifests prior to citizenship acquisition. 
In other words, the relevance of citizenship seems to originate not only from the legal 
status transition itself. Simply handing out citizenship will thus not have the desired 
effect in terms of immigrant integration. So how can policy-makers maximise the 
positive labour market outcomes of naturalisation? 
Findings in this dissertation provide two answers. First, the observed positive effects 
prior to naturalisation stem from the intention to naturalise in the future. Migrants start 
to invest in their human capital development (for instance language capabilities) to 
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meet the formal civic and linguistic requirements for naturalisation, and to utilize the 
rewards and opportunities that citizenship will offer, such as unrestricted access to the 
labour market. These investments already start to bear fruit in the labour market before 
migrants become citizens of the host country. The citizenship premium is thus in part an 
anticipation effect. Consequently, possession of the host country citizenship matters 
most if it is acquired relatively early in the settlement process, when accelerated 
investment in host-country specific skills and knowledge can really make a difference. 
For instance, while the probability of employment for migrants who naturalise after 5 
years of residence (the current residence requirement in the Netherlands) is 34 and 38 
percent higher for male and female immigrants respectively (Odds ratio 1.34 and 1.38) 
compared to their non-naturalising counterparts, this is limited to only 10 percent for 
those who naturalise after 8-10 years of residence. In other words, the timing of 
naturalisation matters. The host country citizenship offers an incentive for migrants to 
invest in their integration process, rather than providing a systematic advantage that 
remains constant over time.  
This has important implications for the residence requirement for naturalisation. If 
the required period of legal residence is too long, the moment of naturalisation is 
delayed to such an extent that it erodes the added benefit of accelerated investment in 
host-country specific human capital. My analyses suggest that acquiring the host country 
citizenship after four to five years of residence maximises associated positive labour 
market outcomes. While five years is the most common residence requirement in the 
EU2825, many countries have more restrictive requirements up to 10 years of legal 
residence. Furthermore, citizenship policies differ not only between countries, but also 
change within countries over time in parallel with the political landscape. Conservative 
governments traditionally argue for restrictive conditions for naturalisation, including a 
long residence requirement. A good example is the Dutch government, which in January 
2014 introduced a bill to increase the residence requirement for naturalisation from five 
to seven years. However, empirical findings in this dissertation show that a longer 
residence requirement would hamper the extent to which citizenship facilitates the 
integration of immigrants. While the proposal was accepted in the Second Chamber in 
June 2016 by the coalition of the Social Democrats (PvdA) and Conservative Liberals 
(VVD), senators of the PvdA took a more critical stance towards the proposal in the First 
Chamber. In the plenary debates, senators from the PvdA, as well as the Greens 
(Groenlinks), Liberal Democrats (D66) and Socialist Party (SP) referred to publications 
based on analyses in this dissertation26 to criticize the proposal (Eerste Kamer, 2016, p. 3, 
5; Eerste Kamer, 2017b, p. 3; Eerste Kamer, 2017c). In October 2017, the proposal was 
rejected in the Senate. While it is difficult to ascertain the impact of this dissertation on 
                                                                
25 Residence requirements in the EU range between 5 and 10 years of uninterrupted legal residence. See the 
Citizenship Law Indicators of the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT) for a more detailed comparative 
overview (http://globalcit.eu/). 
26 See Peters, Schmeets and Vink [2017] and Vink, Peters and Schmeets [2016]. 
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the final vote, the Dutch policy journal Economisch Statistische Berichten (ESB) 
highlighted its contribution in their annual overview.27 In sum, this dissertation 
emphasises that integration outcomes associated with naturalisation are conditioned by 
the way in which the status is acquired. Since the naturalisation process is in part 
determined by citizenship policies, policy-makers can have a direct impact on the 
pathways to citizenship that are open to immigrants. 
Second, the relevance of citizenship depends on the individual background and life 
situation of immigrants. While some migrants may naturalise because of the legal rights 
and privileges it offers, the same status may for others predominantly constitute a 
reflection of social identification with the host society. Indeed, becoming a Dutch citizen 
has different implications for a migrant from Germany or the U.S. compared to an 
Eritrean or Afghan migrant. These differences condition the extent to which 
naturalisation matters for the integration of immigrants. My findings show that 
particularly migrants from economically less developed countries of origin benefit from 
citizenship acquisition in the labour market. However, these migrants are also highly 
dependent on citizenship policies that condition access to status. Migrants naturalise 
less quickly and less often under more restrictive institutional conditions. Yet the 
relevance of citizenship policies is not equal for all migrant groups. Particularly migrants 
for whom the utility of citizenship is greatest are deterred by more restrictive 
requirements. In contrast, institutional variation does not substantially affect 
naturalisation rates of migrants who do not need citizenship as much, and who are 
generally less interested in naturalisation.  
The potential for citizenship to function as a vehicle for immigrant integration thus 
presents policy-makers with the challenge of an institutional balancing act. If there are 
no requirements for naturalisation, citizenship is unlikely to play a role in the integration 
process, as any rights and entitlements linked to the status would be meaningless. Yet if 
institutional conditions are too restrictive, then the very migrants who need it most may 
find it difficult to meet these criteria. Moreover, certain requirements for naturalisation 
are more likely to facilitate integration than others. For instance, some mastery of the 
native language is a precondition for participation in for instance the labour market or 
the political decision-making process. As such, basic linguistic requirements may play a 
positive role. Yet high financial costs to apply for naturalisation only serve to make 
citizenship more selective, and a long residence requirement will erode the added 
benefit of accelerated investment in host-country specific human capital. In other 
words, requirements for naturalisation that do not serve an integration objective can 
easily turn into mechanisms of exclusion. In that case, the potential for citizenship to 
stimulate and incentivise immigrant integration is wasted. The requirements for 
                                                                
27 More specifically, the following was stated by the chief editor of the journal: “Contributions to ESB had a 
societal impact. They really mattered. For instance, the analyses of Hans Schmeets, Floris Peters and Maarten 
Vink on the relationship between citizenship acquisition and employment contributed to the fact that the 
proposal to increase the residence requirement for naturalisation was rejected in the Senate, (…)”. 
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naturalisation should be determined in such a manner that migrants have reasonable 
opportunities to acquire the status, and that the eligibility criteria serve a clear 
integration purpose. 
The relevance of citizenship in the housing market: homeownership 
Although there is an extensive body of literature on the relevance of citizenship for the 
integration of immigrants, these studies focus almost exclusively on labour market 
outcomes of naturalisation. Yet the settlement process comprises a much broader 
range of socio-economic factors, including quality of housing, living conditions and 
neighbourhood characteristics. However, in existing research on those indicators 
(Feijten et al., 2008; McConnel, 2015; Rossi & Weber, 1996; Uunk, 2017; Zorlu et al., 
2014) the role of citizenship for these integration outcomes is often not specifically 
addressed. In this dissertation, I break with the state-of-the-art’s exclusive focus on the 
labour market, and analyse whether citizenship matters for homeownership of 
immigrants. Buying property can be thought of as a long-term commitment to the host 
society, and a reflection of the intent to stay and build a life in the destination country. 
Homeownership can also provide important financial benefits compared to private or 
social rented housing, including favourable tax treatment, the gradual accumulation of 
property wealth and lower long-term payment for housing. Furthermore, 
homeownership may stimulate social well-being through an increase in social status, 
greater psychological health (Rohe & Stegman, 1994) and better neighbourhood 
conditions (Rossi & Weber, 1996). For migrants who have successfully integrated into 
the labour market, homeownership may thus be the next step towards a self-sustained, 
stable life for themselves and their children in the host country.  
Migrants are however less often homeowners compared to the native population. 
Figures from Statistics Netherlands show that on January 1, 2015, 60.9 percent of all 
households with a native-born principal wage-earner were homeowners, compared to 
44.9 and 25.1 percent among migrant households of western and non-western origin 
(CBS, 2017a). Although this so-called ‘ethnic gap’ in the housing market is in part 
explained by compositional differences between migrants and natives in terms of 
income and wealth, this only explains part of the puzzle. An alternative explanation 
would be the legal status of immigrants. While unequal treatment in the field of housing 
on the basis of (among other things) nationality is prohibited in many countries – 
including the Netherlands – there are indications that lenders still consider the 
citizenship status of migrants when evaluating their creditworthiness (College voor de 
Rechten van de Mens, 2016; van Dorst et al., 2017, p. 22-23). Naturalisation may 
placate feelings of risk associated with approving a loan for individuals with a migrant 
background. In that context, I analyse whether citizenship acquisition matters for the 
probability of homeownership of immigrants. 
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Empirical findings show that citizenship acquisition increases the probability of 
homeownership of employed immigrants by 25 percent, holding all other characteristics 
constant. This suggests a mechanism of legal status discrimination in the housing 
market, as migrants who are in principle eligible for a mortgage are less likely to secure 
a loan if they do not have the Dutch citizenship. Moreover, naturalisation matters less 
for migrants with a native-born Dutch partner. This provides further credence to the 
notion of legal status discrimination, as migrants with a native partner are less likely to 
be discriminated against on ethnic grounds, and thus do not need the host country 
citizenship as much to mitigate their disadvantaged position. Migrants are less likely to 
own property after the onset of the financial crisis, or when originating from countries 
that are culturally more dissimilar from the host society. However, citizenship 
acquisition is unable to remove those obstacles in the housing market. 
Policy-makers can respond to these findings in two ways. First, since unequal 
treatment in the field of housing on the basis of nationality is prohibited in the 
Netherlands, the government has a legal obligation to address discriminatory behaviour 
by lenders. Until then, policy-makers should recognise the current reality that 
citizenship matters in the housing market. Facilitating access to citizenship acquisition is 
thus an effective way to improve opportunities of immigrants to secure a mortgage. The 
former Dutch government argued as much in a recent explanatory memorandum on 
the residence requirement for naturalisation, stating that “(…) the opportunities of 
naturalised migrants in the labour market will generally be better compared to a non-
naturalised migrant, even with a permanent residence status. The same is likely true 
when migrants attempt to secure a loan to finance a house or set up a business” (Eerste 
Kamer, 2017a, p. 3). While citizenship may thus remove some of the structural 
obstacles migrants face in the housing market, it should be emphasized that from a 
legal perspective, this is not an acceptable situation. If lenders would act in accordance 
to existing anti-discrimination law, migrants would not need the host country 
citizenship to improve their chances to secure a mortgage. In the long-term, this issue 
should be prioritized. 
In conclusion, findings in this dissertation support the notion of citizenship as a 
stepping stone for the integration of immigrants. Conceptualising citizenship as the 
reward for successful integration does not do justice to the fact that integration is a 
process, not a definitive state of being. If requirements for naturalisation are reasonably 
attainable, the prospect of full membership of the host society can stimulate migrants 
to invest in their integration. However, positive outcomes of naturalisation depend on 
the right timing and functional institutional conditions. The insights from this 
dissertation regarding the question to whom and under which conditions citizenship 
matters are thus crucial for policy-makers to get the most out of legal status transitions 
of immigrants. 
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